International Federation, Tajikistan

Chapter 2 - summary
Building capacity - the ethical dimensions

In the hours and days after disaster strikes, local communities often spontaneously undertake search and rescue, assess damage, handle the dead and distribute relief supplies before external agencies even arrive. In slow-onset disasters like famines – which don't generate such urgent media or donor attention – local organizations are often the first to raise the alarm and remain highly motivated to reduce future risks after international agencies have gone home. Local people are far more knowledgeable about their needs and capabilities than external organizations. If external agencies take any role at all, it should be to improve the capacity of local people to take control over the decisions that affect their lives.

Definitions of capacity building range from ‘helping people to help themselves’ to fostering democratization and accountable government. Methods include technical training, leadership workshops, literacy campaigns and rotating loans. Good capacity building is easy to spot. For example, following an earthquake in Peru in 1990, the international non-governmental organization, Intermediate Technology Development Group, worked with locals to design appropriate earthquake-resistant buildings. Their homes remained largely unscathed by a second earthquake the following year.

However, there is more to capacity building than simply transferring knowledge. The resources which external organizations bring often vanish with them when the project is over. Disaster preparedness training is no good unless locals also have access to sandbags, jerrycans, water purification tablets or plastic sheeting. Training builders in flood-proofing techniques is pointless if slum dwellers lack secure land tenure and have no incentive to invest in improving their homes. Yet organizations often strengthen local abilities without enhancing their capacities to realize those new skills. To build genuine capacity requires generating a fertile environment within which the seeds of training have a chance to grow.

Capacity building is not just about undertaking specific activities – the wider impacts of aid interventions must also be considered. When hundreds of international agencies rush into a crisis, rents and wages are driven up, seriously undermining the capacity of local organizations. In Afghanistan, a local childcare charity was forced from its Kabul premises by rents which rose 40-fold after the Taliban fell. The presence of international agencies may discourage locals from investing their own resources into recovery. When a 1991 earthquake hit the Himalayan foothills of Uttarkashi, villagers refused to rebuild their own homes even two years later, knowing that outside agencies would do it for them.

International agencies often base interventions more on what they can supply than on what local needs demand. Even during emergencies, most victims have a system of organizing aid supplies which should be respected. Yet agencies often rush in to a region with a pre-determined delivery system, which may undermine local traditions. Experiences from Orissa to Kobe show that local people and structures are the first line of disaster response.

Unequal partnerships with local agencies are all too common. Recent evaluations of disaster responses in India found that the agencies that performed best either had local staff and infrastructure in place beforehand or quickly established strong, active partnerships with local NGOs. But the absence of such connections does not stop foreign agencies from rushing in after a disaster, often relying on expatriates and allowing distrust to develop with local agencies. Capacity building is frequently used simply to enable foreign agencies to deliver externally designed aid projects more efficiently.

International agencies can undermine national as well as local capacities. Bypassing government institutions may be more cost-effective. It may also be morally justifiable if governments manipulate aid distribution. But bypassing legitimate authorities can also be seen as a form of political interference.

Many aid organizations have a pre-determined agenda which they bring to an intervention. This may not be based in self-interest, but on a clear mission statement, for example to promote children's or women's rights. But such agendas may not be the top priority for disaster-affected communities. In Afghanistan, Oxfam was criticized for suspending vital work on Kabul's water supply during 1996-97 on the basis that women were denied the chance to participate. This was despite a joint statement made by Afghan women beforehand saying: "Denial of female opportunities should not be used as a justification to stop aid."

Many will argue that outside agencies have a moral responsibility to use disasters to address the root causes of vulnerability. But tackling poverty, marginalization, inappropriate development, poor governance or environmental degradation involves challenging indigenous power structures. Where do the moral responsibilities of humanitarian agencies lie? Post-disaster interventions can have a very positive impact. After the 1993 Latur earthquake in India, local women’s organizations in 300 villages were trained to build safer houses and offer technical advice to householders and government officials. As a result, the women also became more active in other development initiatives. But lasting social change takes years to bring about. Agencies should be honest about what they can achieve within the context and resources available. In many cases projects will only be able to tackle some immediate causes of vulnerability. If community empowerment projects fail to provide ongoing resources to help people implement what they have learned, then traditional elites will seek to reimpose their authority. The lesson to be learned is that it’s not ethical to start something that can't be finished.

Capacity-building projects are often difficult to measure using conventional monitoring indicators. In disaster relief, the pressure to deliver goods rather than build long-term resilience is intense. But how should short- and long-term benefits be weighed up? Agencies need to adopt more sophisticated kinds of impact assessment than the simplistic measures of material outputs currently used.

Not all capacity building results in success. When external agencies push for structural change, it is the communities on the front line that risk suffering the consequences of any official displeasure. Organizations must analyse the possible negative as well as positive outcomes of their capacity-building work, and identify which other conditions have to be in place for real change to occur.

Capacity building raises complex issues with no easy answers. But two simple questions are fundamental: first, what do vulnerable people and disaster victims really want and need? Second, do our actions contribute to meeting those needs in any real way?

From these, more specific questions arise. Are we really building capacity or just transferring knowledge? How can we ensure that every action taken, every decision made, has as positive an impact as possible on local capacity? Sometimes asking the simple questions is what is needed most.

Jennifer Rowell, CARE International (UK) and John Twigg, University College London were principal contributors to this chapter. Freelance writer Mercedes Sayagues wrote the box.