Chapter 7
Box 7.1 Advance funding and contingency planning save lives

Humanitarian organizations trying to develop operational capacity in disaster preparedness are frustrated by the voluntary and unpredictable financing of their operations, and by simultaneous demands to respond to today’s crises while preparing for tomorrow’s.

As well as emergency response teams, some agencies call on dedicated emergency funds when donors delay or fail to deliver. In addition to its US$ 25 million emergency fund, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) can draw on the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) managed by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The International Federation has established a Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) which was used 48 times in 1999, releasing a total of CHF 5.1 million. Oxfam and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) have created rapid response funds amounting to GB£ 4 million and US$ 1 million a year respectively.

But more access to flexible, advance funding is needed. And post-emergency evaluations indicate that the quality of preparedness structures can help – or hinder – agency performance in emergencies.

IRC: Tanzania (1993). In December 1993, some 250,000 Burundians fled into Tanzania. With a US$ 100,000 allocation from the CERF and drawing on its standby emergency grant from the LeBrun Foundation, IRC was able to deploy a response team rapidly to Tanzania, which also responded to Rwandan refugees flooding into the country in April 1994.

Oxfam: Goma, Zaire (1994). Unable to secure advance donor funding, Oxfam used its standby Catastrophe Fund to pre-position water and sanitation materials sufficient for a population of 50,000 refugees, prior to the Rwandan refugee influx into Goma. Had other agencies or donors acted similarly, access to safe drinking water and the control of cholera among refugees could have been greatly improved.

Oxfam: Afghanistan earthquake (1998). Using its Catastrophe Fund, Oxfam financed a needs assessment and GB£ 500,000 of emergency supplies within 36 hours of the disaster. Formal funding approval from Oxfam’s donors took around three weeks.

IRC: Northern Kenya, Walda refugee camp (1992). Poor health conditions in the Walda camp were resulting in high death rates among the population of Somali, Ethiopian and Sudanese refugees. Unable to finance improvements in health, sanitation and nutritional services on its own, IRC applied for donor funding. After delays in the negotiation, approval and allocation process, IRC eventually secured funds. Within four weeks, the number of deaths in the camp declined from 70 to 14 a day.

UNHCR: Uganda/Rwanda (1994). Prior to the Rwandan refugee crisis, UNHCR’s North Kivu Contingency Plan had called for the upgrading of the road between Uganda and Kivu. Had UNHCR acted on its plan and had the resources to do so, it would have enabled a much greater proportion of relief supplies to be transported overland from Uganda, rather than through costly air transport. Lack of advance funding not only delayed humanitarian action but ratcheted up costs of intervention.

UNHCR: Kosovo refugee crisis (1999). The evaluation of UNHCR’s preparedness and response in Kosovo identified critical weaknesses in early warning, contingency planning and management systems. UNHCR had only 20 emergency response staff available and was prepared for a maximum outflow of 100,000 people when half a million refugees fled Kosovo in the space of two weeks. Official communications warning of possible ‘massive outflows’ went unheeded. Contingency plans were stunted by the organization’s low estimates of potential refugees, and throughout the crisis UNHCR had great difficulty finding and placing experienced personnel. Complicating factors did contribute to UNHCR’s poor preparedness stance, including extraordinarily high levels of politicization and bilateralism in relief efforts. And the size and rapidity of the crisis were of a scale seen only twice before: in northern Iraq/Turkey in 1991 and in the African Great Lakes region in 1994. UNHCR was not alone – few if any agencies were prepared for the scale and scope of the Kosovo crisis. However, given that Kosovo is unlikely to be the last humanitarian emergency of this magnitude, donors and agencies need to invest far more in improving response funds and structures – before the next disaster strikes.