An Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake 2010
Meeting Shelter Needs: Issues, Achievements and Constraints

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ACTED  Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
CCCM  Camp Management and Camp Coordination (Cluster)
DTM  Displaced Tracking Matrix
DG ECHO  European Commission - Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection
E-Shelter  Emergency Shelter
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GoH  Government of Haiti
HF  Host Family
HH  Household
IADB  Inter-American Development Bank
IASC  Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IHRC  Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
ICC  Inter-Cluster Coordination
IDP  Internally Displaced Population/Person
IFRC  International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IM  Information Management
IOM  International Organization for Migration
JOTC  Haiti Joint Operations and Tasking Centre
MINUSTAH  United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MTPTC  Ministry of Transport and Public Works (GoH)
NFI  Non Food Items
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
PADF  Pan American Development Foundation
RC/RC  Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
R&D&I  Research, Development and Innovation
SAG  Strategy Advisory Group
SC  Shelter/NFI Cluster in Haiti
SCCT  Shelter Cluster Coordination Team
SSRP  Shelter Sector Response Plan
T-Shelter  Transitional Shelter structure (see glossary)
TWiG  Technical Working and Information Group
UN  United Nations
UN HABITAT  United Nations Agency for Human Settlements
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNOPS  United Nations Office of Project Services
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
OFDA  Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
WASH  Water Sanitation and Hygiene (Cluster)
Glossary

Shelter Cluster: The Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) is coordinated by the IFRC following natural disasters and by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in conflict situations. At country level, the Shelter Cluster is defined by the in-country Humanitarian Country team according to need. It can have a different name and be coordinated by the organisation that is better placed at any given moment.

(Haiti) Shelter/NFI Cluster (SC) / shelter sector: group of all stakeholders in the shelter response in Haiti. It is made up of international and national NGOs, emergency and/or development bilateral or multilateral agencies, UN agencies and the RC/RC Movement. National authorities also take part in the SC. It is not to be mistaken with the SCT Shelter Coordination Team.

Shelter Cluster Lead: Organization that assumes the responsibility of coordinating the Shelter Cluster at country level. Since Jan 12th 2010, three organizations led the Shelter/NFI Cluster in Haiti: IOM (Jan-Feb 2010), IFRC (Feb-Nov 2010) and UN-HABITAT (Nov 2010 – to date).

Shelter actor: any organisation taking part in the Shelter Cluster. This includes shelter agencies, the government, donors, and other stakeholders such as academia, professional organisations, representatives of affected population, or civil society.

Shelter agency: any organisation implementing shelter Programmes including national or international NGOs, members of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, and inter-governmental organisations such as UN agencies or IOM.

Shelter Coordination Team (SCT): Specialized team deployed by IFRC or other Shelter Cluster Lead with support from cluster members to provide coordination services to the Shelter Cluster at country level. These services include representation, overall coordination, meeting management, information management, mapping, and others.

E-Shelter: Used as a noun, it refers to the physical structures built as emergency shelter dwelling.

T-Shelter: Used as a noun, it refers to the physical structures delivered by shelter agencies as one of the transitional shelter solutions.

IDP: for the purposes of this report, an IDP is a person who was displaced due to the earthquake and went to live in a place not in the vicinity of his/her previous home, (that is not being able to see the home or get to it in a short period of time).

Commune: Territory within the limits of each country’s municipal administrative divisions.

Mairie: Municipality. Commune’s representative institution, presided over by the Major
Acknowledgements

The January 12th 2010 Haiti earthquake was one of the most severe and complex disasters the international humanitarian system has had to respond to. In this sense, the authors wish to begin this report by acknowledging the enormous effort, commitment and achievements of all the international and national actors who responded to the shelter needs.

We are particularly grateful to members of communities directly affected by the earthquake who spoke frankly of their experience and concerns, at the meetings organised, and shared their opinions in the survey conducted.

The authors would also like to acknowledge the support received from all evaluation stakeholders. This report does not evaluate individual organizations, but we are thankful for the honest comments, time and support that were received from all the interviewees in and outside Haiti.

Many thanks to the IFRC’s and Spanish Red Cross’ Delegations in Haiti for their logistic support and for making us feel among friends; to IFRC, Concern Worldwide, British Red Cross, IOM and Spanish Red Cross for organizing the meetings in the communities.

Thanks to the IFRC Shelter and Settlements Department at Geneva and to the Evaluation Management Team, for their permanent support and understanding; to Graham Saunders, Margaret Stansberry, Xavier Genot, Miguel Urquia, Miki Tsukamoto, Gregg McDonald, Nuno Nunes, and to all who provided feedback on the draft reports, thank you very much.

Many of the recommendations in this review draw on suggestions by informants. All errors and omissions are our own.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objective of the review is to better understand the issues that shelter actors dealt with in Haiti in 2010. It aims to identify achievements and constraints in meeting the short and medium-term shelter needs, considers views on the response by a sample of the affected population who received support, and addresses implications for interim shelter responses, in order to identify key issues to improve upon and to provide information for future responses. This evaluation does not cover the shelter sector performance in 2011, although information of that period was used for a better understanding of the 2010 results.

Meeting shelter needs

The scale and context of the disaster meant a quantitative leap in the size and complexity of the need and the constraints to be dealt with, which strongly challenged the shelter agencies’ capacities. This challenge was well managed in the emergency phase by the massive delivery of standardized support for the emergency shelter solutions, which helped to cover the basic shelter needs within a few months. In the transitional stage, this leap could have been addressed in more innovative ways by promoting more self-driven responses and adapting solutions to the Haitian post-earthquake context.

The first emergency shelter response was relevant and effective; providing emergency shelter support to 1.5 M people in four months was a great achievement. However, since the emergency shelter response was based mainly on the delivery of tarpaulins and the urban setting of the disaster challenged the response enormously, the shelter agencies did not have the capacity or responsibility to control the final outcome of the emergency shelter solutions.

The shelter sector did not accurately measure follow up emergency shelter needs; emergency shelter reinforcement/replacement actions were not integrated into a comprehensive strategy early on, and responded instead to the resultant protracted emergency (due to rains, hurricane season, cholera outbreak and delay on transitional shelter delivery), representing a higher workload and budget burden for shelter agencies.

The emergency shelter response served only partially as a basis to meet medium and long term needs. A sequence of actions could have been more actively attempted with the most vulnerable people whether they were IDP or not, but most of the emergency shelter support was given to IDP while some sources estimate that less than half of the transitional solutions were given to those living in camps, limiting this approach. Broader emergency shelter support to the non-displaced population could have also helped to reduce the size of the IDP camps and facilitated a wider link between emergency and transitional shelter.

Addressing mid-term shelter approaches early on (February 2010) can be considered a success, even more considering the immense efforts of the humanitarian actors in ensuring and advocating for the urgent needs of emergency shelter and live saving interventions. But the shelter strategy’s critical role in assessing the overall response was progressively weakened. Strategic sector planning and the urge to define and fund specific actions were separate processes that led many agencies to take initial decisions on transitional shelter without further data or consideration of an overall sector strategy, some of them becoming less relevant as more accurate data became available.

There were many limitations to performing needs and damage assessments and it was unclear whose responsibility it was to undertake them; but despite these constraints, thorough field assessments and local consultation could have been done before committing
to a particular transitional shelter response, in order to have a better understanding of the context and to appraise the effectiveness and efficiency of each shelter option.

Early on, many agencies' were inclined to work outside Port-Au-Prince, mainly funding the direct delivery of transitional shelter, and not integrating a housing repair approach into their programmes. Soon after the emergency phase was over, the initial integral and broad design of the strategy was, in practice, narrowed down to the direct delivery of T-Shelters (12-18 m² core-house structures), both inside and outside Port-Au-Prince, providing much less support to other transitional solutions.

This widely supported strategy was unrealistic in timing and cost-wise and was not flexible enough. Relevant progress in T-Shelter delivery started by May 2010, and the sum of the agencies' capacities (125.000 units) proved to be insufficient to meet total transitional shelter need (over 180.000 solutions) within the foreseen timeline (January 2011), even after maximum delivery capacity was reached (7.300 units per month, as of November 2010). All of which led to an accumulated delay, to bottlenecks in the implementation process and to unforeseen relief responses as new emergencies arose. In addition, the approach of a faster delivery of simpler transitional shelter could not be always achieved, and the shelter agencies had serious difficulties in meeting the agreed upon standards and average costs, leading upwards of a 200% increase in the anticipated costs.

As time elapsed, costs increased and implementation was taking twice the time anticipated, the T-Shelters’ opportunity added value progressively reduced, losing relevance and even acceptance with the local authorities and the affected population, while other approaches such as rental support and housing repair became more relevant and even more cost-efficient.
There has been reluctance by most shelter agencies to start repairing damaged houses. The assessment and guidelines on small buildings repairs were finished by October 2010, but very few agencies engaged in it at that time and it took five more months for this approach to really be used. An earlier housing damages assessment may have allowed a greater involvement in this option during 2010.

The transitional shelter response was supply driven to a large extent, with the agencies often taking programming decisions based on their previous know-how, supposed ease of implementation, outcome control, liability concerns and/or visibility, and not so much on the demand (affected population’s plans and needs). In such a constrained context it would have been advisable to put in place demand measuring systems in order to diversify options, as a way to elude bottlenecks. Paying more attention to the tracking and promotion of other shelter options, which were underexplored, would have led to a change in attitude and policies, and the agencies may have engaged more in them.

**Strategy, planning and coordination**

Analysis of the Haiti shelter response shows the need for having and implementing a long term comprehensive approach, with flexible demand-driven ranges of responses, an integrated lead and a clear national shelter sector’s scope.

A continuous review and updating of strategies, plans and goals could have been done, making them flexible enough to be adapted to on-going findings. The transitional shelter strategy could have been revised when it became obvious that goals and deadlines would not be met, resulting in a more comprehensive longer-term transitional shelter or permanent housing approach for part of the targeted population (for instance, a greater involvement in host families’ support and rental support could have lessened the burden to deliver transitional solutions), but shelter agencies’ programmes were not flexible enough, often because of their funding commitments, or could not easily be adapted on the field.

The Shelter Cluster lead’s advocacy role should be reinforced and become more assertive and intensive, pressing and challenging the shelter agencies to commit to a broader approach regarding transitional shelter, and addressing their specific challenges.

Transitional shelter support quite depended on land availability and rubble removal, issues only partially in the hands of the shelter actors. Planning should integrate a more realistic timeframe and budget and establish milestones to solve constraints that must be dealt with to continue. For example, rubble clearance represented a huge constraint for meeting transitional shelter needs, but not many agencies dealt with it directly, and when they did their effort went unnoticed. In future operations, rubble clearance should be addressed head-on by the shelter actors, either by integrating it into their own response or by strongly advocating for other specialized agencies to address it sooner, perhaps even with a stand-alone coordination.

In addition, strategies should attempt to dodge the constraints as long as it is feasible, by integrating diverse and innovative approaches into the response, taking calculated risks and placing the need for coverage before liability concerns as far as possible. For instance, agencies could have more actively engaged in solutions for which rubble clearance was not a limitation, such as host families’ or rental support, or adopted less restraining land tenure requirements (as it eventually occurred), immediately after it became clear that the anticipated ones could not be complied with.

Cost-opportunity analysis was not often incorporated into the decision making process; early planning and allocation of budget in a balanced combination of emergency, temporary...
and permanent solutions could have also contributed to improve both efficiency and
efficacy, even more since private funding was very important and was not as restrictive as
some public donors’ requirements were.

While the shelter response was initially planned with a *contiguum* approach as a
simultaneous combination of emergency, transitional and permanent shelter, its
implementation soon developed to a linear sequence, in a *continuum* approach (a
chronological succession of shelter needs). Carrying out the three types of shelter support
side by side, in order to respond effectively to all aspects and areas, could have allowed a
faster delivery of the transitional solutions and an earlier engagement in permanent shelter
(housing repair or reconstruction).

The *contiguum* approach may have also been hampered by some opposed positions within
the shelter sector and between clusters, leading to shelter sector groups (e.g. land tenure,
host families) and others outside the shelter sector (e.g. *Lodgement quartier group*) to work
in shelter related issues too independently and not linking their outcomes or complementing
each other’s efforts enough.

The shelter sector initially assumed a leading position within a multi-cluster approach, and
soon narrowed its strategic focus, pointing out other clusters’ key issues leadership (rubble
clearance, land tenure, housing repair), but without considering the other clusters’ real
capacities to deal with them. That led to unclear responsibilities around those issues and a
consequent delay in their resolution. The shelter sector scope at country level should be
more clearly stated from the very beginning, and discussion on key issues for shelter
response should be based on the skills and abilities of shelter actors.

Coordination of the international response (MINUSTAH, Clusters System, IHRC, armed
forces, among others), was complex and that, added to the great number of humanitarian
actors (including non-experienced NGOs), made it difficult to agree upon all aspects of the
response hence to achieve a common response plan from relief to reconstruction. The
Inter-cluster and Humanitarian Coordination should also ensure that there are no gaps or
overlapping of responsibilities among clusters, therefore safeguarding an integrated
performance.

**Participation and perspective of the affected population and the Haitian authorities**

Money remittances received from abroad were significant in the early weeks after the
earthquake. Part of the affected population would have had the capacity to contribute to
their own reconstruction effort if support had been provided in the form of materials
distribution and cash support and training, among others. Notwithstanding the scale of the
disaster, logistical limitations and pressure for implementation, a more participatory strategy
would have been desirable to better address the affected population’s needs and plans and
to seek collaboration with them, to allow a more self-driven response and to reduce the
burden on the humanitarian actors.

Haitian authorities are not totally satisfied with the planning and outcome of the shelter
response. Regarding coordination and collaboration, while recognizing their own
weaknesses they feel that their previous housing strategies and post-disaster ideas were
not taken into consideration. On the other hand, the shelter agencies state that because of
the limited capacities, lack of engagement or lack of transparency of the authorities it was
not easy to reach agreements with them or to make them participate more in the decision-
making. Despite these constraints, a greater effort could have been made, in the interest of
sustainability.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE REVIEW

1. Purpose

The Secretariat of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) as Global Shelter Cluster Lead for Natural Disasters pledges to lead the Shelter Cluster in the field following natural disaster. In fulfilment of this commitment, a Federation-led Shelter Coordination Team worked in Haiti between February 10th and November 10th 2010. The Team coordinated work by a number of national and international shelter agencies responding to the need for emergency and early recovery shelter following the earthquake of 12 January. It had at least eighty partner agencies in coordination hubs in and around Port au Prince, Léogâne, Petit-Goâve and Jacmel. IFRC has already commissioned a review of the Haiti Shelter Coordination Team’s performance¹.

The objective of the present evaluation is to understand more about the issues that confronted shelter agencies after the emergency phase in Haiti in 2010, those which facilitated and which constrained delivery of shelter by humanitarian agencies. The review aims at identifying achievements and constraints in meeting the short and medium-term shelter needs, views of the response by a sample of the affected population that received support and implications for interim shelter responses in future emergencies, in order to identify key issues to improve upon and to provide information for future responses. This evaluation does not cover the shelter sector performance in 2011, although information of that period was used for a better understanding of the 2010 results.

The Haiti Shelter Coordination Team and other sources have documented a number of the achievements in and constraints to the timely delivery of emergency and medium-term shelter in Haiti. In examining these and other issues, the evaluation aims to understand whether targets for early recovery shelter were realistic in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness, and the implications of findings from Haiti for future humanitarian response.

The need for better understanding of factors that facilitated and constrained delivery of early recovery shelter is indicated by the perception that the shelter sector worked too slowly after the emergency phase. One year after the earthquake, almost a million people continue to live in emergency shelter. This has raised a number of questions:

- Why have shelter agencies been unable to fulfill targets for interim shelter solutions?
- What more could shelter agencies and others have done?
- What more could others, such as governments or others have done?
- Why people are still living beneath plastic sheets?
- Did the shelter sector consider all options for emergency and early recovery shelter?
- How satisfied is the affected community with the shelter response?
- How useful are the solutions provided?
- What on the initial shelter provision went well and what could be improved?
- Does the quality of early recovery shelter provided meet sectorial standards?

Therefore, the evaluation intended to find out what could have gone better, what additional things could have been done, and what constrained and favoured the performance of the shelter cluster actors. There is no intent to evaluate any given agency or project.

¹ https://www.sheltercluster.org/Pages/Cluster_Evaluations.aspx
2. Methodology

The methodology used in the evaluation aimed to contrast the data available in secondary sources (SC’s documents and other bibliography) with the information and opinions collected in primary sources (main stakeholders in the Haiti earthquake shelter response). 45 persons were interviewed; main key informants were international staff directly or indirectly involved in the Haiti Shelter/NFI Cluster as well as nationals involved in the earthquake response, in order to contrast their inputs and points of view. Affected population’s opinions were also an important asset to the evaluation. 5 affected population camps/communities were visited. The consultation to a sample of affected population was done with an interest in the qualitative information that would be received not so much with intent to find data of statistical accuracy. To collect information, the following activities were undertaken:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information source</th>
<th>Main data collection activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC’s developed documents</td>
<td>Review of main documents available at the Haiti Shelter Cluster webpage and others shared by shelter actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reference shelter documents</td>
<td>Internet research and documents’ review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other documents about Haiti (before and after the earthquake)</td>
<td>Internet research and documents’ review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating, implementing and funding agencies members of the Haiti SC</td>
<td>Face-to-face or phone/skype interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Clusters’ main actors</td>
<td>Design and request to respond to a questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian authorities (related with the SC)</td>
<td>Face-to-face interviews with GoH representative in the SC and Municipal authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected population</td>
<td>Focus groups with leaders and with women in camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survey of a sample of affected population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Shelter Cluster members</td>
<td>Phone/skype interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Design and request to respond to a questionnaire</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The review had to deal with some constraints, the most important being the controversy in most of the issues among shelter sector members (which was however assumed) and the lack of consolidated objective information. A deeper than expected research through the Internet or through the overall IFRC-led SCT documents was needed in order to find and/or consolidate objective data. The interviews also allowed identifying documents of which the team was not aware; making data collection through secondary sources a permanent ongoing activity. As the review was getting to an end, new documents and information were made available, sometimes giving new facts that obliged to review the findings, consuming time and delaying the report completion. Some documents were not yet official and could not be quoted although they gave valuable information. For future evaluations, availability of better summary information should be ensured before the consultant team begins its task.

Also, the review should have been done earlier (e.g. February 2011). The dates in which it was done (June-August 2011; field work in Haiti took place in July) meant some constraints for the evaluation: some interviewees were not currently involved in the Haiti shelter response; some key informants were on vacation (summer time); and since the recovery phase’s way forward was in the midst of a heated discussion within the international humanitarian actors, people often mixed what happened in 2010 with new ideas from 2011, giving a retrospective view of events and decisions taken that interviewees may not have been a part of or had altered their perspective over time. Those factors, together with the limited field work time, limited the number of interviewees or the possibility to interview all
identified key informants, and made difficult to keep the focus in the interviews on the 2010 actions.

3. Context of the shelter response

January 11th 2010. Before the earthquake Haiti, the poorest country in Latin America, was facing numerous problems which made the Haitian context already extraordinarily complex. Among these problems are the following:

- Port au Prince, the capital city is in fact a high density conurbation of several municipalities without common planning or urban authority aside from that held by the GoH. The need for land planning to solve this problem was well stated.
- An estimated 70% of the urban population lived in slums, many of which were tenants (70% of the urban population lived in rented houses), with an average living space below 2 m².
- Rental arrangements are usually for one year, and fees must be paid in advance at the end of the previous year².
- Lack of full population registration
- Very low coverage of public services (water and sewer systems, electricity, waste management, etc.) in both urban and rural areas
- Bad quality of infrastructure and the housing stock; (lack of) urban planning and public spaces, especially in Port-Au-Prince³
- High population density especially in the main urban areas⁴
- Deficient transportation and logistics infrastructure
- Lack of land tenure and property clarity and a significant number of homeless people
- Insecurity; poverty, inequity and lack of livelihood opportunities
- Governmental institutional capacities were very weak; a United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established on June 2004 by the Security Council in the aftermath of an armed conflict which spread to several cities across the country.

January 12th 2010. The earthquake strikes mainly the capital city and other cities like Léogâne (close to the epicentre) and Jacmel (South East), turning the context even more complex and difficult:

- First images showed a high level of destruction. Over 220,000 Haitians were killed and thousands more were injured; up to 1.6 million were displaced and settled in approximately 1,350 makeshift camps; some 500,000 fled the capital⁵.
- People feared aftershocks and abandoned remaining standing houses.
- Camps occupied the scarce free space of the city and rubble volume was at the time estimated to rise to 20-25 million cubic meters, based on satellite images.

