The
unique response to the tsunami triggers questions. A very large
proportion of resources are in the hands of NGOs and the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and its members.
Did private donors really intend money to be used beyond immediate
emergency relief? Has not more money than is needed been collected
and pledged? When the response to other crises suffers from
lack of resources, do organisations compromise the principle
of proportionality when reserving funds for tsunami recovery?
First, what did donors intend? For all who witnessed the destruction
caused by the tsunami, it was obvious that it would not be sufficient
to provide only health services, water, food and emergency shelter.
Survivors’ lives were shattered, loved ones were lost,
homes and the means of making a living were gone. To simply
help keep them alive by limiting assistance to emergency relief
would clearly not be enough. Leaving them in their tents was
not an option. Based on their experience from other big natural
disasters, many Red Cross and Red Crescent societies fundraised
with the explicit intention of funding long term recovery and
reconstruction; this would become an engagement over several
years. And many of the individuals trying to help did so through
donations of fishing boats and equipment. However ill-advised
some in-kind donations were, they nevertheless sent a clear
message that they wanted to help tsunami survivors get back
on their feet.
Second, is there more money than is needed for the tsunami recovery?
In its most recent stocktaking report from Aceh and Nias, the
World Bank finds that almost enough funds have been committed
from governments, UN agencies, IFIs, the Red Cross Red Crescent
Movement and NGOs to replace what was destroyed but not to “build
back better”. Many organisations have pledged to rebuild
with a disaster reduction objective, i.e. to leave poor communities
in disaster-prone regions in a safer state. According to the
World Bank, this would require more funds than have been pledged
at least in the case of Aceh. In Puntland in Somalia, the poorest
region affected by the tsunami, there has been very little assistance
beyond early emergency relief. It is difficult to claim that
there is a surplus of resources.
Would it then be appropriate to transfer funds from tsunami
recovery to other insufficiently funded crises? That is the
wrong question. The problem is not that recovery needs may be
close to being met, but that a number of other humanitarian
crises do not receive sufficient funding. The solution cannot
be to siphon funds from the few well-funded operations to the
many that do not receive sufficient resources. The international
response to people in desperate need must not be a zero-sum
game, be it to post-natural disaster situations with opportunities
to restore lives and livelihoods while reducing disaster risk,
or to meet persistent humanitarian needs during unresolved armed
conflicts to ensure protection and acceptable living conditions
for those displaced.
In particular, governments must allocate humanitarian assistance
according to needs, and not let funding of new crises impact
negatively on support to already ongoing operations. Both these
principles form part of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.
This means that governments must base humanitarian funding not
only on budget decisions at the beginning of the fiscal year,
when nothing is known about what rapid onset disasters will
happen, but instead be prepared to mobilise contingency funds
held in reserve for exceptional humanitarian needs. Unfortunately,
2005 seems to be such a year. The tsunami operation, with hundreds
of thousands displaced while recovery is just starting, the
earthquake in Pakistan with two million homeless, flooding and
mudslides in Central America, on top of the long list of chronic
crises linked to armed conflict, this must lead governments
to contribute more than during a less dramatic year.
But there is also another dimension to recovery and reconstruction.
In many current crises with urgent humanitarian needs, the opportunity
does not exist to engage in recovery. Continued armed conflicts
in Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo or Darfur
prevent such efforts, however much we would like to become involved
in recovery. When such opportunities arise in the post-conflict
phase, it is often difficult to raise the necessary funds from
governments or directly from the public.
Natural disasters however do provide such an opportunity that
must not be missed. There are too many examples during past
decades of front-loaded funding after natural disasters, with
little remaining to complete recovery and reconstruction. There
are too many examples of earthquake victims who never got beyond
their supposedly temporary shelters. Survivors of the tsunami
should not be added to that list.
Does this mean that there are no dilemmas linked to the large
funding volumes for the tsunami? No, the dilemma arises if humanitarian
organisations become dependent on a public which points them
in the direction of only some crises through their earmarked
donations. Organisations need to secure a broad funding base
giving them the flexibility to respond with impartiality to
people in distress. But the dilemma will not be resolved by
leaving the survivors of the tsunami behind.
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Aerial
shot of relief distribution outside Meulaboh, Indonesia.
(p-IDN0720)
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