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Yoshi Shimizui/International
Federation, Sierra Leone
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Chapter 7 - summary
Measuring disasters: challenges, opportunities
and ethics
How many people are killed or affected by
disasters globally every year? Where and when do disasters occur?
What causes the casualties? These questions appear simple, yet the
answers are vitally important for informed decision-making. Humanitarian
aid tends to follow in the wake of high-profile conflicts. Less
reported or less strategically significant crises attract less aid.
High-quality data on all disasters – especially war and famine
– are lacking. Without it, thousands of victims die before
humanitarian organizations even register their need. Inaccurate
data can result in flawed decision-making that may cost lives or
squander valuable resources. And without accurate information on
global needs, no one can judge whether humanitarian spending is
really impartial.
Several global databases exist. The emergencies database (EM-DAT)
of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, based
in Belgium, has collected and analysed disaster data since 1988.
Other databases are operated by reinsurance companies Swiss Re and
Munich Re, regional groups (e.g. DesInventar in Latin America) and
academic centres. But they are not inter-connected and comparisons
are difficult. Linking global and local disaster information systems
has proved difficult, as they define, collect and use data in different
ways.
Some domestic databases include any event, however small, that
results in death or damage. EM-DAT classifies an event as a disaster
if at least “ten people are killed and/or 100 or more are
affected and/or an appeal for international assistance is made or
a state of emergency declared”. This definition catches significant
events while avoiding information overload. Reinsurance databases
concentrate on insurable events and economic damage and are biased
towards natural disasters rather than complex emergencies, so their
loss estimates often bear little relation to levels of humanitarian
need. However, most databases, including EM-DAT, miss significant
human suffering due to conflict, famine and disease.
Widely differing assessment methodologies are also in use. There
is no agreement over how to define who is 'affected' or how many
households need assessing to gain a reliable overview. Agencies’
results cannot be compared because methods and definitions are not
standardized. And since methods are often not evaluated, it is hard
to judge the quality of the data generated. Problems occur in the
interpretation of data too, especially in chaotic and highly politicized
contexts, when pre-disaster baseline data is lacking.
EM-DAT uses data from various sources. Following a disaster, needs
assessments conducted by governmental or humanitarian teams provide
primary data on specific problems. This data is often collated by
the UN or Red Cross Red Crescent into consolidated country or regional
reports (secondary data), which is prioritized by EM-DAT as it provides
an independent overview. Sometimes tertiary data (e.g. media reports)
is used if there is no other source.
The key to good data gathering lies in gaining access to those
in need. But wars and disaster zones are often too difficult or
dangerous to visit. And unpredictable population movements make
it even harder to get accurate data. Most victims die away from
relief centres and go unreported – even in refugee camps.
In Bangladesh in the 1990s, deaths in refugee camps were recorded
using both 'passive' surveillance (deaths reported to camp staff)
and 'active' surveillance (counting graves, interviewing relatives).
Just before a major health crisis, passive surveillance data suggested
that mortality was decreasing, while active surveillance showed
it was actually three times higher and increasing. If decisions
had been based only on passive surveillance, the situation would
have been catastrophically underestimated. Active surveillance prompted
urgent action and proved that accurate and timely data can save
lives.
For complex emergencies, estimates of death rates are often based
on random retrospective mortality surveys, or on active surveillance
in selected locations. These localized rates are then multiplied
up to estimate deaths across a wider area. One series of mortality
studies estimated that 3.3 million people had died due to war in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), from 1998-2002. Of these
deaths, 86 per cent were caused by communicable diseases and malnutrition.
Such calculations are often controversial, as they are based on
assumptions that similar mortality conditions to the survey site
apply across wider areas, or that pre-disaster population and mortality
statistics are accurate. Yet such baseline data is often non-existent
during conflicts. Nevertheless, it is unethical to ignore data from
complex emergencies and focus only on data from safer, more accessible
areas. Equally, it is wrong to discount data just because it brings
unwelcome news. There is a moral imperative for humanitarian agencies
to investigate precisely those areas where data is incomplete but
points to a major, hidden catastrophe.