² Strategic citywide spatial planning. A situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, Haiti. UN-HABITAT, 2009
³ There is no an authority of the whole Port-Au-Prince metropolitan area, being the metropolitan area a puzzle of Communes with individual authorities with no overall planning from a local perspective.
⁴ Approx. 2/3 of the Haitian population lives in the Ouest Region (including Port-Au-Prince)
⁵ Data taken from Rebuilding Haiti. One year on, UNOPS, based on the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and revised estimates from the Government.
• Affected cities were crowded by congested spontaneous settlements.
• People living there had already paid the entire 2010 rental fee. All family savings for shelter / dwell were therefore lost.
• About 1 out of 5 civil servants died and 11 out of 15 ministerial buildings were completely destroyed, further limiting scarce institutional capacity.
• Mobilization within the country and within Port-Au-Prince was an extreme challenge in the first weeks and remained very complicated for the first months.
• International aid trying to get to Port-Au-Prince to cover the overwhelming first needs assessed exceeded port and airport capacities, and even though the roads from the Dominican Republic were not too affected their capacity was overloaded.
• Those displaced as a result of the earthquake merged into the previously homeless or mobile population.
• Proximity of the rainy season.
• The UN increased the overall force levels of MINUSTAH to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts in the country.
• Elections to be held by February 28th were postponed for a year.

Urban setting context. The urban setting of the disaster (particularly in Port-Au-Prince) entailed many constraints for the shelter response, such as:

• Disperse damage of the earthquake: not all neighbourhoods or all buildings in each neighbourhood were equally affected, information that took time to obtain.
• Difficult access to the affected areas to assess the damages and needs and deliver the aid;
• Difficulties to support emergency and transitional shelter solutions with NFI and water and sanitation;
• Rubble removal. Debris also hindered logistics and reconstruction efforts, as well as the provision of in-site emergency and transitional shelter solutions;
• People wanting to remain close to their former homes to look after their saved assets but fearful to go back to not affected houses
• High construction density. Most of the affected neighbourhoods had a very dense plot division, including horizontal and vertical condominiums (two or more story buildings or terraced houses), with no free space in the property;
• Lack of alternative land for temporary settlement in the proximities of their former homes or open spaces (public or privately owned) to settle the displaced population
• Complexity of the land tenure of the affected population, numerous slum dwellers;
• Weaker community identity and organization than in rural areas;
• Income sources of the affected population were within the city and in many cases not far from their previous homes.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE SHELTER RESPONSE

1. Introduction

1.1 Brief background of the Haiti Shelter Cluster

A 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck the Haitian coast on January 12\textsuperscript{th} 2010. The epicentre was located 22 kilometres from the capital Port-au-Prince, and 15 kilometres from the closest towns. The most-affected area was the Ouest province, the most affected cities were: Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Léogâne, and Jacmel. The Government of Haiti requested international assistance and clusters were activated.

Shelter/NFI Cluster (SC) in Haiti was active since 2008 (Gonaïves floods). After the earthquake it was led by IOM, and on February 3\textsuperscript{rd} it was agreed that IFRC would take the lead. IOM continued to provide assistance to cluster partners by managing the NFI pipeline. IFRC sent a Shelter Coordination Team to support the Haitian government in the inter-agency coordination of shelter actors. This team was made up of a national coordination team and a number of hubs including Port-au-Prince, and included as well personnel from the IFRC Secretariat, RC/RC National Societies, and from cluster partners. IFRC handed over the coordination of the Shelter/NFI Cluster to UNHABITAT on November 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2010.

The Shelter/NFI Cluster helped coordinate the efforts of more than 80 agencies. The emergency shelter distribution effort in Haiti was one of the fastest ever mounted, compared to other big scale disasters (South East Asia tsunami, Pakistan earthquake, etc.)

1.2 Summary of the Needs and Damages

1.2.1 Shelter Needs, Humanitarian Aid and Population Movements

Projected figures on Haitian population in 2010 estimate 7,344,890 individuals and 1,468,978 households\textsuperscript{6}. An estimated 30\% of the Haitian population lived in the capital city, 70\% of which lived in slums. In the immediate days after the earthquake, a huge amount of people left the city looking for non-affected regions. The estimated number of displaced persons out of Port au Prince was some half a million individuals. An estimation of these movements is based on call tracking done by a local mobile phone company.

As of February 28\textsuperscript{th} the GoH estimated 1,301,491 individuals (260,298 households) in need of shelter, 17.7\% of the total population. By May, figures were elevated to 1,514,885 individuals, 20.6\% of the total population. By July, IOM’s DTM showed 1,536,447 individuals in camps. Several hundred thousand families were supposed to be sheltered with host families\textsuperscript{7}.

The location of IDPs in camps and shelter needs’ estimations were always based on the data available despite recognizing its inconsistencies\textsuperscript{8}. Many people also remained with significant shelter needs in their neighbourhoods, outside camps.

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\textsuperscript{6} Shelter Cluster Information Management Data based on \textit{Institut Haitien de Statistique et d’Informatique} (IHSI), projection of the population for 2010 by Commune

\textsuperscript{7} DARA Humanitarian Response Index 2010, Haiti Chapter, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{8} SC SAG Meeting minutes. Section 3: “Various set of figures have been used/proposed for the affected population figure. At the last ICC, it was agreed that 1.5 million figure be used as a base number for those in need of Emergency Shelter. Effectively, this is a re-interpretation of GoH’s report using “Personnes en abris” as “people in camp”, and using “Sinistrés” as the figures instead. The breakdown of “Sinistrés” figures, however, has worrying inconsistency with all earlier rapid assessments and field reports”
1.2.2 Housing damages

- By March 2010, according to the Post Disaster Needs Assessment\(^9\), some 105,000 homes had been completely destroyed and more than 208,000 damaged.
- As of October 12\(^{th}\) 2010 the OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, according to GoH sources, established that 188,383 houses were destroyed or partially damaged. 270,476 buildings, including 156,360 residences were being assessed by the Ministry of Public Works, with the following results: 51 % (137,392) Green, 26% (70,521) Yellow, and 22% (58,860) Red\(^{10}\).
- In January 2011 final results of MTPTC assessment established that of a total amount of 359,853 residential buildings assessed, 194,621 (54.08%) were Green, 94,002 (26.12% were Yellow) and 71,230 (19.79%) were Red.

The above figures show a progressive sequence of data, which delayed accurate damages and needs assessments, especially regarding housing repair.

2. Constraints and opportunities for the shelter response

The Haiti earthquake shelter response had to deal with many constraints. Several of them were clearly identified by shelter actors, either as “challenges” or as “constraints”. This review will probably not uncover new constraints that the shelter actors did not see and/or face at a given time, nor will it underrate the challenge they represented to Shelter actors, but it will try to give an outsider reading of how they were handled. Notwithstanding the physical obstacles, the main constraint may have been an intangible one: lack of information and consequently of accurate needs assessments. On the other hand, there were some factors that favoured the provision of interim shelter solutions, opportunities that helped the agencies’ work, which will be also addressed here.

2.1 Constraints

The constraints/challenges stated by the Shelter actors mixed what the context situation was prior to the earthquake (structural constraints), many of which were magnified by the disaster, with a circumstantial situation due to the specificities of the Haiti earthquake – e.g. scale, setting, date- (circumstantial constraints) and with the constraints that appeared as a direct consequence of the earthquake (consequential constraints). There were also institutional limitations that became constraints for a better and/or faster shelter response.

The following chart systematizes the main constraints met by the shelter agencies in the response, dividing them into structural, circumstantial, consequential and institutional, and describing the main effect they had on the shelter response. These were the main constraints as constraints themselves. Some of them also mean a constraint for another one’s solving\(^{11}\). Some interviewees identified as a constraint what was part of the shelter response (e.g. tender and production processes timeline), which in fact if not solved hinders the implementation of the next step, but from the authors point of view they are not a constraint as such and therefore are not included in the chart.

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\(^9\) PDNA_Working_Document.pdf, March 2010 version

\(^10\) The MTPTC tagged each building with a code and colour, meaning “Green: safe to inhabit, minor damages, no structural repair needed”, “Yellow: limited occupation, moderate damages, structural repairs needed” and “Red: unsafe to inhabit, risk for its occupants and their environment, serious damages, important structural repairs or total demolition needed”

\(^11\) e.g. scale of the disaster strongly affected rubble clearance; Haitian institutional capacities reduction hindered the allocation of free public land
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Constraint</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Main effects in shelter response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Lack of full civilian registration</td>
<td>Unknown number of Haitian w/o ID</td>
<td>Difficult to identify and register the affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very low coverage of public services</td>
<td>Water (2005: 8% individual tap; 45% public water points; 47% public wells, illegal sources, trucks)</td>
<td>Need to cover services in emergency shelter sites -- coordination with WASH Cluster What/How should the response provide these services considering their low previous coverage? Solid waste self-disposal in camps affecting living conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bad quality of many infrastructures and the housing stock</td>
<td>Construction deficits</td>
<td>Structural needs assessments House repair strategy design: Non-destroyed houses, minor repairs or retrofit? Return home or build back safer approach?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Lack of) Urban planning</td>
<td>The city has grown w/o a sustainable logic. Lack of public spaces, especially in Port-Au-Prince. Inadequate urban road networks About 40% of the informal inhabitants facing the risk of landslides and more than half of the informal settlements in Port-Au-Prince susceptible to flooding</td>
<td>Lack of land for interim shelter Bad accessibility to most vulnerable neighbourhoods IDP settled in risk areas, how to address their needs? Traffic troubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homeless and slum dwellers</td>
<td>Unknown number of persons living in the streets or in shanks in main urban areas (estimated 60% by recent studies), with average living space below 2m²</td>
<td>Mix w/ affected population, increase the potential but may be more vulnerable than those, should they be assisted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme Poverty especially in the urban setting</td>
<td>Subsistence economy</td>
<td>Risk of assisted population selling the shelter materials to purchase other needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land tenure and property scheme Large percentage of people living as tenants</td>
<td>Property scheme based more on private arrangements and/or long time use than in public registration Majority of PaP population are tenants Hard to be sure who owns a piece of land In many cases landowners in Port-au-Prince who have obtained their land legally still have problems with illegality or extra legality No cadastre and no reliable land records</td>
<td>Response to affected tenants has to be addressed differently Land property requirements should be flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Main effects in shelter response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High population density, especially in the urban areas</td>
<td>Small plots with high building occupancy Multi-story buildings, etc.)</td>
<td>Lack of free space for transitional settlement w/o displacement Original shelter situation under minimum standards, which should recovery shelter address?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bad transportation and logistics infrastructure</td>
<td>Roads, airport, port in bad state Limited transportation services capacities</td>
<td>Unloading, customs, distribution of imported materials would face restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak institutional capacities</td>
<td>Weak Government Presence of a UN stabilization mission (MINUSTAH) Municipal level (Mairies), lack of economic means and technical capacities</td>
<td>Decision making level unclear Difficulty to establish a common strategy and receive national counterpart to the response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>Thefts, assaults, murders, etc.</td>
<td>Risks to security of shelter staff and materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary circumstances that had very significant effects on the shelter response</td>
<td>Scale of the disaster</td>
<td>Death toll and number of affected population was huge, the response was a greater than ever challenge. Country’s coping capacities were exceeded</td>
<td>Hampered needs assessment IDP tracking become almost an impossible Needs figures were overwhelming, hard to distribute at once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban setting and particularly the capital city</td>
<td>High population density in the open areas. Large % of the housing stock damaged and/or unused for the first months (fear to get back in) Urban affected population did not want to leave the city (livelihood and/or housing support opportunities) Sphere shelter standards could not be realistically met in urban areas.</td>
<td>For life saving reasons the standards have to be reached progressively Measures to minimize the impact of not meeting them should be put in place Decrease of the rental housing stock available Hundreds of thousands in camps Consequential constraints amplify their effect in the response implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date of the earthquake</td>
<td>Many tenants had just paid the annual rent Proximity of the rainy season</td>
<td>Less self-coping capacities of the affected population (no savings) Need to define emergency shelter response looking at the upcoming rains (emergency response and contingency planning at once)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake 2010
Meeting Shelter Needs: Issues, achievements and constraints
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Constraint</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Main effects in shelter response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consequential</td>
<td>Rubble to be cleared</td>
<td>Over 10 M m$^3$ of debris have to be removed and transported, w/ previous demolition works in some cases Urban population put debris in the streets</td>
<td>Limitation to deliver T- shelters in original plots Debris in the streets hampered accessibility to neighbourhoods Budget allocation (1 m$^3$ clearance: 25-40 USD) Accountability. Is it part of the shelter response or a precondition for shelter support?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arose due to earthquake or enlarged pre-existing structural constraints</td>
<td>Haitian institutional capacities reduction</td>
<td>GoH and Mairies affected (infrastructure, staff, registers)</td>
<td>Strong limitation to cope with disaster and give counterpart to shelter agencies Decision making slowdown or taken by international agencies w/o local endorsement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local market overwhelmed</td>
<td>Inability of local manufacturers or providers to absorb all materials demand</td>
<td>Need to import and consequent extended timeline for implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics problems</td>
<td>Destroyed/damaged roads, streets, port</td>
<td>Strongly hampered the shelter needs assessment and response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of available free land</td>
<td>Particularly in Port-Au-Prince, lack of open public areas for the population to settle near their houses Insufficient land for sustainable relocation Insufficient interim land made available by GoH despite numerous discussions with shelter actors</td>
<td>Private land occupation and emergence of an improvised E-Shelter camps network Relocation shelter projects limited and/or in far areas w/o services and/or livelihood opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Massive and frequent displacements of population</td>
<td>Hundreds of thousands families displaced, either near their former home or within the country New displacements due to changing information (GoH statements, humanitarian aid pull-factor, etc.)</td>
<td>Almost untraceable displacement tracking Lack of accurate information in the first months Difficult overall shelter needs assessment Difficulties to know who is with a host family Hampered distribution of emergency shelter materials – risk of duplication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Main effects in shelter response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Language issues</td>
<td>French/Creole speaking staff limitations</td>
<td>Difficulties to coordinate with national authorities and organizations and with affected population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of previous knowledge of Haiti</td>
<td>Few agencies had previous experience and knowledge of the Haitian context</td>
<td>Decisions based on other big disaster experiences or LAC country context, not applicable in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of shelter experience</td>
<td>Many agencies (mostly small ones but not exclusively) had no or little previous experience in shelter</td>
<td>Hindered coordination; More difficulties to solve implementation constraints; Vision of shelter only as an object, no chance to get them involved in other shelter options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff rotation</td>
<td>Many actors faced frequent staff turnover</td>
<td>Loss of momentum and of accumulated knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International response systems procedures and requirements</td>
<td>Agencies / donors liability / transparency issues</td>
<td>Slowdown of the response implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Confusing overall leadership and coordination</td>
<td>MINUSTAH / IASC / JOTC / IHRC at the same time</td>
<td>Hard to know who was in charge of what, who takes big decisions with GoH. Waiting time until main guidelines were clear on the shelter response and initial confusing decision-making (relocation or back to neighbourhood approach? tents or tarps? etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shelter cluster scope unclear definition or understanding</td>
<td>Rubble clearance, housing repair, permanent housing, rental support, land issues, etc. Whose responsibility were they?</td>
<td>Narrowed the shelter response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2 Opportunities

Some factors that favoured the provision of emergency and interim shelter solutions were:

- **Political backing**
  Shelter was acknowledged as a very important need, thus the SC was supported and respected by all actors. Shelter was one of the most relevant sectors within the Humanitarian Response System; SC was integrated by a great number of organizations; and SC meetings were largely attended. Despite its limitations, the GoH supported the shelter sector coordination with ad hoc appointees and endorsed the SC strategic main decisions.

- **Previous active Shelter Cluster and preparedness activities**
  Shelter Cluster in Haiti was active since 2008 and NFIIs were prepositioned in the 5 months before the earthquake, by all the active cluster partners\(^\text{12}\). The Shelter and Food Security clusters were called by the GoH on January 13\(^\text{th}\) and requested to immediately initiate the distribution of prepositioned stocks. Although not in very large quantities, the collaboration between the two clusters and the logistic support of MINUSTAH allowed for the shelter cluster to be distributing items on January 14\(^\text{th}\). The establishment of the emergency shelter pipeline in combination with prepositioned stocks allowed for uninterrupted distributions since that date. IOM and IFRC worked in preparedness before the earthquake, and the NFI/shelter stocks were used by both organizations.

- **Presence of the most important shelter agencies**
  Previous experiences in big disasters and long developed know-how of the main agencies was an asset for the shelter response; their high engagement with Haiti allowed the shelter actors to quickly respond to the most urgent shelter needs and to undertake an ambitious transitional shelter Programme.

- **Experienced staff**
  Despite the high turnover, which affected the effectiveness of the response, the shelter agencies deployed their most experienced personnel or hired international experts. That surely helped the development of the strategy, facilitated coordination and contributed to finding ways to solve the many existing constraints for the shelter response. IOM’s combined Shelter and CCCM clusters’ coordination team increased from 3 persons (before the earthquake) to 13. The IFRC-led SCCT was also large and well-staffed, an aspect that most interviewees acknowledged.

- **Funding for shelter**
  Although the budget for Haiti reconstruction is not yet totally allocated, and even with the different financial capacities amongst shelter agencies, money was not an issue for the shelter response. Worldwide solidarity with Haiti allowed the agencies to collect significant private funding, which to a great extent was not conditioned to a specific end; in addition public funding was soon allocated through main donors. Naturally the funds raised for Haiti were not exclusively used for shelter, but as the most urgent need the money available for the emergency and transitional shelter response let the shelter actors make commitments without too many procedures, and in many cases decisions were rapidly taken in country.

- **Solidarity amongst Haitians**
  As mentioned, the earthquake aftermath found most people affected broke since they already paid for their 2010 rental fee. The extraordinary financial support sent by Haitians

\(^{12}\) IOM (SC-lead), IFRC, CRS, Concern and CARE
abroad to their friends and relatives (remittances) allowed many affected to obtain better emergency shelter conditions and to get an interim transitional solution or contribute to complement the transitional shelter support received. Host families’ support and solidarity helped to obtain better shelter conditions for thousands of affected persons, facilitating the work of shelter agencies which supported that shelter option.

- **Allocation of interim land by the authorities**
The allocation of a few pieces of land by the GoH for relocating affected families represented a reprieve for a prompt delivery of Transitional shelter to a few thousands. Aside from the limited amount of land made available, insufficient to tackle the crisis, and the objections that these relocation projects usually encounter, it must be acknowledged that the public land made available by the GoH or some Mairies allowed the settlement of displaced people who were living in high risk places and could not find a place to resettle or people who were about to be evicted from where they had settled.

3. **Planning and delivery of emergency and early recovery shelter**

3.1 **Strategic planning. The Haiti Shelter Sector Response Plan**

The overwhelming shelter needs and the post disaster existing constraints exceeded the capacities of the GoH and humanitarian actors to provide emergency shelter response. The immense number of displaced persons urging minimum shelter and the difficulties for a proper and rapid damages and needs assessment, combined with the lack of land to locate the displaced people (especially in Port-Au-Prince) forced the humanitarian actors to make decisions on how to respond to the most pressing shelter needs with not much information.

Despite these constraints, by early February the Shelter actors put together and agree upon with the GoH appointed representatives, a first Shelter Sector Response Plan (SSRP), in which main guidelines for emergency shelter were drafted, principal challenges were identified, technical advice was included and coordination and monitoring mainstreams stated, pulling the shelter agencies into a common course of action.

The SSRP was a five year strategy in two phases (the first three months and the later period). The Plan aimed at achieving full transitional shelter within 12 months in two phases. The first phase objective was to assure emergency shelter within 3 months, before the hurricane season began. The strategy assumed a gap of about 6-8 months between the emergency shelter milestone and the transitional shelter one.

