Farooq Burney/International Federation

Chapter 4 - summary
Bam sends warning to reduce future earthquake risks

It took just 12 seconds, at dawn on 26 December 2003, to annihilate a city. Of the 120,000 inhabitants of Bam, between 30,000 and 40,000 were killed. Another 30,000 were injured. Practically all the survivors were left homeless, as 85 percent of the city's buildings collapsed. Economic damage totalled US$ 1.5 billion. How did the survivors of Bam cope and what lessons can be drawn?

Several factors combined to crush the city. The earthquake was Iran's shallowest ever, creating enormous impact. It hit on a Friday morning, when most people were asleep. Traditional mud brick buildings crumbled, suffocating those inside. Bam's municipal offices, hospitals, schools and central bank - all under 30 years old - were badly damaged or destroyed. Rich and poor alike suffered. Some buildings survived - including the Iranian Red Crescent's youth centre and all of Bam's mosques.

Earthquakes cannot be predicted, although some fled for their lives after three small tremors that preceded the disaster. However, the existence of an active fault next to Bam was well-known and shown on the maps. Why was nothing done to protect the city - at least its hospitals? Since the mud brick citadel had been standing for 2,000 years, many thought disaster would never strike. Yet between 143,000 and 178,000 Iranians have died in 19 major earthquakes since 1909.

Building well costs more, but spending money is no guarantee of safety. Many of Bam's luxury buildings lie in ruins. Although Iran adopted a seismic building code in 1989, legislation is often not applied. To house a soaring population, Iran has been gripped by a lucrative building boom. Sources claim that inspectors, sent to certify new buildings as conforming to earthquake norms, are often paid off by developers without conducting a thorough inspection. Iran's building code holds engineers responsible, but prosecutions of individuals are almost non-existent. There are no laws against negligent municipalities which fail to retrofit infrastructure. Iran's highly centralized government has the capability to enforce building codes, fight corruption and spread disaster awareness. So why weren't more measures taken to reduce the risk?

Two hours after the quake, the first Iranian Red Crescent (IRCS) teams arrived. The army followed. Around 10,000 seriously injured people were evacuated. Iranian authorities launched an appeal for international aid and waived visa requirements for foreign aid workers - unprecedented decisions. But while 34 international search and rescue teams flew in and found 22 people alive, local Red Crescent teams saved 157 lives with just 10 sniffer dogs. Neighbours saved hundreds more. In total, 1,800 aid workers arrived from 44 countries. Some things went wrong. Thousands of victims were too hastily buried. Competition between the army and Red Crescent flared. The director for disaster response lacked sufficient authority.

The IRCS divided Bam into 13 sectors, each 'sponsored' by an Iranian province, which would send Red Crescent members, officials, medical staff, engineers and imams to take control and offer practical relief. Local 'notables' or 'white beards' helped organize the community. The sponsorship system attracted considerable aid, but had its disadvantages too: problems with coordination, inequality of aid between sectors, and the rotation of Bam's 13 sectors between Iran's 28 provinces, which hampered 'municipal memory'.

The government estimates that 25,000 people will need long-term psychological support. The IRCS dispatched 85 trained psychosocial volunteers the day after the quake. They play with the children and listen to the women, giving them basic toiletries and simple advice. Social links (between families, friends and neighbours) are particularly strong: by late January, 90 per cent of the 1,850 children orphaned by the disaster had been taken in by extended families. The Red Crescent and NGOs are providing women with sewing-machines, material and bread-baking ovens, to help them recover their self-esteem and livelihoods.

The US$ 1 billion reconstruction task is daunting. Irrigation systems have been seriously damaged, jeopardizing valuable date and citrus fruit plantations. Only the rebuilding of the citadel can resurrect tourism. The surrounding countryside has been seriously affected, as the city was its main market and provided jobs for 250 villages. Within a month, aid organizations started providing locals with 'cash for work' or cash vouchers, rather than relief items - helping stimulate the local economy. In May 2004, the World Bank proposed a US$ 300 million loan for reconstruction, of which US$ 42 million is earmarked for economic recovery.

Will Bam rise again more resilient than before? Involving local people will be crucial. In March, consultations entitled "The Bam we want" began with affected communities, local NGOs and the private sector. Two key areas are being addressed: training in sound building practices and promoting public awareness of disasters. The World Bank will target US$ 140 million of its loan at rebuilding homes and offices "with improved standards and less vulnerability to future earthquakes" - plus US$ 15 million to retrofit essential infrastructure. The IRCS, through its provincial branches, provides young Iranians in almost every school and university with courses in disaster awareness and preparedness. The programme has already reached three million Iranians - their aim now is to train one person per family.

Bam will probably be rebuilt, as promised by President Khatami, "stronger than before". The money is there - in 2003, Iran's GDP was US$ 135 billion. But according to Tehran's earthquake institute, there are 24 large Iranian cities exposed to "immediate" or "important" risk. A major quake in Tehran could kill 700,000 people. Key measures at national level to reduce disaster risk include: reinforcing existing public infrastructure; reforming the construction industry; implementing a disaster insurance scheme; and strengthening Iran's national disaster management system.

Much can be achieved at local level too. The knowledge, expertise and resources exist to make Iran more earthquake-safe. But the sense of urgency needed to overturn 'development as usual' has been missing. Key measures to build community resilience include:

• Invest in the public's awareness of disaster risks and mitigation options;
• Promote community values of safety and responsibility among local construction companies and political leaders;
• Engage traditional neighbourhood networks in disaster preparedness and mitigation;
• Invest in local search and rescue;
• Strengthen local disaster preparedness and response within at-risk neighbourhoods;
• Support local livelihoods; and
• Develop long-term partnerships between domestic and international aid agencies.

Iolanda Jaquement, an independent journalist presently based in Jakarta, Indonesia was principal contributor to this chapter. The Box is contributed by Iolanda Jaquement and Gert Venghaus, the German Red Cross's head of international disaster relief.