The DRC mortality surveys suggest that deaths from war-related disease
and malnutrition in that country alone far exceed the total of all
deaths from 'natural' disasters during the past decade. According
to the World Health Organization, communicable diseases claimed
13.3 million lives worldwide in 1998. So should malnutrition and
disease be classified as disasters? The HIV/AIDS epidemic is certainly
a disaster. In Kenya, AIDS deaths are equivalent to two 747 jets
crashing every day. But disaster databases rarely include HIV/AIDS
data. For the global humanitarian system to respond to all suffering
according to need alone, reliable mortality data of all types is
essential. Databases should develop a new category – complex
emergency – which would combine mortality data from war,
violence, hunger and disease.
Complex emergencies raise particular problems, such as how to define
who is 'affected' and by what. Malawi, caught in a cycle of floods,
drought, food insecurity and epidemics since 1994, is one example.
If we record only the primary events (flood and drought), we risk
underestimating the total impact. While very few died from the floods,
we don’t know how many suffered or died from secondary impacts
(hunger, malnutrition and epidemics). These 'casualties' are either
not accurately reported or completely missed. It is often easier
to extract data on single events like earthquakes. In complex emergencies,
however, attributing numbers of killed or affected to particular
causes becomes virtually impossible.
Collecting and using disaster data poses serious ethical challenges.
At the height of a disaster – when humanitarian needs are
urgent – should precious time and resources be spent gathering
data or saving lives? Some argue it is unethical to delay life-saving
responses until data has been gathered. Others argue that aid should
be based on objective assessments of need
Some disasters – notably in Africa – are too dangerous
or remote to raise sufficient international interest. Very little
aid means that few relief workers are active in the region. That
means data is patchy or non-existent. Without reliable data, appeals
cannot be launched, awareness cannot be raised and aid does not
arrive. This creates a vicious spiral of suffering which may go
unnoticed.
Gathering data for advocacy leads to dilemmas if those in power
do not like the message. In Uganda in the 1980s and Bangladesh in
the 1990s, data collectors were arrested, jailed and beaten for
uncovering unwanted news – e.g. data on atrocities or high
death rates. In such situations, aid agencies have to judge whether
to use their data to speak out and risk expulsion, or remain silent
and be accused of colluding with the perpetrators.
In conflict zones, aid agencies may be working alongside military
forces, raising issues of impartiality and neutrality. Any suspicion
that information, provided by aid agencies, was being used for military
purposes would jeopardize humanitarians' security and credibility.
Data collection – especially in wars and famines –
needs much more research and investment if it is to improve. Recommendations
include:
- standardize definitions and collection systems, to enable direct comparisons;
- improve proactive data collection in 'forgotten disasters'; and
- create new data categories (e.g. 'complex emergency') to capture the combined effects of war, malnutrition and disease
Another major challenge is to prevent data
being covertly manipulated for political, military or commercial
purposes. This could be addressed by developing an international
code of ethical data collection and use, with detailed standards,
guidelines and tools along the Sphere model.
High-quality information gathering is the nervous system of the
humanitarian enterprise. Without it, any form of principled action
- whether now or in the future - is paralysed.
Patricia Diskett, director of the Centre for Public Health in Humanitarian Assistance, Uppsala University, Sweden, contributed this chapter and box
| Counting the cost of conflict, famine and disease
The famine in southern Sudan during
1998-99 resulted in high levels of malnutrition and mortality
among both adults and children. Estimates of deaths occurring
as a direct result of the famine varied from 60,000 to 300,000.
Famine-afflicted people often gathered around airstrips and
distribution points in crowded, unsanitary conditions with
only limited access to health care. The combination of destitution,
malnutrition and increased risk of infection led to very high
death rates in these sites. However mortality rates in the
countryside were unknown. They may have been higher, due to
the effects of conflict or lack of health care and food. Or
they may have been lower, since the risks of infection are
less among more widely dispersed populations, and those living
on the land may have had access to some food and shelter.
We simply do not know. So attempts to apply death rates from
around airstrips to the whole of the countryside are clearly
problematic.
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