Together with the emergency shelter provision, the SSRP considered three main blocks of activities for transitional shelter (starting from the first phase):

1. A registration process
2. Assessment of building safety and demolition of unsafe structures
3. The provision of a range of transitional shelter solutions for IDPs and Non-displaced tenants, including:
   a) Displaced Populations:
      - Transitional shelter – Roof of corrugated metal sheeting + frame of timber, bamboo or steel
      - Cash, vouchers and additional materials
      - Coordinated rubble clearance
   b) Non-displaced Tenants:
      - Relocation assistance
      - Rent assistance
      - Extending credit
4. The provision of a range of more permanent shelter solutions for non-displaced owners, including:
   - Self-help
   - Phased materials distribution
   - Technical advice

3.2 Emergency Shelter planning and delivery

3.2.1 Targets and Achievements

The response in this phase reached a larger caseload than anticipated, showing that assessed needs were underestimated. With a massive delivery of 2 tarpaulins per family, by the end of March 2010 more than 100% of the initially estimated emergency shelter needs were covered.

The E-shelter response had to deal with two huge problems: the magnitude of the disaster (enormous number of IDP’s in urgent need of shelter) and the proximity of the rainy season. Other constraints such as the fear people had to return to live in their previous houses even if they were not too affected, as well as the unavailability of nearby land to settle in, probably led to an increase of the IDPs who settled in camps, either planned, self-planned or improvised (self-settlements).

The target for the cluster was established at delivering 2 tarpaulins per family on May 1st. As of March 7th (less than two months after the earthquake) the Shelter actors estimated that they had reached over 50% of the known caseload with emergency materials; and by the end of April, the shelter agencies estimated 99% coverage of the known caseload.

Notwithstanding, the assistance continued. As of May 25th, the Shelter actors stated that the wide coverage number for emergency shelter materials (115%) distracted attention from the fact that the needs in some geographic locations had not been met, and alerted on the need to position additional emergency material.

Data released on late-February underestimated the affected population (DTM showed that in July 2010 people in camps were about 1.535.000 individuals and 360.000 households), with an “increase” of 18% of the individuals and 39% of the households. The number of people outside the camps has been always unknown, but estimations elevate it to more than half a million people. Despite that DTM’s first calculations could have had a not insignificant margin for error that led to an over-calculated IDP population, based on the difficulties to census a still very mobile population and/or on an overestimated ratio of people per household13, it can be said that the people in need of an emergency shelter solution was more than the initially anticipated.

3.2.2 Rains and Hurricane season preparation impact on the shelter response

Recent hurricane memory (2008) and media and political statements contributed to focus enormous attention on this: on January 26th President Preval stated that 200.000 tents were needed before the hurricane season, “goal” that soon changed with the endorsement of the GoH Special Advisor for Shelter on prioritizing plastic sheeting over tents.

Identified in the SSRP as one of the 12 challenges to face, the proximity of the rains in fact represented the main challenge the shelter actors dealt with in the first 3 months of the

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13 initially calculated with a ratio of 5 people per household, which DTM reduced to 4.25 in camps
response. Thus, the Response Plan was divided into two phases, the first of them named as “Phase 1 Shelter within 3 months, before the rains season”.

By mid-February, the “Transitional shelter technical guidance (19/02/10)” annexes include a graphic with Average Rainfall in Port au Prince where two different periods can be observed:

Contingency planning for the hurricane season, as a different event than rains, was not initially considered in the strategy.

The need to replace and/or reinforce the emergency shelter solutions was pointed out in July 2010 when the anticipated progression for transitional shelter solutions was proved unrealistic and the lifespan of the tents and tarpaulins was getting to an end. By then, the SC-SAG invited agencies to provide updates on contingency stocks, and foreseen tarpaulin and emergency shelter kits delivery as well as reinforcement of E-shelters, considering vulnerability levels and technical and logistic issues in the implementation.

By this time the emergency response had reached the limit of its capacity and not enough alternatives were put in place. To raise awareness on this on September 14th the document “Tarpaulin Replacement Distribution Forecast” was released, alerting on the need for replacements. The distribution of 270,000 tarpaulins in November 2010 (220,000 more were distributed in March 2011, and 130,000 more were being distributed in July 2011) involved a great effort for the shelter agencies to achieve the planned goals.

Not enough preparedness was in place, and the capacities reported proved unrealistic. On September 24th, a strong storm hit the Port au Prince metropolitan area for 30 minutes, and as a result of it 14,611 families were identified in need of shelter assistance. Then it was revealed that shelter supplies stocks were not as many as were considered, as far as demand exceeded availability by approximately 2,500.

3.3 Early recovery / transitional shelter planning and delivery

3.3.1 Interim solutions identification and integration in the main response

The shelter sector response plan’s main objective was to “support and assist the GoH meet the emergency and transitional shelter and settlement needs of all Haitians affected by earthquake”, and considered its second phase to take at least five years, even though the objectives and activities are focused on the first 12 months (full transitional shelter).

The transitional shelter strategy was not restrained to the delivery of a transitional/temporary house/shelter, and defined the transitional shelter achievement as a dwelling situation (“habitable covered living space and a secure, healthy living environment, with privacy and dignity for those within it during the period between provision of emergency shelter and of permanent housing”) rather than as a specific output/product to be delivered. Options could be combined, for example, cash or material distribution for a host family to enable it to shelter a displaced family.

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14 Mostly based on the lifespan of the tarpaulins, assessed in May 10th by the “Review of Emergency Shelter solutions in Haiti” report.
15 OCHA situation Report Nº 4, 27 September 2010: “14.611 families in need of shelter assistance have now been identified, meaning demand for shelter now exceeds supplies available in country by approximately 2.500”.

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21
But despite this wide range of options, they were not equally used nor integrated into the main response with the relevance that each one could have had. The direct provision (construction) of transitional shelters was by far the most used option to give an interim solution, both in IDP camps and in the previous living sites.

Aside from host family support, which it remained under SC's leadership (notwithstanding the need to coordinate with other clusters), the rest of shelter options, went off the cluster’s scope, despite the fact that the shelter sector strategy considered them\textsuperscript{16}. Host families’ support and other cash transfer related options were integrated by some agencies to a much lower extent. The shelter actors did not especially promote its use, most probably due to the lack of proper assessments that recommended a higher support to this option and/or to the high work overload.

Transitional/temporary relocation in planned sites was not strongly supported due to the lack of available land and the reluctance of the shelter actors to that option, considering the possibility that \textit{large temporary settlements away from communities and livelihood opportunities create dependencies, social problems, security threats and inhibit recovery}\textsuperscript{17}. However, when necessary and as a last resort, the agencies supported the GoH-driven relocations providing T-Shelters to the relocated population.

### 3.3.2 Strategy vs. implementation. Needs and gaps

The direct provision of transitional shelter (T-Shelter) was first conceptualized as a basic, fast and economic solution, giving the affected population interim dwelling conditions capable to resist potential but not extraordinary hazards, for a maximum three year period in which permanent solutions were planned and executed.

In April 2010, the shelter actors still thought that the transitional solutions were to follow this concept\textsuperscript{18}, although the T-Shelter concept was already evolving into a more expensive, resistant and long-lasting solution with a longer delivery timeline. By September 2010, it was acknowledged that T-Shelter’s design parameters were beyond what had been suggested (such as the 100 mph wind design and the need for a seismic design component), that land tenure issues had become more critical and that the costs and strategies to achieve this longer term need had therefore to be reviewed\textsuperscript{19}. It is important to highlight that, despite anticipating a new longer lifespan for the T-Shelters the living space parameter was not improved\textsuperscript{20}.

\textsuperscript{16} Shelter sector response plan. Summary of responses for both displaced and non-displaced populations. Phase 2, full transitional shelter within 12 months, included: transitional shelter (construction); support provided through public information campaigns and technical advice over seismic and hurricane resistance; Cash, vouchers and materials distribution; Coordinated rubble clearance; (for non-displaced) Self-help, Phased materials distribution, Technical advice, Relocation assistance, Rent assistance, Extending credit

\textsuperscript{17} Shelter Sector Response Plan - Challenges

\textsuperscript{18} SC-SAG’s April 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2010 meeting minute: “The majority of T shelters are likely to be constructed in the second half of the 12 month period mentioned in the strategy and this needs to be clearly messaged to people”.

\textsuperscript{19} A T-Shelter TWiG presentation in September 2010 state that approx. 70% of T-Shelter models had changes in design (most common amendment was to the foundation size), most of them had highest category hurricane resistance -Cat 3-, which reflected a shift in the demand for skilled labour. The average cost had increased to 2,300USD – 4,300USD (original anticipated cost was 1,500USD), and they were going from “Transitional” (3 years) to “Longer term” (10-15+ years) shelter solutions.

\textsuperscript{20} T-Shelter beneficiaries and some local authorities complained about the size of the T-Shelters taking into account that they now seeing them as a long-term solution
Despite these findings, the strategy was not officially reviewed and that recommendation was not integrated into the overall shelter response. In this sense, the participation of the affected population was not sought, for instance by letting them know the new timelines and agreeing on each one’s responsibilities forward.

3.3.3 T-shelter progression

The global SC agencies’ programmed goal of 125,000 T-Shelters was a result not of an assessed or estimated need but of the sum up of pledges made by agencies, and the SC’s Advocacy Document on April 26th mentions this calculation method21. Lack of enough information along the process affected the planning process. Estimated percentage of safe and slightly damaged houses was based on anecdotal field reports and number of people “in shelter” reported by GOh.

On March 15th, an estimation of needs and coverage based on assumptions of anticipated MTPTC assessment results was established, including minor repairs. The revisions from March to September 2010 showed the planned transitional shelter number was around this figure with slight variations along the successive revisions (from 120,000 to 135,000).

Later, total number of affected people increased, and accordingly raised the transitional shelter needs remaining. From June to September, remaining needs estimation moved from 60,000 to 46,000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimate Total Affected Populations*</th>
<th>Estimate no. of Affected Households</th>
<th>Building Damage Assessment**</th>
<th>Estimate Need for Transitional Shelter</th>
<th>No. Of Planned Transitional Shelter</th>
<th>Remaining Need (HH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,301,491</td>
<td>260,298</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>52,060</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>156,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52,060</td>
<td></td>
<td>126,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29,503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 100315_SC_TShelter_Database.xls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimate Total Affected Populations*</th>
<th>Estimate no. of Affected Households</th>
<th>Building Damage Assessment**</th>
<th>Estimate Need for Transitional Shelter</th>
<th>No. Of Planned Transitional Shelter</th>
<th>Remaining Need (HH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,514,885</td>
<td>302,977</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60,595</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>181,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60,595</td>
<td></td>
<td>121,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60,543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 100601_SC_TShelter_Database.xls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimate Total Affected Populations*</th>
<th>Estimate no. of Affected Households</th>
<th>Building Damage Assessment**</th>
<th>Estimate Need for Transitional Shelter</th>
<th>No. Of Planned Transitional Shelter</th>
<th>Remaining Need (HH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,514,885</td>
<td>302,977</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60,595</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>181,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60,595</td>
<td></td>
<td>135,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46,139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 100922_SC_TShelter_Database.xls

**Procurement constraints**

The overall process from funding to actual implementation took an average of 6 months, involving long procurement processes. Moreover, since most of the supplies were imported, customs procedures were needed and took around 3 months, with the exception of specific

21 “According to the latest information submitted by cluster members there are plans for 120,000”
moments when GoH intervened by SC request and during the initial 3 months when the authorities gave aid a clear way and allowed aid to freely enter the country.

Agencies that produced T-Shelters completely in-country (even when the material was imported, but without their involvement in the customs procedures), avoided many of these constraints, contributing a large percentage of the completed T-Shelters at the end of 2010.

**Projections and planning**

The next graphic shows the September forecast against real progression. It seems evident not only that prepositioned or in-country made T-Shelters were not numerous, but also that the increase of the rhythm of completion still took 7 months.

![Transitional Shelter projection (September) and real progress](image)

Main milestones of the transitional shelter projections and planning were:

- **April 2nd**: SC-SAG: “The majority of T-Shelters are likely to be constructed in the second half of the 12 month period mentioned in the strategy and this needs to be clearly messaged to people”.
- **June 6th**: Shelter actors affirm that 80% of all planned T-Shelters, totalling 125,105 units, had funding.
- **July 2010**: Forecast on T-Shelter established a still optimistic goal of around 46,000 units to be built by December 2010.
- **August 26th**: The subject of “Alternate Shelter Programming” was introduced in the SC-SAG and the need to rethink the shelter strategy and look at other ways to provide shelter to affected families. In the course of the discussion, the need to make a quick evaluation of the performance of transitional shelter Programming was expressed by a number of agencies.
• September 14th. The “Tarpaulin Replacement Distribution Forecast” presented the need for tarpaulin replacement against a projection of T-Shelter and House Repairs progress.

• Even though this projection was made as an alert mechanism facing a concerning delay, there were no significant advances from October to November, and the real progression accumulated an average gap of 35% of the foreseen performance.

• September 17th. The transitional shelter TWiG released the result of a survey done within the implementing agencies, stating that the average cost had increased to 2,300USD – 4,300USD (original anticipated cost was 1,500USD), and that they were going from “Transitional” (3 years) to “Longer term” (10-15+ years) shelter solutions.

• October 2010. A new less optimistic T-Shelter forecast is established, this time under the real progression that took place before.

Globally, the T-Shelter progression raised a quite regular rhythm of 2,700 T-Shelters per month between May and November 2010. This rhythm multiplied by 2.7 times in the next 7 months, going to a very regular monthly progression of 7,300 solutions, between December 2010 and June 2011.

3.4 House Repair

According to the SSRP, in the second phase of the response, the Non-displaced People Objective was “Resources and technical support to ensure that reconstruction is achieved that results in housing that is seismic, rain and hurricane resistant. Specific assistance is offered to vulnerable persons and families”, including transitional shelter and self-recovery for IDPs; and Self-help, Phased materials distribution and Technical advice for non-displaced owners, aiming to achieve “durable housing in less vulnerable locations, built back safer”.

Since March 22nd 2010 (Shelter Cluster Position Paper), House Repair was not formally under the SC umbrella, but under Early Recovery Cluster’s. Nonetheless, in April discussions on shelter as a whole were still taking place: “Wording: “shelter” – it is important that this is defined to include permanent housing, repairs of houses, T-Shelter construction, as well as hosted family shelter support”.

3.4.1 Timeline

The assessment of buildings safety and demolition of the unsafe structures was a foreseen activity from the very beginning, and included in Phase 1 of the SSRP. However, this task actually began in March, led by the MTPTC, and was completed by January 2011, assessing 390,000 buildings. This assessment initiative was not within the “area of influence” of the SC, even when it was clearly stated in the SSRP as an objective of the first 3 months phase.

By the end of August 2010, partial results were released, and on November 28th -more than 9 months after the earthquake-, the first guidelines for Small Buildings Repair were released. Between November 2010 and February 2011 MTPTC, UNOPS and PADF made


23 SC-SAG Meeting Minutes of April 16th

24 With the technical assistance of UNOPS funded by World Bank and USAID. [http://www.unops.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/rebuilding_haiti_unops_EN_web.pdf](http://www.unops.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/rebuilding_haiti_unops_EN_web.pdf)
yellow houses assessments, according to guidelines, covering those areas or
neighbourhoods where agencies had the capacity to fund the repairs. By February 2011 -13
months after the earthquake- tracking system shows approximately 2,000 houses repaired.

Final results in January 2011 showed 26% of yellow houses (indicating that the building
could be accessible if repairs are made) summing up residential and partially residential
buildings, and 54% of green ones25, showing a big potential for a partial housing stock
recovery (that some organizations undertook as far as it was possible). Some stakeholders
had stated their interest since April 2010: “More agencies have approached donors to
request for reallocation of funding, from construction of T-Shelters to repair of green and
yellow houses with a shift of focus to Léogâne and Jacmel”26.

3.4.2 House Repair Progression

The “Tarpaulin Replacement Distribution Forecast” developed by the SC presented
a projection on House Repair to calculate the need for tarpaulin replacement
against a projection of T-Shelter and House Repairs progress. There was a big
gap between the foreseen advance and the real performance.

25 MTPTC / UNOPS / PADF - Bureau technique d'évaluation des bâtiments. Inspections du 11 Mars 2010 au 04
Février 2011. [Types d'occupation avec signalisation]
26 SC-SAG meeting (April 16th, 2010)
4. Allocation of funds to different approaches

4.1 Evolution of T-Shelter costs and budget allocation

By mid-February 2010, the shelter actors defined T-Shelter Standards. Cost was defined within a range of 1.000-1.500 USD, including transportation and labour, (excluding taxes), for a single-story 18 m² transitional shelter, assuming additional input of materials and labour from home owners. Two months later, the SC-SAG agreed to increase it by about 15-20% because of some of the identified constraints and adaptations that had to be met:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transitional Shelter Standards</th>
<th>1,000 - 1,500 USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase allowed (April 23th) due to:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small volume of order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase cost due to importing from area outside the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple story design</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demountable design</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of permanent shelter foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Estimated Cost</td>
<td>1,800 USD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transitional Shelter technical guidance and 23th April 2010 SC SAG meeting minutes

Recent studies reviewed show a higher current average cost, considering a sample of 39,600 solutions of 18 projects. Thus, while average size is maintained (18.1 m²), the average price is 2.8 times that originally considered. Considering the foreseen number of T-Shelter solutions and the estimated time to complete them at the current rate, two years and about 530 million dollars would be necessary to deal with the projected coverage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporary Shelter</th>
<th>unit cost</th>
<th>total cost</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planned</td>
<td>1.500 USD</td>
<td>187.500.000 USD</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real cost and time</td>
<td>4.226 USD</td>
<td>528.250.000 USD</td>
<td>2 year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Self elaboration based on data taken from Transitional Shelter technical guidance and budgets data collected

The disparity between costs of delivered T-Shelters is significant: from a tightly adjusted to guidelines budget of 1.392 USD per solution to the amount of 11.428 USD per solution.

4.2 Shelter solutions costs overview

The average cost per m² of T-Shelter construction is only 17% cheaper than if building permanent solutions in situ, and 30% cheaper than the cost per m² of new site permanent housing constructions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average cost (USD) per m²</th>
<th>Average unit cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Shelter</td>
<td>233.5</td>
<td>4.226 USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>5465 USD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction in situ</td>
<td>282.5</td>
<td>7.401 USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction - new site</td>
<td>332.3</td>
<td>11.564 USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental</td>
<td>500 USD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubble clearance (original m²)</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Self elaboration based on budgets data collected and Damage Assessment Results and Yellow Houses Repair Strategies (presentation), S.E. Miyamoto International, Earthquake + Structural Engineers
The estimated impact of rubble clearance had in the overall budget represents about 0.80 m³ per each m² of the former construction. According to Early Recovery Cluster estimations, the cost of removing every m³ would be 41 USD:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rubble clearance</th>
<th>m³ rubble/m² floor</th>
<th>usd/m³</th>
<th>usd/m²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Self elaboration based on data taken from ER Cluster data and Damage Assessment Results and Yellow Houses Repair Strategies (presentation), Kit Miyamoto, Ph.D., S.E. Miyamoto International, Earthquake + Structural Engineers

4.3 Budget Allocation overview

While no complete information is available, it is nonetheless possible to use existing data to have a rough picture of budget allocation. In the table below we examine the reviewed aggregated data which allows an overview of the trends:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Type</th>
<th>Total Units</th>
<th>Nº of Projects</th>
<th>Total project costs</th>
<th>% of project costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Shelter</td>
<td>39.601</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>158,650,421 USD</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>15.242</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100,219,171 USD</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction in situ</td>
<td>10.725</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41,251,455 USD</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction - new site</td>
<td>17.710</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>94,312,839 USD</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental</td>
<td>1.288</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12,198,392 USD</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>84.566</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>406,632,278 USD</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using average unit costs to make rough estimations of budget allocations as of June 2011, the picture would be the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Type</th>
<th>Completed units according to SC Data (July 2011 Data)</th>
<th>Average unit cost</th>
<th>Estimated investment</th>
<th>Estimated Budget allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Shelter</td>
<td>80.390</td>
<td>4.226 USD</td>
<td>339,728.140 USD</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>5.275</td>
<td>5.465 USD</td>
<td>28,827.875 USD</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-site Construction</td>
<td>5.707</td>
<td>10.000 USD</td>
<td>57,070.000 USD</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction - new site</td>
<td>91.372</td>
<td></td>
<td>425,626.015 USD</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW

1. Integrated and multi-cluster approach

1.1 General Coordination System difficulties

- **Unilateral action over coordination and lack of reliable tracking of aid**
  According to estimations private funding amounts to 80% of the total aid. In several cases, the much larger percentage of private funds availability over public funding led to unilateral actions by organizations, as they felt little need to coordinate and public donors were not able to impose strategies. Consequently, the tracking of the aid became less reliable.

