Roger Bracke/ International Federation, Tajikistan 2000

Chapter 6 - summary
Food crisis in Tajikistan – an unnatural disaster?

In 2000, Tajikistan experienced its worst drought in 74 years. Cereal production fell 47 per cent, and a million people faced hunger. For eight years international food aid has been provided. But relief is not enough. Root causes must be addressed. What are the limits of humanitarian action when 'natural disaster' masks the structural causes of suffering? Analysing barriers to food security can ensure coherent disaster responses that support rather than undermine long-term recovery.

Barriers to recovery of food security
Post-Soviet and post-conflict legacy: Until independence from the USSR in 1991, Tajikistan specialized in aluminium, cotton and hydroelectricity. In return, Moscow provided food. Following withdrawal of Soviet support, Tajikistan faced transition to a free market economy. Civil war from 1992-97 claimed over 50,000 lives, caused US$ 6 billion of damage and provoked a massive brain drain of professionals, leading to economic collapse. Two-thirds of the population subsists on under a dollar a day. Recently, chronic malnutrition rates greater than 40 per cent have been reported.

Clarity of available information on food provision: Relief is being planned in an information vacuum. Tajikistan's annual cereal need is estimated at 1 million tonnes. Domestic production covered just 25 per cent of needs in 2000. The president issued famine warnings, but the ministry of agriculture said that producers underreport harvests to avoid taxation. Data on food imports are not publicized. But 40 per cent of needs in 1999 are estimated to have been covered by imports – draining hard currency, undermining local incentives for recovery and drawing accusations of elite profiteering. Kitchen gardens provide around 5-10 per cent of food needs, while food aid aims to cover the shortfall.

Water management: According to the World Bank, "Irrigation and drainage systems have seriously deteriorated since the breakup of the Soviet Union. As a result, irrigation volumes have been reduced by as much as 50 per cent." This means 20-30 per cent of the food production area may be out of use. Yet melting snow supplies the irrigation network with enough water to supply all five central Asian republics, so clearly water management is a problem. While cereals slumped in 2000, cotton production climbed by 6 per cent. High temperatures helped, but prioritization of irrigation water for cotton over cereals played a major role.

Land use: Cotton dominates the agricultural economy, since there is no export market in grain. So far, cotton earnings have not benefited Tajikistan's poorest. Prioritization of irrigation for cotton may be in the interests of new profit-making owners of cotton mills and farms. Meanwhile, peasants work on cotton farms for nominal wages and cannot grow or buy food. The World Bank concludes, "The cotton subsector, as currently managed, prevents the development of the agricultural economy."

Access to land: Tajikistan's mountains make food production difficult. Only 7 per cent of land is arable, yet 70 per cent of the population lives in rural areas. Their livelihoods depend on agricultural recovery, since kitchen gardens alone cannot provide adequate food. Land reforms include leasing of state farms, and allocation of 75,000 hectares by Presidential Decree to peasant families in 0.5 hectare units – intended for food production only. However, notes February 1999's decree, "some community leaders are allocating unsuitable land, with defective irrigation and drainage systems, to citizens, in violation of the President's decree".

Drug trafficking: In August 2000, the United Nations reported that, "a significant proportion of Afghan opium is being smuggled through the border [with Tajikistan]." According to the UN's Integrated Regional Information Network, an estimated 30-50 per cent of Tajikistan's economic activity is drug-related.

Lessons for coherent aid response
An ongoing, structural food deficit exists in Tajikistan and there is no clear strategy to reduce it. How should humanitarian agencies respond? Only detailed analysis will enable agencies to decide what they can and cannot do to address root causes.

Lack of clear information on food availability leads to confusion over relief needs and hampers recovery efforts. An effective reporting system is needed, based on incentives that reward accuracy. Responsibility for this lies with Tajikistan's ministry of agriculture.

Water management could be improved by: (i) irrigation rehabilitation, where economically viable; (ii) rain-fed, livestock and non-agricultural technologies, where irrigation is not economically viable; (iii) user charges for irrigation water; and (iv) reform of irrigation management. A poverty-alleviation strategy initiated by the government targets restoration of irrigation and drainage systems.

Land use: Cotton can be successfully grown on a small scale and could significantly increase smallholders' incomes. However, vested interests ensure the Soviet-style system restricts the number of contracts for producers. The ministry of agriculture, however, could facilitate small-scale cotton production.

Access to land needs to be extended for family-based farming. Reforms could include: (i) extension of presidential land reform; (ii) transparent legal protection of land access and use; (iii) comprehensive information on individual land rights and choices of farm management; (iv) participatory consultation in decision making.

Drug trafficking undermines reform and prevents investment in food production. In June 1999, the government established a state anti-narcotics agency with UN support. The reality is, however, that many people have few alternative sources of income.

How can humanitarian agencies engage?
Major institutional reforms are under way, implemented by the government and international financial institutions. Where do humanitarian agencies fit in? Alleviating immediate needs without considering underlying causes means aid will never tackle long-term suffering. But interventions to address structural issues may undermine organizations' neutrality.

The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response makes it clear that relief has a duty "to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster". In Tajikistan, the International Federation aimed to do this by:

• improving food availability in drought areas;
• ensuring target groups have seeds to plant next year;
• improving water systems through food-for-work activities;
• strengthening community health education;
• increasing quality of drinking water through chlorination of shallow wells;
• giving access to drinking water though new pumps;
• strengthening local disaster response and preparedness capacities.

In addition, aid programmers need to analyse the local context to ensure aid reinforces, rather than undermines, long term recovery (see Box); and map recovery initiatives of the government and agencies to ensure aid complements efforts already under way to tackle root causes. Mapping can help to:

• enable agencies to position interventions and define limits;
• clarify responsibilities of different actors;
• identify potential impact of interventions;
• facilitate coordination between organizations; and
• identify gaps in the recovery strategy.

To conclude, context analysis reveals structural causes of food insecurity in Tajikistan which cannot be resolved by relief alone. Political and economic actors must accept responsibility for long-term recovery. Nevertheless, relief agencies must position their aid within a broader recovery strategy in order to clarify its limitations and relate it to other agencies' interventions. Recovery mapping is one tool suggested to further this process.

Stephen Jackson, director of the International Famine Centre, Cork, Ireland, and Sean Deely, senior officer in post-disaster recovery, International Federation, were principal contributors to this chapter.