Thorkell Thorkelsson/International Federation, Afganistan

Chapter 4 - summary
Afghanistan - power politics or ethical principles?

11 September 2001 propelled Afghanistan from being a largely forgotten country to the forefront of world attention. The US-led attack that toppled the Taliban regime paved the way for political transition and the chance of peace after more than 20 years of war. But many problems remain. Security is arguably worse now than under the Taliban. Joint civil-military aid operations risk compromising humanitarian neutrality and impartiality. The fledgling government has complained that too much aid has gone on short-term relief rather than long-term reconstruction. The moral issues of narcotics and abuses of human rights – which formed such a central part of international condemnation of the Taliban – have yet to be adequately addressed.

The US's war strategy of arming Afghan opposition forces to oust the Taliban has resulted in Panjshiris from the Northern Alliance dominating the political scene, at the expense of Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns. Meanwhile, the loya jirga (grand assembly), held to select the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), was marred by intimidation from armed factions. So the necessary shift in power towards a more broad-based authority did not take place. As a result, the ATA has yet to achieve domestic credibility.

Should aid organizations, committed to impartiality and independence, avoid working with the ATA? International aid is vital to help the ATA provide benefits for its citizens. If the ATA falls apart then armed conflict – the greatest fear of most Afghans – is likely to follow. But engagement with the ATA must be according to sound principles. During the Taliban years, aid agencies agreed that aid should be allocated on the basis of need alone and should not provide any political or military advantage to warring parties. Yet post-11 September, the question of principles seems to have disappeared from the aid agenda. Women's rights remain widely abused. Opium production in 2002 (3,400 tonnes) was almost 20 times that in 2001 and looks set to be even higher in 2003.

Around two-thirds of the money pledged at the donor conference in Tokyo (January 2002) was for humanitarian assistance, much of it as food aid. Although 24 years of war have created chronic emergency needs, humanitarian action, with its short-term nature, free handouts and dependence on foreign staff, is not the answer. The ATA argues that food aid distorts the agricultural economy, depressing crop prices and acting as a disincentive to farmers to plant wheat

If Afghanistan is to solve its problems, it will mean a difficult choice between quick, top-down delivery of material aid and slower, more developmental capacity building. Yet the sheer presence of hundreds of international organizations (350 international NGOs, 670 international UN staff, dozens of embassies) risks undermining Afghan capacities just when they need strengthening. Rents and salaries have spiralled upwards, sucking what little skill and experience remains in the country away from the government. The US embassy, for example, offered over US$500 a month for an Afghan driver, while a government doctor gets about US$45.

Nowhere are the ethical issues more acute than over human rights. More than two decades of conflict have led to abuses by all parties, including some of those now in power. The key question is: can there be peace without justice?

The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 recommended an independent human rights commission, but this remains woefully under-resourced. It also committed the UN to addressing human rights. But the UN's special representative argues that it is currently impossible to have both justice and peace, and that human rights has to be seen within the overriding objective of securing a peaceful transition. Critics say this sacrifices action on human rights to short-term stability.

Abuses did not stop following the defeat of the Taliban – Pashtuns living in the north have been attacked simply for being from the same ethnic group. The Afghan forces accused of the violations were military partners of Coalition forces, which clearly failed to protect civilians adequately. Human rights abuses have taken place across the country, even during the loya jirga process, raising serious questions about free and fair elections in 2004.

Simply making expressions of outrage doesn't help. Afghans may be identified as victims of or witnesses to abuses; but if the international community cannot protect them, they may face greater danger. Given that human rights was central to the West’s dealings with the Taliban, it is not surprising that many Afghans feel let down by the failure to take action now.

For ordinary people, security remains the most important issue. Yet it continues to deteriorate, partly because of the arming of local warlords by coalition troops. By early 2003, disarmament had hardly begun and progress on forming an Afghan army and police force remained painfully slow.

Meanwhile, western powers proved reluctant to extend the International Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul. Instead, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were created at the end of 2002. Comprising both soldiers and civilians, the PRTs are designed to support reconstruction and remove 'causes of instability' across the country. But humanitarian organizations are keen to maintain a clear distinction between military and humanitarian functions in the eyes of Afghans. Blurring these boundaries may result in aid workers losing the protection that goes with being seen as independent and impartial.

The danger is particularly acute in areas which have suffered innocent casualties as a result of America’s 'war on terror' – for example, the airborne attack on a wedding party near Kandahar in June 2002 that killed 54 Afghan civilians. In March 2003, an international aid worker was murdered in this very province, while his Afghan colleagues were spared.

When coalition forces started bombing Afghanistan, world leaders promised they would not walk away but would help rebuild the country. The Afghans are still waiting. While insecurity and warlord power continue, real progress towards either a fully representative government or substantial reconstruction will be hard. These are not problems that can be solved by aid – they require sustained political engagement with the country.

Afghanistan needs long-term assistance yet what it has got is short-term humanitarian aid. The result is a failure to address the country’s chronic crises and an undermining of local capacities. Most of these problems were predictable from experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. From the spiralling rents and inflated salaries to the distorted priorities and the failures to protect, none of it is new. Urgent progress is needed on:

• Security: forming a national army under civilian control, demobilizing private militias, reining-in the war economy and ending the climate of impunity.
• Human rights: peace will only come if some account is made for the past and protection is given for the future.
• Humanitarian principles, to ensure that: priority is given to meeting basic human needs, long-term commitments are made to funding aid programmes, Afghan capacity is built at all levels, aid does not go to warring parties, and the separation between military and civilian activities is strictly maintained.

Chris Johnson was the principal contributor to this chapter and box. She has worked in Afghanistan since 1996, first for Oxfam and then as director of the Strategic Monitoring Unit (now AREU). She currently works as a consultant.