- **Unknown number of humanitarian actors**
  New actors, unfamiliar with humanitarian aid and with the country arrived, uncoordinated and improvising actions. The exact number of actors remains unclear, estimations fall in a wide range of between 400 to 8.000 organizations.

- **High staff turnover**
  Common to all the organizations, it hindered the shelter sector coordination. It also affected Cluster lead agencies. OCHA Head of Office was only appointed in August 2010; UNDP appointed a definitive ER Cluster coordinator after August 2010, following several short-term coordinators; between January and November 2010, there were seven personnel changes in the post of SC Coordinator, three of which took place before the IFRC became cluster lead. Only CCCM Cluster had the same coordinator since February 2010.

- **Complexity and weaknesses of the response coordination structure**
  Before the earthquake the cluster system in Haiti was weak on ownership and accountability, and links with humanitarian coordination were also unclear. The international response after the disaster represented a complex accumulation of several coordination structures, whose linkage was never clear, creating both overlapping and gaps between MINUSTAH, IHRC, JOTC and the Cluster system. Clearly, the coordination of such a large number of actors represented a challenge.

- **National-International coordination.**
  This review could confirm an extended opinion of the existence of constraints to local participation in the strategic decisions. The inaccessible venue or strict security procedures to access UN Log Base and the use of English in the meetings deterred Haitian attendance, an issue that affected SC’s work in PaP, contributing to build a barrier between the international response system and the Haitian institutions. However, where meetings were

**Main sources for this section were:** interviews, DARA Humanitarian Response Index 2010, Haiti Chapter; OXFAM, From Relief to Recovery, 6 January 2011; and A Review of the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster, Haiti 2010.

**DARA HRI 2010.** “A massive influx of funding –probably 80 per% of it from the general public- left many humanitarian actors with more resources than anticipated. (...) FTS data suggesting that private donations total US$1.24 billion, 36.8% of the total humanitarian assistance, is generally believed to be an under-estimate. Many INGOs reported an unprecedented response from their supporters. By July 2010, the American Red Cross had received US$468 million (CNN 2010). MSF reported receiving 91 million euros in private donations and in the UK, the public provided 101 GBP million for the work of major NGOs (Disaster Emergency Committee 2010)”

**OCHA estimation**

**BBC News estimation**

**Three different persons during IFRC-led period, since the 2nd and 4th coordinator was the same person, who had also been the deputy of the first coordinator.**
held in French, Haitian attendance was not regular in all locations, Jacmel being the one that had a higher involvement of local agencies.

1.2 The inter-cluster roles distribution and the SC’s narrowed Scope

Assuming the role “in assisting to define the overall strategic direction of the relief and recovery effort”, the SSRP defined the need to establish special coordination with the clusters activated in the first days after the earthquake for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Recovery Cluster</td>
<td>Clearing surface water drainage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rubble removal, especially when land is released for shelter or reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recovery and livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM Cluster</td>
<td>Sites used for transitional settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH Cluster</td>
<td>Water and sanitation provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection Cluster</td>
<td>Protection monitoring and support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between January and February, the Early Recovery Cluster was aiming to deal with some of these issues, mainly rubble clearance through Cash for Work, and UNDP allocated 3 million USD to rubble removal and the rehabilitation of essential social infrastructure. In mid-March, the Cluster Position Paper, based on the “particularities of the Haiti earthquake response”, established those issues in which the SC had agreed to take the lead and those in which SC would participate but expected others to take the lead on:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster (Haiti)</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter Cluster</td>
<td>Emergency Shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transitional Shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shelter NFIs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Host Families (SC Core responsibility, but including other clusters work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Recovery Cluster</td>
<td>Land Tenure and Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rubble Removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM Cluster</td>
<td>Site selection, Camp Planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the established Early Recovery Cluster responsibilities, the SC Position Paper recognizes the need for them to be handled by people with specific skills and experience, with a longer-term view. It also assumes that shelter agencies will have some involvement with them, recommending that it be dealt within a TWiG under the Early Recovery Cluster.

The SC position to have a “supporting role” in those topics probably led to a reading by some agencies that they were not their responsibility, hence leaving them out of the scope of their Programmes, waiting for someone else to solve them. Bigger agencies, however, played a more active role in these topics’ resolution, but at the end of the day they meant a huge constraint for their transitional shelter Programmes development.

From March to April 2010, shelter actors worked on plans and guidelines on Host Families and Community Needs and Land Tenure, adapted to the Haitian context.

Even if the ER Cluster included several different Working Groups, such as Logement Quartier Group (animated by UN-HABITAT Country Team), or Host Families Working

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32 CWGER Update on Haiti (21 January 2010). doc
33 21/03/10
Group, the fact is that in the meantime, the Early Recovery Cluster showed a low – and decreasing - capacity to handle these issues. By October-November the Early Recovery Cluster was functioning properly, but still with 1-2 people.

Between May and July 2010, UNDP attempted to hand over responsibility for running the Early Recovery Cluster to the Haitian Government, but it did not succeed.

The chart at the end of this section shows the evolution of capacities and roles during the time between January and November 2010 for both the Shelter and the Early Recovery Clusters highlighting the most relevant milestones. While initial decisions could be based on the logic of burden sharing among similar cluster capacities and willingness, by March it becomes clear that Early Recovery capacities were not suitable to deal with such relevant issues as Land Tenure and Property, Permanent Housing or Urban Planning. It seems as if neither the Inter-cluster nor the Humanitarian Coordination Team effectively intervened to assure the solution to these key issues.

In conclusion, it could be said that the SC initially assumed a leading position within a multi-cluster approach, and soon narrowed its strategic focus, pointing out other clusters’ key issues leadership, but without considering their real capacities to deal with them, therefore losing the ability to ensure the accomplishment of key tasks to guarantee transitional shelter. As a result of this, gaps remained unsolved or solutions were delayed, which in some way contributed to enhance or reinforce the foreseen constraints, as happened with both the rubble removal and housing repair.

Some key stakeholders considered that to have had a flexible approach in the cluster ToRs in order to adapt operations to the existing contexts would have been very useful. For instance, the possibility for the SC and/or the HC to clearly state the need for a stand-alone coordination mechanism in order to respond to rubble removal could have allowed a better coordination of operations and the necessary resource mobilization.
### Shelter Cluster

#### Roles and Activities

- **Begins SSRP design First E-Shelter distributions coordination**
- **21/3/2010 Cluster Position Paper states that Land Tenure and Property + Permanent Housing + Urban Planning + Rubble Removal are expected to be under ER Cluster responsibility (TWiG)**
- **10/04/2010: Host Family and Community Needs Assessment Guidelines (TWiG)**
- **20/04/2010: Towards Tenure Security after disaster (doc)**
- **SC begins discussion handover with UN Habitat**
- **SCT added new roles: Urban Settlements Advisor, and Housing (USA), Land and Property Adviser (HLPA)**
- **A Debris Advisor is added to the SC-CT**
- **USA and HLPA arrived**

#### Coord Capacities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 pers in PaP</td>
<td>2 pers in PaP</td>
<td>9 pers in PaP + 2 in Léogâne &amp; 2 in Jacmel</td>
<td>8 pers in PaP + 2 in Léogâne &amp; 2 in Jacmel</td>
<td>8 pers in PaP + 2 in Léogâne &amp; 2 in Jacmel</td>
<td>14 pers in PaP + 3 in Léogâne &amp; 1 in Jacmel</td>
<td>18 pers in PaP + 3 in Léogâne &amp; 1 in Jacmel</td>
<td>17 pers in PaP + 2 in Léogâne &amp; 1 in Jacmel</td>
<td>14 pers in PaP + 2 in Léogâne &amp; 1 in Jacmel</td>
<td>IFRC handover to UNHABITAT - From 14 to 4 pers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Early Recovery Cluster

#### Roles and Activities

- **19/1/2010 Cluster meeting minutes includes Cash x Work arrangements to rubble removal, work on building codes and informs on UNOPS or UNESCO building assessment**
- **19/1/2010 Cluster states the need to elaborate an action plan on rubble removal 25/2/2010 ER Cluster in Jacmel releases the Inventaire Georeferencie des immeubles affectes par le seisme du 12 janvier dans la ville de Jacmel et ses zones peripheriques.**
- **16/03/2010: last meeting minutes available in web until October 14th**
- **UN Habitat staff in charge for running Logement Quartier Group –LQG– (although not clear if under ERC umbrella)**
- **UNDP attempts to hand over responsibility for running the Early Recovery Cluster to the Haitian Government**
- **ER Cluster lead by GoH “collapses”**
- **UNDP appoints a new (and definitive) ER Cluster Coordinator**
- **14/10/2010 new Cluster Meeting Minutes in web**

#### Coord Capacities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 pers in PaP</td>
<td>2 pers in PaP</td>
<td>2 pers in PaP + 1 in Léogâne 1 in Jacmel</td>
<td>4 pers + 2 pers for LQG</td>
<td>1pers in PaP + 1 in Jacmel</td>
<td>2 pers in PaP + 1 in Jacmel</td>
<td>2 pers in PaP + 1 in Jacmel</td>
<td>2 pers in PaP + 1 in Jacmel</td>
<td>2 pers in PaP + 1 in Jacmel</td>
<td>2 pers in PaP + 1 in Jacmel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The shelter sector response strategy and its evolution

Aspirational and/or realistic?

Initial steps in defining a joint strategy were taken at a very early stage; by early February 2010 the GoH and shelter agencies had a fourth version of a shelter strategic framework (the SSRP), devised by the SC-SAG. Continuous strategic discussions served the purpose of advocating for the emergency and transitional shelter needs of affected people, towards partner organizations, donor community and media.

The SSRP was an important achievement considering the context of extraordinary difficulties to understand the situation and draw a main path for the shelter agencies. However, due to the shortage of information it suffers from being theoretical to some extent, including a very wide range of shelter options and not accurately gauging the constraints/challenges to be met. But despite the weaknesses that SSRP could have had, it was a significant milestone and represented a solid foundation from which the shelter actors could have developed specific strategies, filling in the gaps (particularly the transitional shelter options’ goals and distribution) as new information was being released.

One and half months after the disaster and one month after the initial version of a preliminary shelter strategy, a number of points had become redundant, as humanitarian and governmental efforts started to take shape and in some cases did not proceed as initially expected –such as for rubble removal and land availability. However, the preliminary strategy served at the time as a strong advocacy tool for what shelter actors considered as necessary to move forward shelter provision in a large scale.

The evaluation found conflicting positions regarding the SSRP’s design and relevance in the overall 2010 response. Despite the SC-lead efforts to allow shelter actors to commonly define a strategy\(^{34}\) applying approaches as participatory as possible (keeping them manageable), many shelter actors’ interviewees stated that they did not have the opportunity to contribute and/or provide feedback to the strategy’s design. Constraints for a better coordination and lack of sufficient information in the first weeks after the earthquake probably did not allow having a more effective participatory process\(^{35}\).

But it also has to be considered that early-on many agencies were already engaged in or committed to specific shelter projects (not only emergency solutions but also transitional shelter actions), making strategic sector planning and the urge to define and even fund agencies’ specific planning two separate processes, which probably made the SSRP an all-inclusive document but that did not rule the subsequent shelter agencies decisions as many of them were already taken.

That probably led many of the main shelter actors to see the SSRP as an aspirational but no so realistic document, and not as much as a functional strategy that took into consideration what the agencies could accomplish and addressed all issues adapted to the Haiti context, finding “a gap between a well written document and the post-earthquake reality in Haiti”.

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\(^{34}\) Shelter actors were requested to feedback the initial strategic framework (as stated in January and early-February SC and SAG meetings minutes). The SC-SAG was first formed by 25 organizations, and members later decreased and increased once and again as different criteria applied (either efficiency -too many people led to lack of decisions- or wide participation -many agencies complaining from being outside the SC-SAG-).

\(^{35}\) Comments to the first SSRP drafts received were not numerous and/or came at a time when either turnover of staff was just about to start in a number of agencies, or agencies were too stretched while responding to operational and programmatic needs in order to participate in the revision of the plan.
As a matter of fact, although further sectorial approaches were developed, the context evolved and new information was available, the shelter sector strategy was not updated (not its main lines of action nor its goals), which can be seen as an endorsement of the initial strategy or as its progressive loss of significance in the shelter sector’s performance.

The protracted emergency

The strategy assumed a gap of about 6-8 months between the emergency shelter milestone and the transitional shelter one. Emergency shelter solutions provided were able to endure this time according to the findings of the Review of emergency shelters made in May that stated the need to replace materials following the hurricane season in November 2010 in preparation for the 2011 rainy season.

This report anticipated the appearance of a protracted emergency since many families were going to remain under E-shelters into 2011 and beyond. The replacement need was then established as the response strategy, and generating the need for new actions.

Considering that the main effort was focused on the wide emergency shelter response and that other approaches were constrained by a wide range of difficulties, the integral design of the SSRP (consisting of parallel tasks) was in practice narrowed as time elapsed, leading to an accumulated delay in the provision of temporary or transitional solutions, and therefore needing new relief responses as new emergencies arose.
The shelter response second phase, which aimed at achieving full transitional shelter within 12 months, focused mainly on one approach, based on the provision of wind-proof structures of 18 m² with a 3 year lifespan.

Although the second phase activities were designed as part of a contiguum strategy (simultaneous combination of relief, rehabilitation and development, with an integrated and encompassing approach whereby the three forms of assistance are carried out side by side in order to respond effectively to all aspects and areas), distinguishing the emergency phase from an emergency approach, relevant progress in transitional shelter started by May 2010, in a continuum approach (linear sequence), which meant an evident delay on the foreseen strategy.

The timeline for transitional shelter was also miscalculated. To achieve the 125,000 target in January 2011 it would have been necessary to put in place 11,400 houses per month, starting by the end of February 2010. From May to November 2010 the transitional shelter progression followed a quite regular rhythm of 2,700 solutions per month.

Later on, when tender, production, shipping, customs, rubble clearing and build up times were better articulated delivery rhythm increased 270%, achieving a ratio of 7,300 units per month, which could constitute the maximum ratio to be reached. Following this rhythm the target would be reached in January 2012, 24 months after the earthquake, doubling the anticipated completion of T-shelters planned, and not fulfilling the overall estimated need (around 180,000).

3. Shelter response’s adaptation to the context

3.1 Adaptation to the urban setting context

Lack of more detailed information in the first days, media reports and the GoH statements about damages and needs while encouraging the affected population to leave Port-Au-Prince to smaller towns or rural areas, led to an idea shared in general terms: that the earthquake had caused a write-off in the urban areas, particularly in the poorest Port-Au-Prince neighbourhoods.

And, even if this idea was not assumed in absolute terms by the shelter agencies, the lack of more accurate damages and needs assessments in the first weeks/months led many agencies to take strategic and funding decisions without further data. Regarding the shelter sector response, the evaluation could see trends in the transitional shelter programming based on the following decisions:

i) Choosing to work out of Port-Au-Prince (smaller town or rural areas), due to more land availability and still high demand

ii) Funding transitional shelter Programmes based mainly on the production and delivery of T-Shelters, assuming the lack of host families within Port-Au-Prince, and rental supplementary housing stock limitations

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36 The Rapid Needs Assessment results were published in mid-February; some actors even did not know it took place. An IASC report lamented that “assessments in the early stages of the Haiti response followed different standards, methods and focuses, thereby hampering effort to create an overview of cross-cluster needs”

37 These decisions were not taken by all agencies nor the shelter cluster promoted them, but the overall shelter response mainstream shows trends based on these decisions.
iii) Not considering the possibility to integrate a housing repair and/or reconstruction direct approach into the programming, (skipping the transitional phase) in cases where it would require as much time and/or money as the T-Shelter solution

The transitional shelter direct delivery (T-Shelter) solution mainly adopted by the shelter agencies, found stronger constraints in the contextual facts, such as lack of land, rubble accumulation and land tenure and property, amongst others. Of course, in some cases the direct provision of a T-Shelter had no alternative solution, but it appears to have been a more agencies-driven decision than a thoughtful “urban setting context considered” one.

Regarding land tenure issues, the shelter actors promptly identified the complexity of the Haiti context and developed guidelines to address them, and suggested solutions such as give the property of the T-Shelter to the affected family (when it was to be delivered to a tenant) and make an arrangement with the owner in order to ensure that the tenant could stay there for 3 or more years. But it was not easy for the agencies to reach that kind of agreement, because in Haiti it is not usual for arrangements to go beyond a one-year term, aspect that was not well anticipated.

3.2 Adaptation to the previous Haiti shelter/housing plans

Another relevant contextual fact existed before the earthquake: the GoH was working on the possibility of locating new developments in other parts of the country, as a way to relieve pressure on the infrastructure of the capital and encourage the development of other parts of the country, some of which were likely to significantly influence the long term settlement choices of those affected. The shelter actors took it into consideration but the lack of governmental counterpart capacities and the overwhelming emergency needs impeded the integration of this on-going possibility to the main shelter response and to date it has not been raised again. It may have been opportune to revise it after the first months in order to consider its viability and the chance that the shelter sector strategy could support it in the recovery phase, creating an opportunity out of the disaster.

3.3 Addressing the “rubble trouble"

“Let’s face it: rubble clearance is not a ‘sexy’ issue” [a review interviewee]

From the very beginning, rubble was identified as a main constraint, and therefore included in the SSRP as a challenge to be dealt with. Nonetheless, no accurate calculations were made until January 2011. Meanwhile, based on satellite images, estimations of 20-25 million cubic meters were made. The MTPTC calculations after a more accurate measurement established an approximate volume of 10,000,000 m$^3$, half the initial estimations but still an enormous amount of rubble. Currently, UNDP estimates that 2 million cubic meters were removed in 2010, dealing with a serious problem around the scarcity of identified dump sites.

Rubble removal in cases of urban large scale disasters like in Haiti will represent interventions in the range of billions of dollars. In Haiti, the integration with the SC only became a possibility discussed between humanitarian partners after the failure of non-humanitarian efforts (military, etc.).

38 Shelter sector response plan. Challenges. “Given the pressing need to respond to emergency shelter needs, however, comprehensive plan (regarding this issue) will need to be developed quickly if these activities are to effectively inform this strategy”.

An Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake 2010
Meeting Shelter Needs: Issues, achievements and constraints
Rubble removal required several intermediate steps, such as the owner’s authorization, the need to destroy large elements into smaller pieces to facilitate their transportation, the transportation itself, and the disposal in a dump site. At the end of 2010 main roads of the city had been cleared and access made possible, but difficulties still remained to access neighbourhoods or entire blocks, mainly in the most severely affected areas. Regarding the SSRP, rubble clearance was not only the way to obtain an important part of the scarce space available to facilitate transitional shelter to the IDPs in the initial 12 months, but also the way to decongest the overcrowded E-shelter camps. Also, it was a fundamental step to facilitate space both for displaced and non-displaced owners or tenants.

In March 2010, rubble clearance was one of the areas on which the SC-SAG agreed the SC did not have the lead, although keeping some involvement with. This decision aimed at enabling the shelter agencies “to focus on the urgent emergency and transitional shelter issues”.

But also in March 2010, in the released guidelines/policies to achieve Transitional Shelter solutions both in hosted or original locations, rubble clearance represented the first step to gain space in approximately 20% of the cases (“Red houses”, those that constitute a risk and occupation should be avoided), in what seems to be a contradiction. This led to a situation in which no clear accountability was defined to clear up the plots in which transitional shelters were to be delivered:

i) The SSRP identified the Early Recovery Cluster as the rubble clearance coordinator, but not based on official roles divisions.

ii) Later on, in March 2010, the SC attempted to clarify it, pointing out the Early Recovery Cluster as the issue’s leader, who did not officially take on the challenge, at least not until the last months of 2010.

iii) The SC carried out its self-appointed supporting role in the matter with a TWiG and a rubble expert technical advisor, more focused on pointing out recycling possibilities than addressing the problem overall.

iv) A few agencies undertook specific projects but not to the extent that was needed.

v) The GoH was pointed out as the main responsible for rubble removal, but its capacities were very limited. However, GoH efforts with military assistance helped to clear most streets of PaP in record time, although not reaching levels even closer to the extent that rubble removal was necessary for the shelter programmes implementation.

Thus, rubble clearance remained as “the constraint” for transitional shelter delivery but lacked a thorough strategy and remained unbudgeted. Actually, lack of a budget has indeed been the main constraint to address this issue. Shelter agencies’ alleged lack of funding for rubble clearance (donors did not accept it and/or they had already allocated their funds for T-Shelter construction), and reconstruction funding was below expectations. On the other hand, agencies were also reluctant to spend their privately-raised funds on rubble clearance, for different reasons (lack of experience, liability concerns, funding already committed, lack of visibility, etc.).

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39 Shelter Cluster position paper. March 22nd 2010: “[The SC] is working on having a Recovery Advisor that can participate in the discussions on these issues”
40 100324 Presentation TS Programming Haiti.ppt
41 SC-SAG’s Position Paper
Later studies done within the Early Recovery Cluster estimate a 25-41 USD/m³ cost for rubble clearance (tending to be higher when done in a small scale), raising the transitional solution cost by at least 1.200-1.500 USD, which is over a 50% increase. Despite this, the shelter agencies have already delivered over 80.000 T-Shelters.

It seems that priority was given to cases where it did not require much effort (moving it within the same plot or to a close disposal place), and that very often the same agencies that delivered the T-Shelters were in charge of clearing it with participation of the beneficiaries. Although no clear information on how they did it or how much did it cost, this effort of the agencies and the population has gone unnoticed.

The shelter actors were more focused on giving technical advisory in the reuse/recycling of the rubble rather than in designing a wide strategic approach to integrate the “rubble trouble” into the main transitional shelter response.

3.4 Comparison of interim shelter options’ constraints and opportunities

The following chart analyses and compares the main constraints and/or risks and the opportunities (favouring factors and links with a full shelter recovery) that each interim shelter solution could meet. As can be seen no shelter option was the “cleanest” solution, but some were underexplored. Even within the same shelter option, some shelter agencies managed to “avoid” the constraints better by, for instance, choosing less dense locations for T-Shelter delivery or working with a closer neighbourhood approach the host families’ support.
An Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake 2010
Meeting Shelter Needs: Issues, achievements and constraints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shelter option</th>
<th>Constraints / risks</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| T-Shelter direct provision (original plot) | Rubble  
Logistics (customs, transportation, access to plots)  
Land conditions (size, disaster risk, etc.)  
Land tenure security (ownership proof, arrangements w/ owners - tenants support)  
Local construction market overwhelmed (import needs – more complex production and delivery procedures - effects on timeline and unit costs) | Return to neighbourhood approach  
Possibilities of T-shelter upgrading into permanent housing  
Better control of the outcome (size, materials, resistance)  
Longer duration of the interim shelter (upgraded solutions)  
More agencies’ know-how, R&D&i and expertise in T-Shelter products delivery  
Increased / easier funding  
Integration of full shelter recovery approach  
Adequate site planning  
Better logistics  
Political backing (land allocation and projects endorsement)  
Possibility of multi-story shelter (land efficiency) |
| T-Shelter direct provision (relocation site) | Land allocation  
Livelhood opportunities and social equipment shortage when site is far from prior home  
Uncertainty of land use duration | Return to neighbourhood approach  
Possibilities of T-shelter upgrading into permanent housing  
Better control of the outcome (size, materials, resistance)  
Longer duration of the interim shelter (upgraded solutions)  
More agencies’ know-how, R&D&i and expertise in T-Shelter products delivery  
Increased / easier funding  
Integration of full shelter recovery approach  
Adequate site planning  
Better logistics  
Political backing (land allocation and projects endorsement)  
Possibility of multi-story shelter (land efficiency) |
| T-Shelter direct provision (for self-construction, w/o technical assistance) | Less control of outcome quality (size, construction procedures, resistance, etc.)  
Less control of site conditions (rubble, disaster-proneness, etc.)  
Risk of replicating shelter deficits  
Risk of misuse of materials | Self-driven shelter solution  
Higher synergies w/ affected own resources and/or capacities  
Higher effectiveness and efficiency (less delivery costs)  
Camps exit approach |
| Support to host families (Vouchers, cash transfer, housing upgrading, etc.) | Displacement tracking (hindering needs assessment)  
Disperse location of beneficiaries (hindering implementation and monitoring)  
Risk of misuse of voucher / cash transfers  
Lack of institutional expertise of most agencies | Self-driven shelter solution  
Better cost/benefit ($ x solution / lifespan)  
Synergies with HF support  
Upgrading of non-affected housing stock  
Land allocation at HF for T-Shelter product construction |
| Rental support | Shortage of rental housing stock (supply constraints)  
Assessment of the renting houses conditions  
Market distortion / increase of rental fees  
Risk of misuse of cash transfers  
Low local custom of long (+ 1 year) rental arrangements | Self-driven shelter solution / Higher synergy w/ affected own capacities  
Better cost/benefit ($ x solution / lifespan)  
Use of available housing resources – Bring closer supply and demand  
Combine with housing repair (increase supply of rental shelter/housing while supporting interim solutions for tenants)  
Multi-story shelter (land efficiency) |
| House repair | Damages assessment (at first stages of the response)  
Accurate repair needs assessment (Minor repairs? Retrofitting?)  
Rubble clearance (in some cases) + Logistics  
Budget uncertainty and funding short availability  
Lack of institutional expertise of most agencies | Return to neighbourhood approach  
Build back safer approach  
Faster recovery (when possible) skipping the transitional shelter stage  
Political backing  
Land planning / neighbourhood upgrading approach |
4. Emergency shelter as a basis for Transitional Shelter

"Only 40% of T-Shelters delivered in 2010 were for a family living in a camp. In 2010 most people left camps by their own means" [a shelter actor interviewee]

The first needs assessments and IDP tracking showed that the number of people living in camps with emergency shelter solutions (1.5 M) was approximately the same as the number of people assisted by the emergency shelter materials distribution (mainly tents or tarpaulins, and in some cases also rope, zinc sheets, tool kits and/or some timber).

Although the shelter strategy aimed the transitional shelter at the displaced population, in a humanitarian continuum approach, it could be said that the shelter agencies’ transitional shelter Programmes were not mainly aimed at providing a transitional solution to those living in camps to facilitate their return to their neighbourhood.

Although consolidated figures in this sense are not easily available, data collected from some main implementing agencies and CCCM cluster researches allow to estimate a 60-40 percentage distribution of the delivered transitional shelter solutions given respectively to:

i) Households not living in IDP camps (non-displaced, already returned to neighbourhoods or displaced in some place other than a camp –e.g. host families)

ii) Households living in IDP camps (delivering the transitional shelter in the same camp or in a neighbourhood)

The ratio of shelter implementation was not sufficient to absorb people exiting from camps. In fact, while as of November 2010, the DTM\textsuperscript{42} registered the accumulated exit of approximately 116,000 people; the T-Shelters delivered were only 19,000, representing a big gap. Later, by March 2011, when the exit rates decreased, and shelter production rate increased, absorption capacity started to be positive:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{HH / Shelter Solutions} & may-10 & jul-10 & sep-10 & nov-10 & jan-11 & mar-11 & may-11 \\
\hline
\textbf{Bi-monthly rate of completed solutions (T-Shelter+House Repairs+Permanent Houses)} & 1.018 & 5.778 & 9.113 & 3.108 & 20.130 & 23.051 & 22.014 \\
\hline
\textbf{Bi-monthly rate of HH exit from Camps} & 40.309 & 75.622 & 49.810 & 24.469 & 12.807 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Source: Self elaboration based on DTM and T-Shelter progression data of IM services of SC

The graphic below shows the evolution of both progressions (accumulated exit from camps and shelter production including permanent solutions) from May 2010 (note that these figures do not include the unknown number of IDPs who were not placed in camps):

\[\text{Absorption capacities. Rates of people exit from camps and shelter production}\]

\[\text{HH / Shelter Solutions}\]

\[\text{Bi-monthly rate of completed solutions (T-Shelter+House Repairs+Permanent Houses)}\]

\[\text{Bi-monthly rate of HH exit from Camps}\]

\[\text{may-10} \quad \text{jul-10} \quad \text{sep-10} \quad \text{nov-10} \quad \text{jan-11} \quad \text{mar-11} \quad \text{may-11}\]

\[\text{1.018} \quad \text{5.778} \quad \text{9.113} \quad \text{3.108} \quad \text{20.130} \quad \text{23.051} \quad \text{22.014}\]

\[\text{40.309} \quad \text{75.622} \quad \text{49.810} \quad \text{24.469} \quad \text{12.807}\]

\[\text{Source: Self elaboration based on DTM and T-Shelter progression data of IM services of SC}\]

\[\text{The graphic below shows the evolution of both progressions (accumulated exit from camps and shelter production including permanent solutions) from May 2010 (note that these figures do not include the unknown number of IDPs who were not placed in camps)}:\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{42} Displaced Tracking Matrix – CCCM Cluster, from July 2010 and updated every 3 months approximately}\]
Considering the above mentioned, as to whether the emergency shelter response served as a basis to meet medium and long term needs, it could be said that aim was only partly achieved.

Furthermore, in the cases in which the family received support for both emergency and transitional shelter, the emergency shelter support delivered was not a basis for the transitional solution, considering the low quality of most of the self-constructed E-Shelters and the consequent minimum use of their materials for the transitional solution or the little ability to improve the E-Shelter to become a T-Shelter.

5. The humanitarian aid, a pull-factor to stay in camps?

"What we get here is good but not enough (…) living in this tent is unbearable (…) what keeps me here is that I have no other place to go or means to rent a house” [E-Shelter dwellers]

“If we keep giving water, cleaning the latrines, etc., they [IDPs] will never leave the camps, we are creating dependence (…) go to a camp, just cross the street to the nearby slum and see how the people in there live; the ones in the camp will probably have better conditions because they don’t pay rent and have water and sanitation” [review interviewees]

“Some people are leaving camps if offered 200$ by someone. That money does not even cover two months of basic needs and still they go (…) even if we replaced some materials, water and sanitation alleviates their situation but don’t make them ‘fortunate ones’ (…) maintaining minimum shelter conditions is within our humanitarian mandate, not a way to keep them in camps” [review interviewees]

The first of the above statements summarizes the opinion of a majority of the IDPs still living in camps consulted in the review. The other quotes from several shelter actors’ interviewees show the different positions existing within the shelter actors with regard to whether the humanitarian aid given to IDP discourages them from leaving the camps, or not.

In the first 3-4 months of the response, due to the scale of the disaster and to local idiosyncrasy, needs, people movements or related pull factors were very difficult to track and assess, and estimations were always affected by a significant margin for error\(^{43}\).

\(^{43}\) Population displacement was massive, lack of full people registration in Haiti, and overwhelmed GoH, Municipalities, UN and NGO capacities to track the displacement led to very rough and changing estimations of
From July 2010 onward, DTM\textsuperscript{44} registered a continuous decrease in the number of IDP in camps. The main decreases took place in the second half of the year\textsuperscript{45}.

Many people went outside the city in the early days of the emergency, when tons of aid landed without strict requirements for beneficiaries; and a significant exit from camps is registered by July, when relief capacity was probably at its maximum.

![Graph showing the decrease in IDP in camps](image)

6. Other possible early approaches to meet short and medium term needs

“The Haiti shelter response flaws are not in what was done, but in what wasn’t”

[a review interviewee]

The shelter response approach could have been more ample in some respects in order to have been more effective and efficient in meeting emergency and medium term needs.

6.1 Regarding Emergency Shelter

6.1.1 A more comprehensive and followed-up strategy

Some other approaches could have also been used in the emergency phase to reduce the number of IDP settled in camps or to achieve better emergency shelter standards. The proximity of the rainy season put pressure on the emergency shelter response and led to the approach of delivering mostly tents or tarpaulins and to a lesser extent to providing rope, tools, roof sheets and timber, and focusing more on the displaced population. However, SC was not solely responsible for this, and coordination with other clusters found strategies’ clashed that hindered a higher assistance to the non-displaced population\textsuperscript{46}. The presence of a number of inexperienced agencies and the insufficient governmental capacity to lead the response was also a constraint for a more comprehensive emergency shelter strategy.

This huge emergency shelter support efforts made may have taken out of focus the complications arising from the uncontrolled settlement of emergency shelter camps in order to keep dwelling conditions to a minimum while the transitional solutions were provided.

IDP origins and destination. The urgent need and the huge number of assisted, which also constrained understanding the logic of affected population displacements and pull-factors to (re)settle in a specific place.

\textsuperscript{44} Some stakeholders questioned the accuracy of first DTM data, but even if figures had margin for error, the exit figures were still very significant

\textsuperscript{45} A 10.6% from July to September and a 22.2% from September to November

\textsuperscript{46} WASH cluster was promoting the delivery of latrines and water only into camps
Thus, perhaps an on-going and longer term emergency shelter response should have been drafted in the early weeks after the earthquake, programming a second distribution of timber, tools and nails, rope and zinc sheets, to be finished by the end of June, overlapping with the first most urgent tarpaulin and tent distribution, in order to ensure a better self-construction of the emergency shelters.

The shelter agencies made a second massive distribution of tarpaulins in July-September\(^{47}\), but it seems to have been more a reaction to the assessment of the emergency shelter solutions conditions\(^{48}\) than part of a planned strategy to achieve and maintain proper emergency shelter conditions for the IDP.

The magnitude of the disaster would have probably greatly hindered the implementation of this wider emergency shelter approach, or perhaps the capacities of the agencies were not expandable (despite the money available) to procure, place and distribute more emergency shelter materials within the first six months, nevertheless it appears that although the emergency shelter response was successful as to “deliver at least minimum support for the entire displaced population”\(^{49}\), the follow up on this response was not adequate.

Addressing the non-displaced needs better. A camps reduction factor?

The emergency shelter materials are very likely to have been used to build E-Shelters in the camps and not in their previous living sites. Thus, even if giving priority in emergency shelter support to the IDP was adequate as for the impartiality principle observance, it could be said that an uncertain but significant number of persons stayed in or promptly returned to their neighbourhood or home, with not much emergency shelter support.

Immediately after the earthquake there were many constraints in place both to assess the individual situation of the non-displaced families (e.g. whether the buildings were safe to inhabit or to settle nearby) and to deliver the help directly in their neighbourhoods, but that does not change the fact that the non-displaced population support and the quick safe return to home approach was not significantly addressed by the shelter agencies.

The emergency shelter response strategy considered specific needs and approaches for the non-displaced population, and encouraged the agencies to support a safe return home as a way to avoid a higher burden in supporting the displaced population in camps, but when it came to its implementation the agencies did not manage well the prioritization of the emergency shelter needs of the non-displaced or of those willing to return to their previous plot and safely settle there\(^{50}\). This did not discourage people from staying in their houses or in their proximities, but may have also become a pull-factor to the camps, together with food, water, sanitation, and others.

A wider approach to support the non-displaced population, by giving higher priority to delivering emergency shelter materials for those willing to remain in the proximity of their houses (focusing in the constraints’ resolution), through specific distribution points (even if within the camps if it was logistically easier) and registering and tracking them as non-

\(^{47}\) Of approx. 1/3 of the first amount distributed. A second replacement was done in March 2011, and a third one (and allegedly to be the last) was on-going as of July 2011.


\(^{49}\) Shelter sector response plan. Displaced population objective, Phase 1.

\(^{50}\) People found no restriction to take emergency shelter support out of the camp, but they had to go there to receive it, not being treated specifically as non-displaced.
displaced, and a more flexible approach when it came to assess and inform if they were really affected and/or if they would be settling safely in the proximity of their homes, could have helped to reduce the size of the IDP camps and facilitated a wider implementation of other options to support the achievement of transitional dwelling conditions, more beneficiary-driven.

6.2 Regarding transitional shelter

“We know that T Shelter is not the best solution, but this is the only one we get to respond to the situation” [a review interviewee]

Although no document restrained the agencies from working in any of the interim solutions, and guidelines and technical tools for implementing host families support, safe return home, and cash/vouchers kind of actions were developed or shared, in practice the transitional shelter approach noticeably narrowed down to the construction and delivery of T-Shelters. The shelter agencies engaged in the delivery of a large number of T-Shelters, and many of them left out of their actions other options for transitional shelter.

Although no objective data was available as it was hard to track the displacements right after the earthquake, especially those out of the affected areas, the shelter actors estimated at 30% the percentage of displaced people living with a host family (that is over half a million people), and since the early weeks it is agreed that a significant number of people had left Port-Au-Prince to live with host families. However, and despite the fact that a few important agencies committed to host families support, the coverage that each of these organizations had in any given area was relatively small and required further intervention and support, and the amount of money allocated to HF Programmes was significantly less than to T-Shelter construction.

Other transitional shelter support options such as vouchers, cash or material distribution for self-construction or rental support were even less promoted, advised or integrated into the main cluster response. Many agencies’ interviewees stressed the lack of rental housing stock but no accurate figures could be found regarding it. The following aspects might have discouraged the agencies from doing it:

- Low expertise in working in cash transfer Programmes
- Less control of the outcome

51 In March 2010, the SC estimated the transitional shelter needs based among others in an estimated percentage of safe and slightly damaged houses based on anecdotal field reports, that perhaps could have been done in a not such an anecdotal amount.
52 Shelter Cluster Haiti Transitional Shelter Technical Guidance 19/02/10: “Transitional shelters are structures that provide solid cover for families for up to three years, providing additional time to develop durable solutions. The materials from transitional shelter can be incorporated into final reconstruction or relocated if required. They can also be repaired and maintained by their owners to increase the shelter lifetime”
53 As said, technical support was given to these other options as part of the shelter cluster’s outcome, but even if some agencies actually did had host families, rental assistance, safe return support and/or rubble clearance Programmes, it was in a much lower overall extent and the shelter actors did not monitor them too much.
54 SC’s “Shelter in Haiti - Achievements as of November 2010” poster
55 The mobile phone company Digicel tracked the origin of the calls made in the first weeks after the earthquake and found a relevant displacement of users to non-affected areas; a few weeks later a large number of users moved back to Port-Au-Prince, but as of May there were still hundreds of thousands living in host families / communities.
56 Shelter Cluster Haiti. Host Families TWiG. Community Guidelines. Supporting Host Families in Haiti by Tracking Movements, Understanding Needs and Directing Reponses
• Liability concerns
• Lack and/or difficulty of proper needs assessments
• Less visibility
• Insufficient promotion / advise from leading agencies
• Alleged rental housing under stock and stress to rental market

Despite the fact that constraints and liability risks actually existed, they could have been worked out and/or mitigated in most cases. A wider and earlier approach to support host families could have been used, promoting the involvement in that option. Accurate enough figures of displacement (Digicel tracking and research done by individual agencies) and hosted/hosting families were available within the first 2-3 months after the earthquake, as well as the Host Families support guidelines and other technical reference handbooks and guidelines. Considering the long time it finally took to construct T-Shelters and their cost, a high involvement in host families’ support could have lessened the burden to deliver transitional solutions, particularly in Port-Au-Prince, in a more effective and efficient way.

A rental support Programme could have also been highly developed and publicly promoted, getting supply and demand of rented houses closer in a self-driven process, and later assessing the viability of each case. Naturally, as any other shelter options it would have not avoided effort and constraints, but probably would have helped some thousands to find a transitional solution in a more efficient way.

6.3 Meeting standards and indicators in the T-Shelter approach

*The T-Shelters improvement: unavoidable or self-decided?*

The T-Shelter strategy aimed at agreeing upon common minimum standards, costs and approaches. In this matter, the Transitional Shelter technical guidance first draft (mid Feb 2010) was a quick and important milestone, to set performance standards and indicators for transitional shelters. But the first approach of a faster delivery of simpler while good enough transitional shelter proved unrealistic in order to meet all the standards, particularly in harmonizing the cost and the hazards resistant condition and the agreed deadline.

Part of the reason for not being able to simultaneously meet agreed upon T-Shelter standards and costs falls on the indicators design itself. For instance, the condition to resist a Category 1 hurricane for a 3-years lifespan solution seems to have been too demanding.

Hence, some agencies upgraded their models into a semi-permanent or progressive housing unit, all of which resulted in more expensive units and the consequent higher complexity of the production process and required conditions to provide a T-Shelter, affecting their capacity to fund the needed units and/or to meet the January 2011 deadline.

As time elapsed, the first simpler T-Shelter model progressively also lost acceptance with the local authorities and the affected population. Some authorities even banned the delivery

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57 The UNOPS technical review service only helped agencies knowing if they were meeting the standards, and it was not as much a factor for the T-Shelter upgrading; as a matter of fact many 4-5.000 USD T-Shelters delivered did not go through the UNOPS review, and some that did would not later integrate the suggested technical improvements

58 E.g. Many shelter agencies’ interviewees in Haiti acknowledged that as the T-Shelters’ costs were increasing and were becoming less mobile and longer-term structures, their concerns about the land tenure raised and requested more “inputs” to guarantee the ownership of the land or its sustained use by the T-Shelter recipient. Later many shelter agencies relaxed again the land tenure requirements, but time elapsed during that debate.
of plastic walls T-Shelter in their Communes, forcing the shelter agencies that had not upgraded their models to do it. But this stronger position appears to be based on the view of T-Shelters as a long-term solution considering the lack of expectations on permanent shelter solutions. Other reasons for this upgrading could have been eviction tense climate, limited capacity to implement emergency shelter reinforcement or to deliver T-Shelters in camps.

Since this “low-cost & high quality” approach appeared unlikely to be fulfilled, the T-Shelter strategy could have been revised, perhaps resulting in a more comprehensive longer-term transitional shelter, or permanent housing approach for part of the targeted population, with new timelines and a concurrent emergency shelter reinforcement programme where needed, diminishing the pressure on the T-Shelter implementation. But the agencies’ transitional shelter programmes were not very flexible and could not easily make changes to their on-going implementation processes, or it was not logical neither acceptable for them to downgrade their T-Shelters.

Another approach could have been to soften the most demanding standards in order to allow that the T-Shelters had been “kept simple”, since even though the need to import most materials and procurement procedure timelines may have remained, the less materials to purchase, less construction process complexities and less land tenure issues to solve would have allowed a faster delivery.

6.4 Regarding housing repair

A procrastinated option?

There is no doubt that doing housing repair or permanent housing on large scale in a country under risk of an even bigger earthquake needs to take into consideration more skilled construction workers, land tenure stronger restrictions, bigger liabilities, higher need of quality control, etc., but the fact is that as of the end of 2010 (and may we say, up to date) there was no clear roadmap on what to do for permanent housing in the urban setting, no model or process had been outlined, no vision or guidance was in view, and most shelter agencies did not evaluate their real capacity to engage in housing repair.

Either if housing repairs is seen as part of permanent housing and was not under the official scope of the SC, it is undoubtedly a shelter issue. The shelter sector in Haiti promoted a “return to neighbourhood strategy” aimed at drawing the displaced population out of the camps through the provision of shelter (transitional, permanent, home repairs), but the shelter agencies procrastinated their engagement in housing repair. This low engagement with the housing repair in 2010 could have been motivated by:

- Lack of experience / fear to find many constraints (rubble, logistics, trained labour)
- Difficulty to design big-scale funding proposals (need to budget on an individual-basis)
- Budget increase concerns (unforeseen events during repair works)
- Impartiality concerns (“Are the yellow houses IDP-owners’ the most vulnerable?”)

59 Including more m²/person
60 Although whichever the type of T Shelter was erected perhaps some implementation steps could not be timely compressed to a large extent (e.g. selection of beneficiaries, land tenure tracking, rubble removal), the possibilities for a higher involvement of the beneficiaries in constraints’ solving and construction processes could have reduce the implementation burden on the agencies and allowed a faster overall T-Shelter delivery.
61 See adjacent graphic from “Haiti Shelter Cluster Update Poster, Nov 2010”
62 The review heard at least once each one of these motivations in the interviews with the SC informants.
• Disagreement with the minor repairs approach; debate between repair vs. retrofitting (What if we only do minor repairs and a new earthquake happens?)
• Option seen as a recovery/reconstruction issue (not under the SC umbrella) and not within their response plan (not many agencies look after the whole continuum)
• Lack of funding (HQ and/or donors not willing to go into complex construction projects)
• Camp-driven response (less constraints and higher visibility),

To define standards (security, building codes, trainings, etc.) for housing repair would have been essential for motivating agencies and donors to engage earlier on in these initiatives. Lessons learned from previous cases of other humanitarian post-earthquake assistance seem to have shown the importance of establishing those standards before initiating the works. In Haiti, donors and agencies did not want to take the risk.

Some interviewees stated that housing repair was not procrastinated but less prioritized amongst the overwhelming transitional shelter needs, or just undertaken when minimum preconditions were given. Despite this logic, only few agencies committed to making these ‘preconditions' available, treating them as part of the housing repair process rather than as requested preconditions to engage in housing repair.

The initial results of housing damages assessment and IDP intentions surveys showed:
• The will of a majority of affected (either if they were in camps or with host families) to return to their original place
• That over half of the houses assessed had not suffered extreme damage (green houses) and other 25% were safe following minor repairs (yellow houses).

Despite some obstacles and delays in the assessment and guidelines developing process, basic conditions and/or information were at hand as of September 2010, but the shelter sector strategy did not change but to a small extent in order (for instance) to begin an in-depth assessment on a neighbourhood-basis to later commit to a given number of house repairs or with a massive awareness campaign to promote green houses dwellers return.

An earlier housing damages assessment, despite having to face several constraints, may have allowed a faster return to green houses and the repair of yellow houses, reducing the need for transitional shelter in the interest of the direct delivery of permanent solutions. An earlier release of the MTPTC assessment could have also helped in this sense. Even if the green and yellow houses were not owned by the affected population, this approach would

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63 Some interviewees stated that the MTPTC first housing damages assessment could have done a more in-depth technical evaluation of the buildings and concurrently assess property issues and previous dwellers data. But taking into account the urgent need to know the effect of the earthquake on the housing stock, the decision to keep it solely as a structural evaluation appears to be pertinent hindsight.


65 The MTPTC Damages Assessment results could have been released earlier (even if partially) and its diffusion was also delayed. The housing repair technical guidelines were not massively spread until Jan-Feb 2011

66 The evaluation team identified an awareness campaign with this purpose done by UNOPS to 120.000 owners, although they state only 10.000 decided to return to their houses.
have probably more cost-efficient than building a T-Shelter, as arrangements could have been made with owners\textsuperscript{67}.

Agencies had privately-raised funds that may have been partially redirected from T-Shelters to housing repair in cases in which the family could skip the transitional stage, and even more considering the constraints they were already meeting in the T-Shelter delivery.

7. **Extent to which the response was adequately staffed**

In global terms it could be said that the agencies’ staff was adequate in number and profiles, or at least the evaluation did not find any constraint to a better implementation of the response caused by staff shortage or skills deficit.

Regarding SC coordination staff, IOM had 3 people working before the earthquake, and increased the size of the combined CCCM and Shelter clusters coordination team (with support of secondments from CARE/DFID and also from internal resources) with additional 6 people directly involved in shelter coordination, plus 4 coordination and 6 operational people working in the coordination of NFIs, making a total 19 people staff by the time the Shelter/NFI Cluster lead was handed over to IFRC, 2 of who remained in IFRC-led SCCT (CARE seconded). On the first weeks of the response, large number of people in the NFI pipeline was required for processing NGO requests, in-kind contributions, plan distributions, coordination and IM. The IFRC-led SCCT was promptly staffed with key positions after the handover, and it was progressively increased to a very amply team as of May 2010; almost all interviewees acknowledged the expertise of most of the team members\textsuperscript{68}.

From the part of the agencies, it can be also said that the shelter staff was appropriate, and its structure depended on each one shelter’s expertise or the involvement they had in the main shelter response. The smaller agencies’ staffs were more implementing-oriented. The bigger agencies had more expert profiles and gave more value-added to the cluster’s common outcome. But in short the agencies’ staff number or profile does not seem to have been a constraint for a better shelter response, on the contrary their hard work contributed towards a better development of the cluster’s activities.

High staff turnover in both the SC-CT and shelter agencies was an issue that affected the response as far as it meant loss of momentum in several aspects. However, it does not appear to have been a major factor for the shelter response outcome in 2010, since the handover was smooth in most cases according to a majority of the interviewees.

Language was a more important issue regarding staff. Hiring French-speaking personnel was not common among shelter actors except for those from a French-speaking country. Most meetings took place in English (in rural areas French was used more as the cluster language) and therefore communication with the local staff and with the local authorities and the affected population was not smooth. Nevertheless, the language issue might have been a constraint more for coordination than for implementation. A larger French-speaking staff could had facilitated the overall shelter response, but the agencies prioritized expertise instead of language skills when hiring their main staff, which seems pertinent hindsight.

\textsuperscript{67} E.g. making improvements in a “green house” or repairing a “yellow house”, in exchange as a lease to let an affected family (to which a rental subsidy could be given) live in it for 2-3 years. The arrangements would not have been easy to reach, but neither was those made with owners to provide a tenant with a T-Shelter.

\textsuperscript{68} See the IFRC-led Haiti Shelter Cluster review, for more specific findings about IFRC’s SC lead.
The consultation with the affected population conducted as part the evaluation showed that beneficiaries had some concerns of T-Shelters about the quality of the constructions and the competence of the hired workers; but it can’t be stated that construction staff was an extended problem.

8. Broad cost-benefit analysis

The economic Haitian context was not well enough considered when establishing the costs of their adopted transitional shelter options. Let us consider some economic figures:

- The average annual rent of the displaced tenants was 500 USD and it is usually paid in advance in January
- The previous income of a large number of affected families was less than 200 USD/month
- The economic value of an average house in a poor neighbourhood in Port-Au-Prince (where most of the IDP settled in camps lived) was between 5,000 and 8,000 USD.
- Most of the affected population had debts to pay (credits with banks or microfinance companies) and their limited income after the earthquake was to pay those debts.
- Money remittances from relatives abroad was over 150 M$ in the first month.

The cost of a T-Shelter was established at 1,500 USD including transportation costs69, and its lifespan was up to three years, comparable to rent for a house for three years under (more or less) the same living conditions. But that budget proved unrealistic soon after and the T-Shelter structures evolved into an even more expensive upgraded model70, making the delivery of T-Shelter less pertinent and less adapted to the Haitian context.

From a Haitian’s perspective, an asset worth 3,000-4,000 USD is not something intended to last for 3 years71, since this amount often represents more than what they could afford to spend on a permanent house. That, added to the delay in the delivery of the T-Shelters and the lack of expectations for help to obtain a permanent solution, led to the feeling in the population that these were permanent structures, not seeing them as a transitional dwelling, despite their claim that the 18m² were not enough for a family over 5 members.

If the least expensive T-Shelters’ final cost is over 2,000 USD and its lifespan aims at a maximum of 3 years, the cost/benefit relation is higher (worse) than other options that may have cost 1,500-2,000 USD to guarantee a family having similar shelter conditions for the same period, such as rental subsidies or host families’ support. Considering that these upgraded T-Shelters have a longer lifespan it would improve its cost/benefit analysis, but it is important to remember that the T-Shelter (with the agreed standards) is an interim solution, not just due to the durability of the materials but to the living space provided.

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69 Haiti Shelter Cluster. Transitional shelter technical guidance. Not considered the rent of the land when the beneficiary is a tenant
70 Most agencies interviewed estimate their T-Shelter model cost in over 5,000 US$ including transportation and local labour, but not the organization overhead. The average T-Shelter cost delivered in Haiti is not available but it is estimated in 4,000 US$ not including overheads.
71 Haiti Shelter Cluster. Transitional shelter technical guidance. Lifespan of a T-Shelter
9. Local participation and view of the shelter response

**Authorities and people’s ideas, plans and needs: addressed, overlooked or underestimated?**

This section summarizes the findings of the consultation done to the Haitian authorities and the affected population. Further details can be found in the Annexes.

### 9.1 Local participation in the SC coordination

The initial strategic definitions were amply discussed with GoH representatives. Later on, different approaches appeared, mainly related to the transitional shelter. On the PaP coordination, since metropolitan urban planning is a GoH’s responsibility and its operational capacity was severely affected by earthquake, Hubs at Commune’s level were put in place soon. This approach was widely recognized as an opportune one to effectively work with some Mairies. Nonetheless, this quick step down into local-basis coordination decreased the capacity to deal with planning matters in a more ample approach, although some effort was done in this respect with a President’s advisor.\(^{72}\)

In fact, the shelter response in PaP was based mainly on international participation, and most participants did not have previous knowledge of the country. The excessive turnover contributed to the loss of accumulated knowledge. Therefore, discussions were excessively based on external considerations.\(^{73}\) Corruption or political interest risks justified the weak effort to handle the political aspects of coordination.

While other Hubs, such as Jacmel, developed actions through approaches based on local capacities and participation (and with French being the working language), both approaches remain in distant shores; the temporary participation of CROSE, a local NGO, as cluster lead in Jacmel was seen as a mistake by some shelter actors since they were considered “politically partisan”, and some interviewees consider the DINEPA performance as WASH Cluster lead nationwide oriented by different logics, thus very difficult to coordinate with.

Despite its scale (the damaged buildings assessed were about 3.000), the Jacmel example was a positive experience and illustrates not only a very early response on releasing a key tool to estimate damages and therefore facilitating the response planning, but also an efficient involvement of local capacities. Working in French and Creole was also an asset for a better coordination outcome.

### 9.2 Haitian Authorities’ Participation and Perspective of the Shelter Response

Among many constraints the shelter sector faced the challenge to work with a Public System with its already limited management capacities very weakened, in order to agree upon a shelter response strategy. Despite this limitation, a strategy was put together during the first weeks, coordinating with the appointed Presidential Advisors. As the response evolved, a stronger local coordination developed while global coordination was progressively reduced to punctual issues and less follow-up of the overall strategy.

Despite the smooth overall relationship between the shelter actors and the Haitian authorities, after the wide-approach shelter strategy was agreed upon and implementation issues began to be thoroughly addressed (land allocation, needs assessments, beneficiary

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\(^{72}\) Seconded first by AECID and later on by DFID

\(^{73}\) Some interviewees criticized this excessive external vision, and lack of understanding of the local situation in the SC response
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selection, site planning, etc.) coordination with authorities worsened, especially at the municipal level (worse in some Communes than in others).

Haitian authorities interviewed appreciate the solidarity of the international humanitarian actors, but complain they were not consulted much, or that if they were their opinions were not really considered in the planning and consequent outcomes.

“Our ideas were not taken too much into consideration. Some said it is because we didn’t have the capacity [to actively participate in the cluster’s decisions] (…) Perhaps we were weak but we were there and tried, but they [shelter agencies] wouldn’t listen to us, they only coordinated when they needed us to solve things to implement their already decided upon projects”

On the other hand some shelter agencies, while admitting their limitations to integrate the authorities’ ideas, argued it was due to problems on the authorities’ side, such as:

- Lack of official representatives at the SC national level (decision-making delays)
- Insufficient capacity to provide the requested contribution and make counterpart decisions and they could not wait for them to decide (implementing pressure)
- Complex and/or slow bureaucratic procedures
- Corruption, either to benefit directly or to benefit their friends and relatives

A clearer strategy and a more ample approach within the shelter agencies would have been more desirable for the Haitian authorities, who complained that the shelter response design was not sufficiently adapted to the Haitian context, and showed some concerns on the response not addressing the most vulnerable. However, the GoH also admits their fault as they could not provide effective counterpart to the shelter actors.

“The Haitian part failed too, we were not able to draw a clear and consistent path (…) we didn’t show a coherent shelter and housing plan that helped the coordination with the SC”

The consultation often heard criticism by the Haitian authorities of some shelter NGOs, especially the smaller ones; both at national and municipal levels the interviewees showed dissatisfaction with the overall NGO system, although they made differences among them and highlighted the coordination efforts done by some NGOs. Nevertheless, it is a widespread opinion that shelter actors should pay attention to for the future.

Some criticism was also stated regarding the alleged unwillingness of the shelter agencies to adopt innovative approaches in some key issues, such as land tenure or other self-driven transitional shelter solutions.

Specifically at the municipal level, the authorities consulted had more concerns and complaints about the way the shelter response was planned and implemented, and about the little participation they had in the decision-making level. Also many of them complained about the T-Shelter solutions delivered.

“The Mairie was never deeply involved in the implementation of the shelter projects (…) we were not well informed about the implementation agendas, they were defined by each agency based on their own objectives, budgets and timelines (…) the [geographical] distribution of the agencies in the Commune was decided without the participation of the local authorities”

As for some interviewees there was over 3-4 thousand NGOs working after the earthquake, but most of them were not registered by the GoH or the IASC Clusters.
On the positive side, a Commune representative stated an overall satisfaction with the way the shelter response was coordinated and implemented:

“We were not deeply implicated in the [transitional shelter] Programme execution (…) but the overall management went along with a plan agreed between the Major's office and organizations [that were building T-Shelters]. The Major’s Office delivered a certification and an authorization to all organizations that participated in the construction of shelter (…)

In conclusion, this review found a worrying gap between the shelter actors and the Haitian authorities’ points of view regarding coordination and synergy seeking, and disparity in the opinions about the causes. Its impact on the overall shelter response is not easy to calculate, but probably meant delays and loss of efficiency to some extent.

It is not easy for the international humanitarian actors to balance the urge to respond to people’s needs and the will to do it coordinating and aligned with the national and local priorities and Laws; in that sense the effort done by all shelter actors has to be acknowledged, but the review findings in this matter should lead to a more in-depth SC’s self-analysis in order to identify more specific lessons learned.

9.3 Affected Population’s Participation and Perspective of the Shelter Response

9.3.1 Financial contribution of the affected population to the shelter response

Considering the emergency shelter support delivered (mostly tarpaulins) and the reality of the emergency shelter dwellings, the population had to contribute with rope, timbers, roof sheets and others. Also, the fact that over half a million people left the camps between July and September 2010 (up to seven hundred thousand by the end of the year) compared to the number of T-Shelters delivered and host families supported in the same period, show a significant self-effort of the displaced families to achieve better shelter conditions.

The money sent by Haitians abroad to their relatives or friends in 2010 represent over than 30% of the country’s GDP, and was almost 2.000 million USD, with an inter-annual increase of 20% (approximately 300 million USD more than in 2009); remittances in January and February 2010 represented more than half of the total in 201075.

If half of the annual remittances increase was used by recipients to obtain shelter it would mean over the same amount of money that the shelter actors spent as of November 201076.

Estimated figures may vary in an in-depth review, but there is no doubt that despite the high losses burden, the response was highly co-financed by the affected population.

Money remittances received in Haiti 2007-2010
(Million USD and inter annual growth rate)

75 “Las remesas a América Latina y el Caribe durante 2010. Estabilización después de la crisis”. Fondo Multilateral de Inversiones (IADB group).
76 Rough estimated figures.
9.3.2 Contribution of the affected population’s plans and needs in the response design

“Affected people were not consulted nor their capacities considered, the response was what those with the [foreign] money decided” [an interviewee]

This statement, although it was made by a non-affected person, summarizes the opinion of the affected population. The following pages go through the result of the review with regard to the data collected in the focus groups and the survey.

Synergy with the affected population

The shelter agencies did not read well the post-earthquake affected population’s capacities, perceiving them as shocked and helpless. Neither the agencies’ interviewees nor the consulted population stated that the shelter sector tried to find out and take advantage of possible synergies between the agencies and the affected population. Nevertheless, the scale of the disaster and the lack of interim land would have probably made impossible a different initial emergency shelter outcome, and under control of the shelter actors and the GoH.

Regarding the emergency shelter initial response, the shelter strategy rested on people’s capacity to find a place to settle and to complement with other shelter materials in order to achieve minimum shelter conditions. But the review could not find a cluster document in which the decision to fix two tarpaulins per family as the main emergency shelter support is based upon the capacities of the population to complete the shelter solution.

Affected population self-response was practically not integrated into the main shelter response, although synergies were more in the host families support actions -which were less implemented. If the transitional shelter support offer would have been more widely disseminated among the population, they could have chosen the one that better suited their wills, possibilities and capacities, then organizing the response according to the demand.

In the Emergency shelter response design

Overall it can be said that the emergency shelter and NFI response in the first months was sufficiently well informed by the population plans and needs, with some caveats.

Immediately after the earthquake, the possibility to consult the affected people on their plans and needs was tremendously hindered. People were worried about disappeared loved ones, fearing an aftershock, and many did not know in what situation the house they lived in was but were not to go back to it no matter what.

Therefore, it is easy to presume their plans and needs were simple: stay outside the buildings they thought in risk of falling (whether they really were falling or not) and finding shelter.

However, the inability to make a more thorough assessment, logistics constraints and the overwhelming size of the needs led to an emergency shelter response focused on the displaced population, delivering shelter materials and NFI in distributions points to people settled in camps. But this promoted displacement and limited the amount of support...
provided to the non-displaced affected population\textsuperscript{77}, exception made of the rural communities in which most of the population stayed by their homes yet most of them did receive emergency shelter support.

As for the selection of the place to settle in, in the urban areas, the displaced people settled where they could, except for a few sites in which the GoH or the Mairie took the decision to place affected population.

\textbf{In the Transitional shelter response design}

The transitional shelter response overlooked the affected population’s plans. Actually, the people’s plans were affected by the (already planned) transitional shelter strategy, and not the other way around.

Being the first strategy document produced after the earthquake, the SSRP had very limited information on the people’s plans and needs. However, it includes most of the worldwide commonly accepted shelter options for the transitional and recovery phase. But when transformed into a transitional shelter operational plan, it narrowed down mostly to T-Shelter direct delivery (in planned sites or in original plots), in what seems to be an agencies-driven decision, not taking into account the people’s plans to obtain a transitional or a permanent shelter solution.

When asked about the benefits of being in the camp (either with an E-Shelter or a T-Shelter dwelling), the population consulted stressed the fact that they did not have to pay rent, but that regardless they had not been asked if they wanted to live there or not.

In many cases the assisted family was offered a “one plate menu”. Of course, the offer itself was good and addressed the need (a transitional dwelling solution) but it was not necessarily the way that the family was seeking or the one with fewer constraints for the agency to deliver. To put it into marketing words, the transitional shelter demand was so big that it adapted to the available offer, which easily sold out.

\textbf{9.3.3 Perspective of the affected population on the shelter response}

It is important to understand that the way of thinking of the affected population in Haiti is based on their previous situation and life constraints, not only (and might we say, not mainly) by the consequences of the earthquake on their lives. Lack of a proper dwelling (either owned or rented), public services and livelihood opportunities was common to a large percentage of the affected population\textsuperscript{78}.

These previous habitat conditions may lead to the thought that the shelter support given after the earthquake, even the emergency shelter solutions, put them at least in the same conditions they used to live in, and therefore that the assisted population’s satisfaction was

\textsuperscript{77} The SSRP included under the “displaced persons” those who “have been displaced by only a few meters”. Later, in the “urban self-settlement option” description, it says that “the vast majority of the affected urban residents have chosen to displace short distances away from their damaged or destroyed homes to open spaces nearby …”. Thus it is not clear whether people remaining right by their homes are “nearby”, a few meters do not mean a real displacement from their home despite the fact they do not sleep under the same roof.

\textsuperscript{78} The document “Strategic citywide spatial planning. A situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, Haiti” (UN-HABITAT, 2009) states that around 70% of inhabitants of Port-Au-Prince were slum dwellers and the living space per person was below 2m\textsuperscript{2}.
high. But both participants in the focus groups and surveyed population in this review state gratitude to the organizations but only partial satisfaction with the support received.\(^{79}\)

The transitional shelter Programmes beneficiaries practically did not participate in the decision making process. The population consulted during this evaluation states that they did not have the chance to suggest nor decide anything about the T-Shelter designs and, although they value the benefits of having been upgraded from the E-Shelter, they feel the transitional solution does not meet their family needs, especially regarding living space.\(^{80}\)

**Main ideas shared by the focus groups**

- The transitional shelter and the emergency shelter support are commonly seen from an economic point of view: if the organizations had not given it to them they would have had to spend money either on tarpaulins and timber or on materials for getting something as a T-Shelter. Not paying rent is also seen as savings they could spend on other basic needs.

- The E-Shelter they live (or used to live) in was fine right after the earthquake but not a few months later; the protection against rainfall did not last long and they had no protection against winds or water (they flooded very often). Almost all the participants in the focus groups described the conditions of the emergency shelter solution as “infrahuman”, “unbearable”, or simply “very bad”, despite the fact they did not have to pay rent or that they received water and sanitation support.

- The T-Shelter gives them a much better dwelling condition than the E-Shelter, but still they think they are too small and the materials not very durable; many see it as a permanent house because they assume they will have to live there for many years as their expectations to receive support for a permanent solution are very low, but when asked if the T-Shelter is an appropriate long-term solution they generally stated that is a temporary situation that has to be improved.\(^{81}\) Consulted T-Shelter dwellers in the rural areas complain more about the living space.

- In general the affected population consulted claims to have not been consulted at all (or barely) about their plans, needs and preferences. Most stated that the agency that helped them with emergency and/or transitional shelter did not take into consideration the family size when delivering the solution, (“It did not matter if there were three or nine in a family, they gave everybody the same”) or other issues to be included in the designs (materials, internal divisions, two doors –cultural custom-, ground elevation, etc.).\(^{82}\)

- People living in a planned site (Annexe de la Mairie, Corail) said they had no choice but to go there, although they feel it as an opportunity to obtain a house of their own, stating their willingness to remain there forever although the actual conditions are not ideal.

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\(^{79}\) The consultation to affected population was done through focus groups with women and camp leaders and a survey to 177 residents in 12 sites. See the Annexes “Methodology of the review” and “Detailed overview and participation of Haitian authorities and affected population” for further details.

\(^{80}\) The evaluation team was not able to reach and consult formerly displaced population now living in a T-Shelter solution back in the original plot. In Leogane, the evaluation team visited communities were the affected were not displaced by the earthquake, and in Port-Au-Prince the T-Shelters beneficiaries consulted were in a planned-site.

\(^{81}\) In their own Creole words “Ti kai pou ti tan” (a little house for a short time)

\(^{82}\) A focus group satirized the conduct of the implementing agency and defined it as “antidemocratic” because they asked them to state and prioritize their needs and later gave them their fifth choice according to valuation responses. Nonetheless, because they needed it and it was the only organization helping them, they willingly accepted it and feel grateful to the organization.
• Where relocation meant further displacement (Corail), lack and/or higher cost of basic supplies (water, etc.), lack and/or more distance to public services (health centre, market, etc.) and distance to income (even if scarce) sources were common concerns stated. On the other hand, the better settlement conditions (plot with free area, wider streets, community plaza, etc.) and the existence of some community equipment (school, police station, meeting room, etc.) are highly valued by the population, leading to an overall wish to remain if they have livelihood opportunities.

**Results of the survey to affected population**

A survey was conducted with affected population from 12 sites, although most of them were from 5 sites, the same in which the focus groups took place. The output was 177 valid surveys. It must be said that this survey was conducted on a small sample of affected population and does not claim to have statistically valid results, but serves to become a piece of information useful to understand the feelings and plans of these affected people.

Regarding the sample characteristics, 93% of the people surveyed lived there since June 2010 or earlier, 40% arrived before April 2010, percentage that increases to 60% considering only the IDP surveyed. This shows a very low mobility of the population (inter-camps or from host families to camp) in the last year, and a lower mobility after April 2010.

The displacement distance of the consulted population tends to have not been very long. Excluding the non-displaced surveyed, 52% used to live “close” or “very close” to the camp, 22% lived “far” and 28% lived “very far”. The population surveyed in Annexe de la Mairie were the least displaced, and those living in Jerusalem and Corail the furthest displaced.

Living in the current location was mainly a self-driven decision, very likely to have been their only choice. 49% of the consulted people self-settled in the camp (66% among IDPs), 25% lived in the same place before the earthquake (all of them in Léogâne) and 27% were motivated by the offer of a shelter solution (most of them, to Corail).

One out of three households surveyed have member/s that returned to their previous homes. This percentage increases to 50% when considering only IDPs (most in Port-Au-Prince). It shows a trend to remain in camps while watching over their remaining belongings, to stay closer to their previous income sources, or even as a way to stay registered in the camp to receive other kind of help.

To the question *why are you still living here?* 75% of those consulted state that they do not have a choice. These persons also value the economic benefit of living in the camp (free rent and water) but they do not find it enough incentive or at least did not choose it as the main reason for staying in the camp.

Only 19% of the surveyed persons want to stay where they are, half of them currently living in Corail or Annexe de la Mairie in a T-Shelter solution, showing that the possibility to become owners by living in a planned site in public land is not enough motivation for the people to stay there. 100% of the people surveyed in Jerusalem (E-Shelter dwellers in public land) answered that they still live there because they have no other place to go.

This interpretation contradicts the answers to the question about their future plans, to which 70% answer “*stay here*”. This contradiction might be due to the answer being based not on

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83 This two are planned sites in public land
their ideal plans but on their realistic expectations, considering their answer to the previous question *Has any organization promised you a new house (permanent or transitional) or to repair your damaged house?* to which most answered “No”.

The answers to these questions provide some conclusions:

- People in IDP camps (either in T-Shelter or E-Shelter) have few other settlement options without further external support.
- The provision of a T-Shelter increases their willingness to stay in the camp when they foresee chances to become owners of the piece of land on which it is built.
- Money saving and additional humanitarian aid are not enough incentives to stay in camps.
- Expectations of getting a permanent shelter solution are very low, which leads them to see the T-Shelter as a long-term dwelling, explaining the criticism with the T-Shelters stated in the focus groups and in the survey (see following lines).

Regarding satisfaction with their current shelter conditions, over 60% of the people surveyed feel “very good” or “good” about living there, as opposed to 40% that feel “bad” or “very bad”. This distribution respectively matches the percentage of people surveyed living in T-Shelter and emergency shelter solutions, meaning that aside from other services available in the camp/community, dwelling conditions are the main factor that determines the feeling.

People living in T-Shelters value aspects as comfort and water and sanitation support more (even if the second one is the same for the E-Shelter dwellers in the camp\(^84\)), and even other factors such as income possibilities. Security is also valued higher by T-Shelter dwellers based on the better protection from thefts that the T-Shelter structure provides.

Specifically about the comfort of the shelter solutions, the delivered T-Shelters barely passed the recipients' test, although they do feel it is a big improvement from their previous emergency shelter conditions. Access to jobs / income sources is the least valued aspect of living in their current location, although except for population relocated at long distances (Corail, Jerusalem) probably the low figure has nothing to do with the shelter conditions.

### 9.3.4 The CCCM Cluster's Intention Survey

For a better understanding of the affected population points of view, the very recently released “Displaced Intention Survey” done within the CCCM Cluster\(^85\) was also reviewed. Their intentions for the future are clearly stated, as 94% wishes to leave the camp. The preferred destination shows a variety of wishes: 17% would rather go back to their previous home, 12% wanted to go outside Port-Au-Prince, 11% wanted to have more information before leaving, 10% preferred to move to a planned site, 9% wanted to go back to their

\(^84\) e.g. In Annexe la Mairie camp, water and sanitation services are the same for E-Shelter and T-Shelter dwellers, but first ones give a 2.9/10 to the WatSan services and last ones give it a 5.9/10 valuation


Done between October 27th 2010 and February 8th 2011, to 15,446 individuals in 94 shelter camps in 14 Municipalities (Communes). Most (95%) of the participants in CCCM’s survey arrived at the camp right after the earthquake and over half of them used to be tenants. Only 5% lived in a “green tagged” house (in the MTPTC Damages Assessment), and 35% lived in a “red tagged” house, while 38% did not know how their previous house was assessed.
house even if it was not safe. 19% did not know where they would go. 11% answer *it does not matter where*, which clearly shows their lack of tangible perspectives for the future.

When asked where they would go if they had to leave the camp immediately, 53% said they would not know where to go, confirming the lack of alternatives and low expectations of obtaining another shelter solution. However, 68% had no particular concerns about leaving the camp, showing a strong wish to leave it, not making it happen due to lack of money.

A few of those surveyed were highly concerned about losing access to camp services (water, sanitation, education, information), which goes along with the evaluation survey results and focus groups opinions that weakens the idea of the humanitarian aid being a pull-factor for not leaving the camps. On the other hand, the CCCM Survey shows that one of the main concerns of the population was proper shelter\(^{86}\) and income (either to rent a house or to buy first needs supplies), and that receiving a transitional shelter solution would facilitate their exit (43%), in keeping with the results of the survey done within this review.

Another interesting data from the CCCM Intention Survey is that 48% of the house owners wanted help to repair their houses instead of receiving a transitional shelter solution, while one third of the tenants expressed their preference to receive a rental subsidy, which reinforces the idea exposed above in this report that the transitional shelter strategy was not well informed by people’s plans and needs.

### 10. Attention given to relevant cross-cutting issues

Broadly speaking, attention given by the shelter actors to relevant cross-cutting issues was low, except with regards to environmental respect and protection and to a lesser extent for physically handicapped. Age, Gender, other general Human Rights concerns, and HIV/AIDS were not integrated much in the Shelter response on a global-basis.


Some shelter agencies’ interviewees justified the low attention paid to cross-cutting issues on the need to standardize shelter solutions as much as possible, and the lack of time to assess specific groups’ needs, all of which were certainly a limitation for a better integration of relevant cross-cutting issues into the main response. However, many times this integration could have been done without great effort and/or resources.

In summary, even if the low value given to this aspect in the review does not largely damage the overall shelter response, it should be better addressed in future responses.

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\(^{86}\) As the CCCM surveys were mainly done between Nov10-Jan11, when T-Shelters delivery progression was yet not very high, the concern about proper shelter might be reduced in T-Shelter camps dwellers as of July 2011, but probably remains equal E-Shelter dwellers.
10.1 Age, Gender & Diversity

The review could not find implementing strategies that considered the risks of de facto discrimination or other unintended negative effects regarding women, children, elderly and/or handicapped.

Although the SC soon developed a guidance note to address Gender issues in Shelter planning\(^{87}\), and linked the shelter agencies to other general guidelines to integrate these cross-cutting issues in shelter responses\(^{88}\), no special planning attention was given to participatory assessments with a broad range within the community including adolescent people, female-headed households, elderly, those with mental and physical disabilities and minority groups, and persons living with HIV/AIDS. The attention to be paid to these groups is mentioned in some shelter guidelines as a “principle statement” but with no specific indications on how to address this issue\(^{89}\).

In most cases, site planning and design of emergency and interim shelter did not enhance protection or reduce the risks of gender-based violence, including sexual exploitation and abuse, by integrating aspects such as family-size shelters or partitioning shelters. Corail (relocation project) site planning somehow prevented these gender-based risks with wider streets and bigger plots, resident women think that the risk remains\(^{90}\).

Not much attention was given to enable and encourage the participation of women (including the elderly, adolescent girls and young women) in the design and implementation of shelter planning. Indeed, women in all camps visited shared the idea that the organizations did not consider their particular needs and feelings. Camp representatives are mainly men, and decision-making spaces are not very open for women.

Long-distanced new settlements increased the distance of groups with specific needs to health facilities and to other communal services such as distribution points, water points, markets, schools, places of worship, etc.

Despite this broad negative appraisal, some specific positive actions were identified.

- Most agencies included age and sex disaggregation in data collection and management systems in place in their shelter projects.
- An “affirmative discrimination” approach was taken with a group of handicapped people (mainly deaf-mutes), prioritizing their selection as T-Shelter recipients and settling them together in a sector of the IDP camp La Piste. Despite the good will of measure, it would have been more advisable to integrate them (as well as other handicapped) as part of the mainstream, establishing inclusive approaches to further assess and meet their specifics needs by all shelter agencies.

\(^{87}\) Gender Considerations in Shelter interventions. Haiti Shelter Cluster, May 2010

\(^{88}\) “Guidance on including older people in emergency shelter Programmes” (HelpAge International and IFRC) was released and distributed to shelter actors in March 2011

\(^{89}\) E.g.: SC Technical Guidance for T-Shelters; Performance standards and indicators for transitional shelters – Other Programme issues: “Organizations must work carefully to ensure that the most vulnerable families, including the landless are not excluded from transitional shelter support. Gender sensitive Programming is required and women should be consulted about a range of issues. The groups at risk in disasters are single headed households, children, older people, disabled people and people living with HIV/AIDS”.

\(^{90}\) Women consulted in Corail stated that some existing problems such as rape and sexual harassment could have been lessened by giving more space per person to families with more women and girls, making internal divisions in the T-Shelter, or including camp lighting in the shelter projects.
With regard to water and sanitation most projects ensure construction of separate toilet blocks for women and men, and blocks for small groups of families were often built. However, due to a later decrease of latrine cleaning services, some of the consulted population stated their wish that the latrines be moved further away from their homes. Some agencies delivered bigger T-Shelter provision for families of over 5 members. Relocation projects included education and recreation spaces as well as community centres in site planning.

10.2 Environmental respect and protection

Environment was the better addressed cross-cutting issue of the shelter actors. Issues as shelter site environmental impact assessments, materials need and impact, environmental best practices in transitional shelter, timber procurement, debris reuse; selection and use of chemical wood protection, etc. were of the shelter actors’ interest. Appointing an Environmental Advisor to the SC shows the specific attention paid to this issue91.

10.3 Other human rights concerns

The advocacy on shelter and human rights was addressed in some specific projects and shared with the shelter actors but without an in-depth global strategy. Despite the lack of a thorough strategy in this matter, to some extent the shelter actors applied existing human rights standards to ensure legal security of tenure; availability of services; habitability; accessibility, and especially location, particularly looking after temporary settlements in risk to become permanent with time.

As far as the evaluation team was aware, site planning, shelter distribution and allocation to all families and households was made in a non-discriminatory manner. Freedom of movement (in and out) of any temporary camps or settlements was guaranteed to people in camps. The communities are able to freely express their views and opinions, and although improvements can be made in the consultation and participation activities, they were allowed to contribute to their shelter process.

Individuals and communities had equal access to information that impacted upon their rights, however information about infrastructure planning and design, availability of services and other factors was not always at hand for the affected population.

Local customs, practices and culture were not taken much into account in planning shelter issues. The use of a second door (local custom) in part of the T-Shelter structures delivered was the only aspect identified in the review.

A liaison with the Haiti Protection Cluster existed and some shelter actors also took part in it (e.g. IFRC, IOM, USAID-OFDA, OXFAM), but a closer relationship at national coordination level could have existed in order to seek a stronger synergy among them.

91 More information about environmental integration in the shelter response can be found in “A Review of the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster Haiti 2010”. IFRC, April 2011
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conclusions

- **An earthquake with huge impact**
  According to the post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and other sources:
  
  - At least 2.5% of the Haitian population died.
  - About 1 out of 5 civil servants died and 11 out of 15 ministerial buildings were completely destroyed, further limiting the scarce institutional capacity.
  - The total value of the damage and losses caused by the January 12th 2010 earthquake is estimated at 7.804 billion USD, equivalent to slightly more than the country’s GDP in 2009. In fact, in the 35 years that the DALA method for estimating damage and losses has been employed, this is the first time the cost of a disaster is so high compared to the size of a country’s economy.
  - Additional construction capacity will have to be imported from other countries for the recovery and reconstruction Programme.

- **Limited needs and damages assessment and unclear responsibilities to do them**
  Needs and population movements have been managed based on inaccurate data. Initial figures were agreed upon by all cluster members as rough estimations that would allow for initial planning and advocacy. Neither a good estimation of people in shelter need nor an early estimation of damaged houses was available in the first half year. However, initial figures allowed for provision of emergency shelter needs and for advocacy for both emergency and transitional shelter. Without sufficient information, many initial decisions had to be taken on best intentions alone, and some became less pertinent as more accurate data were available, particularly on transitional shelter provision.

Damages assessment (linked to support the overall shelter) was initiated as a shelter actors idea but they did not follow it and its lead was not clear (Early Recovery Cluster / MTPTC/ IHRC). Shelter agencies had very limited capacities to do it but they could have been more demanding and stressed its need from the very beginning, since housing repair or reconstruction (as part of the full shelter recovery) had to be done at some point.

- **The first emergency shelter response was relevant and effective**
  Providing emergency shelter support to over 1.5 M people in less than four months was an outstanding achievement. The SC’s harmonized emergency shelter/NFI response was a coordination success. However, since the emergency shelter response was based mainly on the massive delivery of tarpaulins, the quality of the E-Shelters was diverse, and the shelter agencies did not have the capacity or responsibility to control the final outcome of the E-Shelters.

Due to the huge number of displaced people and the urban setting of the disaster it was not possible to plan the emergency shelter settlements or to meet standardized minimum emergency shelter conditions. For life saving reasons and because of the constraints of the urban setting, some of the Sphere shelter standards indicators were not initially met, in hopes that they would be reached progressively later; camp decongestion actions contributed to meeting the standards for emergency shelter site planning, but the overall

93 Particularly on physical planning –area per family, conditions to avoid flooding--; covered living space - floor area per person; and design -capable of withstanding appropriate wind-loading-
conditions of the E-Shelters remained below the Sphere indicators despite the E-Shelter reinforcement programmes, which focused on materials' replacement and/or wind-load reinforcement rather than on upgrading the initial shelter solutions constructed by the affected population (e.g. increasing the extent or quality of the enclosed space provided).

Despite these flaws, the emergency shelter situation after the first four months can be considered good enough considering the extraordinarily hampering context with which the humanitarian actors and the GoH had to deal.

- **Protracted emergency shelter needs impacted the overall shelter response**
  Emergency shelter reinforcement / replacement Programmes were not initially planned since most of the transitional shelter solutions were planned to be ready by the end of 2010, coinciding with the tarpaulins’ lifespan ending. That, together with climate factors (the proximity of the rainy season first and the hurricane season later), led to a protracted emergency in the uncovered time gap, demanding new emergency shelter / NFI responses through the implementation of emergency shelter reinforcement / replacement actions. This unforeseen effort put pressure on the transitional shelter progression, meant a higher workload for shelter agencies and burdened their budgets.

- **It cannot be affirmed that humanitarian aid in camps was a main pull factor to remain in camps**
  There is no evident link between humanitarian aid in camps and people’s movements, and it cannot be affirmed that humanitarian aid in camps was or is a main pull factor for people to remain there, although it could have been a pull factor for registering as IDP in the first semester of 2010. The decrease of people in camps from July onwards, still in a relief delivery phase, cannot be explained if humanitarian aid provision was a key pull factor in this crisis.

- **Progressive weakness of the shelter strategy’s leading role**
  The initial approach of the SSRP appears to be very relevant, conceiving the shelter strategy playing a critical role in assessing to define the overall strategic direction of the relief and recovery effort. The fact that that mid-term shelter approaches were addressed so early on (mid-February 2010) can be also considered a success. Nonetheless several factors weakened this approach:

  - A trend to not effectively implement mid-term approaches during the emergency phase.
  - The differences in approaches, capacities on the field, and response timelines, among the involved clusters’ lead agencies.
  - The relief approach of many of the major shelter agencies acting in the emergency.
  - The complexity of the international response coordination, including MINUSTAH, Cluster System partners, IHRC, armed forces and non-experienced NGOs among other stakeholders.

- **Conflicting positions within the shelter actors and between clusters**
  The different points of view on some aspects that the review found in the shelter actors members and between different clusters is to be highlighted, all of them respected but sometimes very distant. The different positions led to several TWiG working too independently and not linking their outcomes, or to other groups working outside the SC.

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94 Shelter, Early Recovery, CCCM, WASH

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lead in shelter related issues (e.g. Logement Quartier group), losing the opportunity to complement each other.

- **Scale of the disaster and quantitative leap in shelter response**
  The response scale overwhelmed the shelter agencies capacities. The disaster meant a quantitative leap from any previous shelter response, in the size and complexity of the need, its geographical concentration and the constraints to deal with, which strongly challenged the shelter agencies’ capacities. This challenge was well managed in the emergency phase by the massive delivery of a standardized support for the emergency shelter solutions development, which helped achieving the ambitious coverage identified within few months. In the transitional stage, this leap could have been addressed in more innovative ways, promoting more self-driven responses and adapting solutions to the Haitian post-earthquake context.

- **Response’s deficient adaptation to the context. Imported approaches failure**
  The understanding of the post-earthquake urban context took time and was not gauged well enough. Despite the complicated situation, the shelter response strategy managed to promptly identify many of the contextual issues that could affect the delivery of shelter – emergency, transitional and permanent-, but the later development of the strategy lost focus on some of the contextual issues of the urban setting of the disaster, finding bigger constraints on them by adopting the strategies without enough analysis of the context’s impact on its implementation.

  Thus, rubble clearance became an almost insurmountable obstacle for many T-Shelters delivery, and so was land (space) availability in cases where the affected family used to live in multi-story buildings. Focusing earlier and clearer in rubble removal (which was seen as a non-core SC issue and linked to mid and long term actions) with a multi-cluster shared responsibility could have contributed to a faster coverage of transitional shelter.

  Also, the response was very constrained by strict mandates, institutional specializations and the inertia of procedures designed for other contexts, mainly rural or in which the country level capacities had not been as affected as they were in Haiti. Many shelter agencies based their actions in experiences and approaches which had been successful in different contexts but found strong difficulties when used in the Haitian post-earthquake’s one, particularly regarding land issues and transitional shelter solutions design.

- **Narrowed transitional shelter approach. Supply driven response and bottlenecks emergence**
  Considering the high financial autonomy with the high private fund-raising (with no earmark), most agencies’ leeway was very high in the first months. Nonetheless, although almost all of the shelter agencies’ actions were pertinent, the transitional shelter response was very supply driven, since most agencies chose a single solution to provide transitional shelter, based on the direct delivery of a T-Shelter. Moreover, some main public donors did not have very constraining funding requirements or narrowed the agencies’ proposal to a certain type of solution.

  According to some interviewees, the T-Shelter strategy responded mainly to compensate red houses lost housing space, and to complement other solutions, and it aimed at being a flexible approach to tackle land tenure and to provide safe missing space. However, the review could not find any SC's document that explains this way the decision to focus on this option rather than in others, but it rather seems to have been an agency-driven decision (although not clear by HQs or field teams), based on their previous know-how, the
availability of money, liability and visibility concerns, and somehow anticipating the lack of enough full shelter recovery support.

Some other tested options based on a demand driven logic, like appealing for people’s availability of land through call centres, support to host/hosted families or rental subsidies were underexplored. The implementation based on a single solution collapsed the capacities to deal with customs management, rubble removal and land availability\textsuperscript{95}, to mention some of the main constraints identified, leading to the emergence of bottlenecks in the implementation process.

- **Scope and “Tracking power”**
  Since one of clusters’ main roles is ensuring the assessment and coverage of gaps, tracking reports are key tools to keep the lead. Narrowing the scope is not only relevant for policy matters, but to ensure the control of the implementation progression and to act as a focal point for supplying information to acting organizations, donors, government or media. Tracking therefore becomes a powerful tool to highlight approaches and solutions and to send policy messages.

The shelter actors did not pay the same attention to the tracking and of other options shelter options as they did to T-Shelter Programmes. If these options would have been more visible and promoted, perhaps more organisations would have engaged in them, leading to a change in attitude and in policy on the shelter sector in Haiti.

- **T-Shelter strategy was unrealistic time and cost-wise and not flexible enough**
  The shelter agencies planned to build 125,000 T-Shelters in 10 months (March 2010 to January 2011), but that was proved to be unrealistic. Furthermore, as time elapsed, the T-Shelter lifespan and costs increased by reinforcing the core-structures and improving the quality of walls, roofs, joinery, etc.

Some constraints determined a narrow path for the shelter response (rubble clearance, land tenure issues, urban setting, etc.) and delayed the transitional shelter delivery. The sum of the agencies’ capacities proved to be insufficient to meet all shelter needs within the foreseen timeline. By November 2010, only 19,000 T-shelters (15% of the total goal) had been completed and delivered.

Agencies’ achievement of the state-of-the-art process for transitional shelter solution delivery in Haiti took over a year (see T-Shelter progression section). Reaching coverage projections complying with all the standards, tender processes, shipping, customs, land availability, site clearance, building, among other constraints and requirements demanded a longer deadline, making the T-Shelter delivery time twice the foreseen. Highest rate (7,200 solutions per month) was reached from November 2010 onwards.

Hurricane winds resistance raised the basic standards of T-Shelter, demanding improvements in foundations and structure, and imported materials, shipping and customs represented extra costs. Thus, foreseen prices were multiplied almost 3 times (from an initially agreed upon 1,500 USD to an average of 4,200 USD). The anticipated 3 year lifespan became 10 to 15 years.

The shelter actors’ acknowledged this situation in July 2010, but would/could not change their transitional shelter Programmes, due to commitments with donors (public and private)

\textsuperscript{95} E.g. required land agreements to settle a T-Shelter on another owner’s land is 3 years, when usual rental arrangements in Haiti do not exceed 1 year.
in their countries, on-going production processes, or incapacity/unwillingness to work in other transitional shelter options. The T-Shelter approach should have allowed more flexibility from the cluster members to mitigate the implications of its delayed delivery, increased costs or unforeseen constraints.

- **T-Shelter approach’s critical time of relevance**

T-Shelters, as time elapsed, lost their opportunity added value and increased their cost, progressively losing pertinence and even acceptance with the local authorities and the affected population. The hurricane hazard, among other factors, introduced the need to reinforce T-Shelter standards; as standards rose, the price also increased.

As far as transitional shelter objectives (based on T-Shelter delivery) were taking at least twice the foreseen time, its relevance decreased critically, while other approaches like repairs, rental subsidies or even permanent housing became relevant and even more cost-efficient as time elapsed.

On the Haitian side, the first “transitional shelter concept” also went into a crisis as its progression was delayed, and began to demand longer term solutions. Considering that 70% of the urban population before the earthquake lived in slums, where living area per person was very low, GoH representatives considered that the final average cost of a T-Shelter is more than what most of the people usually invest in their own homes and demanded the upgrading of the T-Shelters (including living space standard) and/or the change of the effort focus to permanent solutions (housing repair or reconstruction).

The affected population also started to look at the T-Shelter models as permanent solutions, both because of the materials quality and the low expectation to be benefitted with further aid. Some of beneficiaries’ criticism of the T-Shelter characteristics (heat, available space) is therefore based on this assumption.

Despite the fact that the existing significant constraints hampered the shelter response however it was done, it could be said that the shelter agencies took “the road with more bumps” to provide transitional solutions by delivering mainly T-Shelters, even if they thought it was the ‘easiest’ option. In some cases, easily foreseen obstacles for the shelter needs coverage could have been avoided (or its effect on the response diminished) by “taking other roads” in engaging to ‘achieve full transitional shelter’, such as host families support or other cash transfer based solutions.

Very few agencies dealt with the rubble trouble directly, although it was a major constraint to shelter response. As part of the process to deliver transitional shelter solutions, rubble clearance should have been more efficient and addressed frontally by the shelter agencies.

- **Low synergy with the affected population capacities**

Financial support by the Haitians abroad was very significant yet somehow underestimated by the shelter actors as a way to seek leverage with the humanitarian sector support. Naturally, it cannot be assumed that all affected families had financial capacities, but the fact is that the shelter actors did not assess or try to complement them.

It is proven that the contribution of the people to their own recovery helps the sustainability of the actions; therefore, synergy with the affected population’s capacities could have been sought to allow a more self-driven response and reduce the burden on the humanitarian

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96 The average price of the T-Shelter solution became 77% of the average cost for house repair, or 57% of the in-site permanent solutions building cost (83% if comparing costs per m²).
actors to meet the transitional shelter needs. For instance, some T-Shelter improvements could have been done directly by the beneficiaries, and partial rental support could have been completed with remittances’ money in cases where the affected family had the possibility to rent a safe house.

- **Half-way satisfaction of the local authorities and the affected population**

On some matters the opinions of the national and local (municipal) authorities and affected population consulted differ to an important degree to those of the international actors. Broadly speaking, the authorities’ satisfaction with the way they were able to participate is low, acknowledging gaps on their side and recognizing coordination achievements, but also stating complaints about the shelter actors’ approaches to work with the authorities.

The affected population appreciates the support received although they feel agencies failed in consulting their needs and plans, resulting in a half-way satisfaction about the outcome. Most of the consulted population lacks expectations for a full recovery support, which probably influenced their feelings, especially regarding transitional shelter support.

2. **Recommendations**

Analysis of the Haiti shelter response shows the need for having and implementing a long term integrated approach, with flexible demand-driven ranges of responses, with an integrated lead and a clear national shelter sector’s scope.

Some recommendations in this sense are:

**From the context to the response**

- **Integration of “constraints management” in the response schedule and budget.**

As far as some constraints’ solving constituted premises to implement a large percentage of specific approaches (e.g. rubble removal to allow T-Shelter setting, or damages assessment to facilitate house repairs), planning must integrate a more realistic timeframe, and establish milestones around these issues.

In future operations, as part of the process to deliver transitional shelter solutions, the rubble clearance should be better and addressed head-on by the shelter agencies, whether as part of the shelter or the early recovery cluster, either by integrating it into their own response or by strongly advocating for other specialized agencies to address it sooner.

- **Facing / dodging constraints. Innovative approaches integration**

When an operation is as complex as the Haiti earthquake response, and the context is so extraordinarily restricting from the very first day, the humanitarian actors have to think “outside the box” when meeting the many constraints they will surely encounter. Sometimes

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97 Some interviewees stated that even if part of the affected population had economic means, the response should have focused on the ones who did not, or that that money should have been kept for the family to purchase other basic needs. Criteria differ to decide whether to address ones or the others.
the context cannot be sufficiently and/or rapidly changed to achieve the planned goals, but on the other hand the response can be adapted to the context to a greater extent. In the Haiti shelter response some constraints became much more challenging as the approach’s success relied excessively on their solution, and the agencies had to face them no matter how difficult they were to solve.

Therefore, strategies should attempt to dodge the constraints as long as it is feasible, by integrating diverse and innovative approaches into the response, taking calculated risks and placing the need for coverage before liability concerns as far as possible. For instance, agencies could have more actively engaged in solutions for which rubble clearance was not a limitation, such as host families’ or rental support, or adopted less restraining land tenure requirements (as it eventually occurred), immediately after it became clear that the anticipated ones could not be complied with.

In this same sense, if land is as scarce as it was in the urban setting of the Haiti shelter response, diverse and innovative approaches could be integrated in the response, supporting non-constructive solutions, assessing the viability of collective and/or multi-story transitional shelter solutions, addressing as soon as possible shelter recovery, etc.; if most of the affected population are tenants and agreements with land owners in order to allow T-Shelter recipients to remain in their plots for a 3+ year period are difficult to reach, an emergency shelter upgrading Programme and/or a stronger camp decongestion plus T-Shelter construction Programme could be pertinent, as agreements with sites owners might be easier to reach than those done in an individual basis.

**Flexible, wide and demand-driven range of responses**

- **Strategy’s flexibility and updating**
  The changing context, the new available information, and the lessons learned as the response went along should represent a continual review and update of strategies, plans and goals. However, the shelter sector strategy appears not to have been completed or reviewed and the transitional shelter Programmes were not too flexible to be adapted to the on-going findings. Review and planning update could have assisted the sector in questioning shelter options and targets, particularly the emphasis on transitional shelter, in light of the complex situation in Haiti.

- **Solution diversification and bottlenecks reduction**
  A wide range of solutions becomes a way to reduce bottlenecks, decreasing the constraining factors in each of them. Since every single solution included in the Shelter Response Plan had its own related constraints, diversification of solutions would have been a way to elude bottlenecks. For instance, customs clearance constituted a constraint for solutions that required importing of materials; however it had no effect on rental subsidies or housing repair.

- **Context appraisal as a base for agencies’ response engagement**
  Visibility, know-how or higher outcome control can be factors taken into consideration to engage in some shelter option, but when the needs are as big as in the Haiti earthquake disaster, shelter agencies should base their decisions on the context appraisal and the estimated effectiveness and efficiency of the actions, more than on the donors’ alleged preferences or on insufficiently informed senior levels estimations. Therefore, field assessments and local consultation are key aspects to be undertaken before committing largely to a particular shelter response, especially regarding interim/transitional shelter.
• **Demand driven options**
In such a constrained context, with a limited picture of needs and difficult engagement with local population and authorities, it is advisable to put in place demand measuring systems, in order to diversify options and design more tailored-made approaches. Some interesting experiences such as call centres for people with available land for T-Shelters could have been multiplied, for example regarding the rental market.

• **Reinforce SC lead’s advocacy role**
Some SC-SAG agencies state that they advocated for a more ample approach regarding transitional shelter, including all possible options and addressing their specific challenges and risks. However they did not succeed and a prominent discussion about it did not take place. Despite its lack of mandatory powers before the shelter agencies, the SC lead’s advocacy role with the shelter agencies should be more intense and aggressive, pressing them strongly and challenging them to commit in the identified needs.

**Early integration of emergency, transitional and permanent shelter**

• **Cost-opportunity analysis**
Since the timeline to solve constraints may signify relevant delays in the overall implementation, a cost-opportunity analysis must be incorporated to the decision making process. Considering that massive coverage of transitional shelter was not being achieved, MTPTC assessment and guidelines could have facilitated a more cost efficient investment in house repairs. In other cases, the huge effort invested on rubble clearance in search for available space might have been in many cases more relevant -both in time consumption and objective costs- if it had been used as a step towards building permanent housing solutions.

Thus, an early planning and allocation of budget in a balanced combination of emergency, temporary and permanent solutions, may contribute to assure both efficiency and efficacy. Advocacy through funding assignment pressure and/or funding earmarks should be managed at agencies’ senior levels at much as possible , since most donors and developed countries’ public opinion nowadays have more educated criteria to understand the flexibility needed in complex disaster contexts.

• **Operational contiguum and link between relief, rehabilitation and development**
Analysis of the response in Haiti shows the need to use a contiguum approach, distinguishing between emergency phase and emergency approach, initiating not only emergency activities or approaches from the very beginning, and therefore avoiding the delay on actions such as rubble removal which later become absolutely necessary.

Even if transitional shelter support is not limited to those who received emergency shelter support, an long-term approach with emergency, transitional and permanent shelter support could have been more actively attempted with the most vulnerable people, either if they were IDP or not.

**Towards a clearer Shelter Cluster’s scope**

In long term response operations, where the recovery will take time and face numerous constraints, and protracted emergencies are foreseen, the limits between emergency an early recovery phases blur.

Shelter Cluster Mandate, Scope and Structure have to adapt to each crisis. Shelter and Housing links (blur line especially in Haiti) must be streamlined with capacities of key
stakeholders. Thus, it is necessary to (re)define early recovery approaches to be handled in the emergency centred phase, and vice versa how emergency issues have to be managed in the early recovery centred phase.

In this respect, the SC scope should be clearer stated, and issues such as how rubble removal or settlement related issues are addressed in shelter cluster performance should be discussed, resulting in the (re)definition of the skills and abilities of shelter actors.

The possibility for the SC to clearly state the need for a stand-alone coordination mechanism in order to respond to rubble removal, maybe outside traditional clusters and selected among strong operational partners not concerned with coordination of other sectors, could allow for better coordination of operations and the necessary resource mobilization.

Nonetheless, the result of this cannot become an arbitrary selection of themes, solutions or gaps to handle under the cluster umbrella, and that each cluster's scope should be better defined based on accumulated response experiences.

Accepting the need for a separate responsibility of each cluster to achieve efficiency in the first months of the emergency, a more integrated approach should be put in place, to assure the development of many interrelated actions, as they were defined in the Shelter Sector Response Plan. Humanitarian Coordination and Inter-cluster Coordination play a key role on ensuring this integrated performance.

**Integrated lead**

Inter-cluster and Humanitarian Coordination should ascertain that there are no gaps or overlapping of responsibilities among clusters and that there is clear leadership for every single key aspect of the clusters’ strategies, consequently avoiding that the clusters can decide whether or not to assume critical responsibilities included in their mandates or sectorial approaches, ensuring an integrated performance. In addition, integration of cluster responsibilities until emergency response is achieved may be considered, resulting in a reduced number of clusters.

Rubble clearance would have benefitted from a stand-alone coordination, able to advocate/negotiate and coordinate since day one with non-state actors, non-humanitarian partners, government, and humanitarian community for the resources needed to a gigantic operation. Including the rubble removal inside the shelter cluster in large scale urban disasters may prevent rubble removal to be considered as a priority on itself, alongside with shelter and other interventions.
LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex 1. Methodology of the evaluation

Annex 2 Methodological tools

   a. Questionnaire for shelter actors
   b. Template for interviews with Municipal authorities (French)
   c. Template for focus groups with affected population (French and Creole)
   d. Survey questionnaire to affected population (English)
   e. Survey questionnaire to affected population (Creole)

Annex 3. Survey to affected population data base (Excel file)

Annex 4. Overview of the shelter response by Haitian authorities and affected population

Annex 5. List of interviewees

Annex 6. Main documents reviewed

Annex 7. Terms of reference for the review
Strategy 2020 voices the collective determination of the IFRC to move forward in tackling the major challenges that confront humanity in the next decade. Informed by the needs and vulnerabilities of the diverse communities with whom we work, as well as the basic rights and freedoms to which all are entitled, this strategy seeks to benefit all who look to Red Cross Red Crescent to help to build a more humane, dignified, and peaceful world.

Over the next ten years, the collective focus of the IFRC will be on achieving the following strategic aims:

1. Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crises
2. Enable healthy and safe living
3. Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace