Responses to Typhoons Ketsana and Mirinae

Evaluation of the Vietnam Red Cross relief response with support from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and Participating National Societies
Strategy 2020 voices the collective determination of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to move forward in tackling the major challenges that confront humanity in the next decade. Informed by the needs and vulnerabilities of the diverse communities with whom we work, as well as the basic rights and freedoms to which all are entitled, this strategy seeks to benefit all who look to Red Cross Red Crescent to help to build a more humane, dignified, and peaceful world.

Over the next ten years, the collective focus of the IFRC will be on achieving the following strategic aims:

1. **Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crises**
2. **Enable healthy and safe living**
3. **Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace**

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Cover photo:
A data collector interviews an ethnic minority woman beneficiary and her children in Trok commune, Chu Se district, Gia Lai province. Photo: Ngo Cong Chinh

This publication and the Evaluation Report funded by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (“IFRC”) reflects only the author’s views, findings and recommendations.

The IFRC, makes no warranties or representations, express or implied, as to the completeness, accuracy, and the reliability of the views, findings and recommendations of the author and information contained in this Publication.
The Vietnam Red Cross (VNRC) responded to the Typhoons Ketsana and Mirinae, which hit Central Vietnam in 2009. VNRC received support from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and Participating National Societies (PNS). This evaluation reviews the relief phase supported by IFRC and five PNS.

The evaluation was conducted by a team of three consultants including Henk Tukker – international consultant, Ngo Cong Chinh national consultant and Vu Thi Phuong a representative from VNRC between 10 June and 9 July 2010. The evaluation was conducted intensively in 19 communes of five provinces hit by the disasters. During two weeks of field visits, consultations were held with key stakeholders from the national to the village level.

The evaluation team would like to acknowledge the valuable support and useful comments received from the management and staff of the IFRC, VNRC, and PNS. We are sincerely grateful to the chairmen and staff of provincial, district and commune Red Cross (RC) chapters in the five provinces of Quang Tri, Da Nang, Quang Ngai, Phu Yen and Gia Lai for participating in group discussions and in-depth interviews, as well as effectively facilitating the field survey. We also highly appreciate the precious support of 25 RC volunteers who worked hard with the evaluation team to conduct more than 500 household visits and interviews in 19 communes. Last but not least we would like to thank all the beneficiaries who participated in the group discussions and interviews.

The evaluation team
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AmCross</td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Australian Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARU</td>
<td>Aid Receiving Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCFSC</td>
<td>Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSC</td>
<td>Committee for Flood and Storm Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMWG</td>
<td>Disaster Management Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIPECHO</td>
<td>Disaster Preparedness Programme of ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission-Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Fatherland Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRC</td>
<td>French Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GRC</td>
<td>German Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSO</td>
<td>General Statistics Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>DREF</td>
<td>Disaster Relief Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAT</td>
<td>Join Assessment Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoLISA</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDRT</td>
<td>National Disaster Response Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLRC</td>
<td>Netherlands Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>People’s Committee</td>
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<td>PNS</td>
<td>Participating National Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standards Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Spanish Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWDM</td>
<td>Department of Social Work and Disaster Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNRC</td>
<td>Vietnam Red Cross</td>
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1. Executive Summary

On September 29, 2009, Typhoon Ketsana hit Central Vietnam with wind gusts up to 160 km/hour. It caused widespread destruction in twelve provinces. About a month later, on November 2, 2009, Typhoon Mirinae struck nine provinces in Central Vietnam. In total, both typhoons caused 303 deaths and 1,507 injuries and 12,612 collapsed houses.

The Vietnam Red Cross (VNRC) actively participated in the evacuations and rescue. Immediately after the typhoons made landfall, the local chapters of VNRC distributed relief items to the affected population. VNRC Headquarters requested international support from the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the following Participating National Societies (PNS) provided financial and technical support to VNRC: American Red Cross (AmCross), Australian Red Cross (ARC), German Red Cross (GRC), French Red Cross (FRC), Netherlands Red Cross (NLRC) and Spanish Red Cross (SRC). This evaluation focuses on the support for the relief phase given by IFRC and these PNS.

The purpose of the evaluation is to examine the extent to which the ongoing VNRC typhoon operations’ goals, objectives and expected results were achieved during the relief phase in terms of effectiveness, timeliness and relevance to beneficiaries needs; and to highlight good practices, lessons learned and areas of improvement for future response.

The evaluation combined both qualitative and quantitative methods. Relevant documents were reviewed and semi-structured interviews were conducted with all stakeholders at all levels from beneficiaries to representatives and managers in Ha Noi. The team made field visits to the provinces of Quang Tri, Da Nang, Quang Ngai, Gia Lai and Phu Yen, nine districts and 19 communes. In addition, a household survey was conducted with more than 500 randomly selected households.

VNRC was able to mobilize a significant amount of resources both inside Vietnam and abroad in response to the typhoons. In the relief phase, the support of IFRC and five PNS enabled VNRC to distribute 5,815 tons of rice to 115,115 household and to distribute household kits, instant noodle packages, water tanks, water filters, water purification tablets and plastic sheets. The relief efforts reached in total approximately 166,534 households and 563,087 beneficiaries.

Overall, the typhoon response relief phase was satisfactory as most targets set for the quantity of relief items to be distributed and number of households to receive support were achieved. However, there is still scope for improvement at all levels of the relief response chain.

VNRC assesses needs by using damage information from the Vietnam Government and their own experience of past disaster responses. With the improvement of Vietnam’s economy, the rural populations’ coping mechanism has improved. This makes needs assessments based on past response experience less reliable. The population’s current coping mechanism makes distribution of relief items after essential items are available at the markets less relevant; except for rice distributions, which serve as a cash substitute. Rice distributions were necessary to overcome the difficult period until the next harvest. VNRC, IFRC and PNS are advised to develop commonly agreed methodologies and tools for needs assessment linked to other multi-stakeholder initiatives.

The coordination between VNRC, IFRC and PNS prevented overlaps and resulted in a more or less similar approach to the response. In the future, a faster response is possible if prior agreements existed among parties on coordination mechanisms and responsibilities. This could be documented in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

The tools and methods for beneficiary selection need to be further developed. The evaluation team estimates that only half the beneficiaries could be considered vulnerable and the other half only marginally vulnerable. The more vulnerable the beneficiaries, the more impact the distributed relief items have on their lives. Beneficiary selection guidelines need to be more clearly defined and have more emphasis placed on poverty as a selection criterion. Poor households have fewer coping mechanisms and need more support.
There are several guidelines, manuals and documented and undocumented procedures at VNRC. These could be integrated into one set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for international support, which are annually updated before each typhoon and floods season. Such SOP could include the guidelines and procedures on assessment, targeting of beneficiaries, distribution systems, pre-stock arrangements, cash distribution guidelines, and the roles and responsibilities of different departments and teams at VNRC, as well as procedures for resource mobilization, communication and logistics.

The VNRC cash programme supported by AmCross shows that under certain conditions, cash can be a good alternative to relief and early recovery items once the market of commodities is restored. It is recommended to gradually increase cash support. Rice distributions can be continued in future similar disasters until cash distributions are well institutionalized in VNRC. Distributing rice only to the most vulnerable is more in line with SPHERE standards.

The VNRC has insufficient staff at Headquarters to carry out thorough needs assessments, provide sufficient technical support to local Chapters and monitor disaster response. It is recommended to form a National Disaster Response Team (NDRT). This team could be mobilized among experienced staff from the Provincial Chapters in non-affected areas. The main responsibilities could include needs assessments, targeting beneficiaries and monitoring implementation. Such a team could reduce the need for future international technical assistance.

Relief items were most needed in the disasters’ emergency phase, the early days after the hazard (heavy winds and flooding) hit. A quick response is only possible if relief items, such as plastic sheets, household kits and water filters, are kept in stock at strategic points in disaster prone provinces and are released immediately for distribution.

The most valuable disaster response was provided at the local level by the people themselves and local organisations. Early warning and evacuation reduced the human impact of the disaster. PNS and IFRC are strongly advised to continue and enhance their support to strengthen the disaster preparedness capacity of VNRC and Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction.
2. Background

2.1. The disaster

On September 29, 2009, Typhoon Ketsana hit Central Vietnam with wind gusts of up to 160 km/hour. The typhoon swept through the following 12 provinces: Binh Dinh, Da Nang, Dak Lak, Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Lam Dong, Phu Yen, Quang Binh, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Quang Tri and Thua Thien Hue. It caused widespread destruction, with the provinces of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai, the hardest hit. According to the Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control (CCFSC) the typhoon caused 179 deaths and 1,140 injuries; 26,778 households were evacuated; 9,770 houses collapsed and 263,565 houses were flooded, damaged or had the roof broken; 42,915 hectares of rice were damaged; and the area incurred an economic loss of 5,796 billion VND or 305 million USD.

About a month later, on 2 November 2009, Typhoon Mirinae struck nine provinces in Central Vietnam. Typhoon Mirinae was the 11th storm to strike Vietnam in 2009, ravaging the provinces of Binh Dinh, Dak Lak, Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Phu Yen, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Kon Tum and Gia Lai. Of these, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen were the most affected. Many of these provinces were already hit by Typhoon Ketsana, exacerbating their present situation and posing a setback in gains already made in relief and recovery. According to the CCFSC, this typhoon caused 124 deaths and 188 injuries; 12,606 households were evacuated and 2,842 houses collapsed; 110,175 houses were flooded, damaged or had the roof broken; 19,226 hectares of rice were damaged; and again the area incurred an economic loss of 5,796 billion VND or 305 million USD.

In total, both typhoons caused 303 deaths. The Vietnam government estimates the total economic damage caused by the two typhoons to be 1.3% of the country’s 2009 GDP.

2.2. Red Cross Response

Vietnam Red Cross (VNRC) participated actively in the evacuation of 400,000 people in flood-prone areas before the first typhoon hit. Immediately after the typhoons made landfall, the local chapters of VNRC distributed relief items to the affected population. VNRC Headquarters (HQ) called for a meeting to obtain international support from the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The International Federation Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Vietnam representative and the following Partner National Societies (PNS) responded: American Red Cross (AmCross), German Red Cross (GRC), French Red Cross (FRC), Netherlands Red Cross (NLRC) and Spanish Red Cross (SRC). The IFRC launched an emergency appeal and the PNS approached their HQs, governments and ECHO (European Union) for support. The Australian Red Cross and Swiss Red Cross, who have no representative office in Hanoi also responded to VNRC’s request for support.

The request for support resulted in three channels of financial and technical support to VNRC:

1. IFRC launched an emergency appeal to support relief, livelihood recovery and disaster preparedness. The Appeal was completely funded and IFRC provided financial and technical assistance.

2. PNS raised funds individually and as a consortium to support relief, cash distribution and livelihood recovery efforts which were implemented with VNRC as bilateral programs.

3. VNRC also raised funds through its own appeal, receiving donations from other national societies, embassies in Vietnam and private donors.

The aim was to raise about 10 million USD in total of which half was to be raised by the IFRC Appeal. The resource mobilization of VNRC was successful and VNRC was able to support the affected population in 18 provinces.

Rice distribution conducted by VNRC in Quang Nam province.
3. Evaluation Objectives And Methodology

3.1. Overall objective
The purpose of this evaluation was to examine the extent to which the goals, objectives and expected results of the ongoing VNRC typhoon operations were achieved during the relief phase in terms of effectiveness, timeliness and relevance to beneficiary needs; and to highlight good practices, lessons learned and areas of improvement for future response operations.

3.2. Specific objectives
1. Assess the appropriateness (particularly, of food and non-food items distributions), effectiveness and impact of the relief activities, taking into account Vietnamese context and scope of objectives set for the relief phase.
2. Assess if resource mobilization technical assistance support provided by IFRC and PNS to the relief operation met the VNRC expectations, including if the support was appropriate and efficient.
3. Examine the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms between VNRC, IFRC and PNS.
4. Assess key achievements, challenges and areas for future improvement of the relief phase.
5. Make recommendations toward the development of standard operating procedures (SOP) for future VNRC disaster response operations.

3.3. Methodology summary
The evaluation combined both qualitative and quantitative methods. A study of relevant documents was conducted prior to the field survey to better understand the response and develop appropriate questions for the household survey. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of VNRC, IFRC, PNS, and UNDP in Hanoi and with the VNRC Chapters, the Fatherland Front (FF) and CFSC in the provinces and districts. Five of the 18 provinces were selected, including Quang Tri, Da Nang, Quang Ngai, Gia Lai and Phu Yen. The evaluation team made field visits to 19 communes in nine districts in these provinces. Besides interviews with the commune Red Cross (RC) and People’s Committee (PC), the evaluation team conducted 8 focus group discussions with beneficiaries and interviewed beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in their homes. The team received full cooperation of the local RC Chapters and PCs in the communes and was able to discuss the relief response with beneficiaries without others present.

A household questionnaire was prepared. This survey made it possible to provide quantified data. In each province, five RC volunteers were trained in interviewing and questionnaire techniques. The 25 data collectors from the Provincial Chapters interviewed more than 500 households, which were randomly selected from beneficiary lists. The use of volunteers for the household survey had its limitations. The volunteers did not have sufficient interviewing skills and were not external to the RC. Beneficiaries tend to please those who donated items and this could then have influenced their answers. These factors may have created a certain degree of bias in the household survey results. The evaluation team spoke directly with more than 80 beneficiaries to counterbalance this bias. The findings from the household survey were mainly in line with the team’s interview findings. However, in cases of discrepancy, the team relied on their own findings, not on those of the household survey.

The evaluation team reviewed only the international support to VNRC provided by IFRC and the five PNS who have representative offices in Hanoi (AmCross, FRC, GRC, NLRC and SRC). The findings of the GRC and ARC supported water treatment unit are based on the evaluation conducted by ARC in December 2009.

More methodology details can be found in Annex I.
4. Main Findings

4.1. Major achievements

VNRC was able to mobilize a significant amount of resources from both inside Vietnam and abroad in response to the typhoons. The Provincial Chapters of VNRC were able to respond immediately with small quantities of relief items from their own contingency funds and local resource mobilization. The larger scale response started with financial and technical support from IFRC and PNS. This international support enabled the VNRC to distribute relief items in 18 provinces to achieve the following results by March 2010¹:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Relief item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Number of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>10,078 millions VND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>5,815 tons</td>
<td>115,115 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Household kit</td>
<td>29,320 kits</td>
<td>33,350 households or 126,945 beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Emergency pack</td>
<td>15,995 packs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Water filters</td>
<td>4,929 jars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Water purification tablet (Aqua tabs)</td>
<td>12,500 packs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Plastic sheet</td>
<td>8,000 sheets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Water tank</td>
<td>7,744 tanks</td>
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VNRC also distributed construction materials, rice seeds, fertilizers and cows during early recovery efforts. These have not been reviewed in this evaluation.

The relief efforts of VNRC, IFRC and PNS reached in total approximately 166,534 households and 563,087 beneficiaries. The actual figure is slightly less as a limited number of households received more than one item. Overall the typhoon response relief phase is satisfactory as most targets set for number of items to be distributed and a number of households to receive support have been achieved. However, there is still scope for improvement in the response at all levels (IFRC, PNS, VNRC HQ, Provincial, District, Commune Chapters) and in the different phases of disaster response.

Key finding 1: Most targets set for the number of items to be distributed and households to receive support were achieved.

4.2. Program design phase

4.2.1. VNRC damage and needs assessment

The CCFSC is the main coordinating body for Vietnamese disaster response. Committee members are all government agencies, with the exception of VNRC and few other mass organisations that are members. CCFSC has representations (Committees of Flood and Storm Control) in the provinces, districts and communes (an administrative unit covering a number of villages). CCFSC has a well-established damage assessment mechanism both at local and national levels. Usually, the village leader, local authority representatives (local defence and security) and mass organizations (including VNRC) conduct a rapid damage assessment, mainly by observation. CCFSC does not assess humanitarian needs, but provides information on indicators such as number of people died/injured/missing, number of houses collapsed/flooded and agricultural crops/rice stock lost.

Provincial VNRC chapters identify needs of the affected population using damage information from CCFSC and their own experience in disaster relief. Four out of five Provincial Chapters visited applied only this method. These chapters did not conduct needs assessment in the field by interviewing key informants and members of the affected population immediately after the disaster. The Provincial Chapters started field assessments only after donors indicated the type and quantity of relief items the chapter would receive. Quang Tri RC Chapter is the only exception, where there is a system for reporting damages and needs from the Commune RC Chapter.

¹ VNRC review report on response to typhoon 9 and 11, 2009, dated 25 March 2010
Responses to Typhoons Ketsana and Mirinae

Interview #34, June 28 and one copy of a commune report

Key finding 2: Provincial Chapters of VNRC assessed needs using Vietnam Government damage information and their own experience of past disaster response. Quang Tri Provincial Chapter is the exception. It has a system of reporting damages and needs from the Commune RC upwards and was proactive in providing information on needs to VNRC HQ.

There is a link between damage and need, e.g. the total collapse of a house and subsequent need for construction materials. There are, however, several reasons why assessing needs based only on damage and past experience leads to inaccuracies. Since the economic reforms in 1989, the Vietnam’s economy has been growing significantly. Although most growth is in the cities, the rural areas in the low lands have been profiting from economic development as well. All communes visited in the low lands have electricity and a clear diversification of the economy.

Fewer people today are solely dependent on income from agriculture as many households have income from working in towns. One PC chairman in a commune in Quang Tri revealed that 30% of households have income from city labour. For many villagers, it is common to own a brick house and other assets such as motorbikes, TVs and telephones. The coping mechanism for recovery has improved. However, there are still vulnerable groups, which cannot recover without outside support. This appears to be much more the case in minority areas than in the low lands. This changing context makes basing current needs on past experience unreliable.

In addition, certain damage indicators, such as houses flooded or roof blown away, do not give sufficient information about needs. One beneficiary in Quang Tri clearly explained: “Our rice stock got wet because of the floods. It all depends on how long it was wet and whether the weather is sunny immediately afterwards whether we will really lose our stock. We could still dry our rice and eat it this time, but sometimes we can only feed it to the pigs”.

Another reason not to rely solely on damage figures is that these are not always accurate, especially when looking at damage to livelihood or infrastructure. The information is collected by village leaders and local staff who have limited skills in damage assessment. As damage indicators are used for resource allocation by the government, there could be a tendency to overestimate.

Key finding 3: There is a clear link between damage and needs, but solely relying on damage information and past disaster response experience leads to inaccuracies in the assessed needs.

The evaluation team identified several constraints at the four Provincial Chapters which inhibit more thorough needs assessment by interviewing the affected population and key-informants.

upwards. Quang Tri RC Chapter was also proactive in contacting VNRC HQ to provide information on the needs in the province. The first appeal launched by IFRC on October 2, three days after the first typhoon, was based largely on damage information linked to past experiences from national and provincial VNRC levels.

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Another beneficiary in Quang Tri said: “Our house was flooded, but all our household items were still inside, and we could dry them and still use them”.

Another reason not to rely solely on damage figures is that these are not always accurate, especially when looking at damage to livelihood or infrastructure. The information is collected by village leaders and local staff who have limited skills in damage assessment. As damage indicators are used for resource allocation by the government, there could be a tendency to overestimate.

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The evaluation team identified several constraints at the four Provincial Chapters which inhibit more thorough needs assessment by interviewing the affected population and key-informants.

3 Interview #34, June 28 and one copy of a commune report | 4 Interviews # 1, June 4; #2, June 14; #12, June 17; #23, June 21; #34, June 28; #56, 3 July | 5 Interviews # 41, June 29; # 48, June 30 | 6 Interviews # 12; #23; #34; #56
• There is insufficient ownership to give needs assessment a high priority. Some are convinced that damage indicators and past experience are sufficient methods for assessing needs, while other recognise the importance of doing more, but do not act.

• The other members of the provincial CFSC do not consider needs assessment based on interviews as important and make it difficult for the VNRC chapter to stand out.

• The Provincial Chapters have insufficient human and financial resources to implement thorough needs assessments.

• There is no approved needs assessment system within VNRC.

• The staff have limited knowledge and skills to conduct a systematic needs assessment in the affected areas, which is much more complicated than damage assessments.

The VNRC Disaster Preparedness Manual prepared in 2001 has a chapter on Disaster Response, Disaster Information and Reporting. The manual was used in large scale training for several years and is still used in some cases. It contains a system for damage and needs reporting, which has never been formalized. This system is not yet part of standard operational procedures and appears to not be used in practice.

VNRC HQ conducted early field visits and participated in subsequent needs assessments, which were carried out at the initiative of IFRC and PNS.

**Key finding 4:** Provincial Chapters do not assess needs by interviewing key informants and the affected population. The reasons for this omission include: insufficient ownership, absence of an approved needs assessment system within VNRC, limited human resources and lack of skills.

### 4.2.2. IFRC and PNS needs assessments

United Nations (UN) agencies particularly UNICEF, RC, and INGOs, involved with the Disaster Management Working Group (DMWG) have developed their own multi-stakeholder assessment tool. Assessments are conducted by Joint Assessment Teams (JAT). VNRC, NLRC and SRC joined JAT, which carried out a thorough needs assessment in six provinces. Short-term needs identified included food (rice), safe drinking water, shelter, education, and non-food items. The primary medium and long-term needs consisted of house reconstruction and agricultural inputs. The JAT assessments focused on the affected population’s needs. They gave only limited attention to the capacity of provinces, districts, communes and households to cope with the disaster themselves.

In addition to joining the JAT, there were several other IFRC and PNS initiatives in which VNRC participated. FRC and GRC conducted their own assessments jointly with VNRC before JAT went to the field. The Federation’s Southeast Asia regional office in Bangkok sent one delegate to work with VNRC to carry out a field assessment. IFRC joined an assessment initiated by AmCross and USAID. Another assessment was done by the Regional Disaster Response Team (RDRT) member from the Malaysian Red Crescent and the Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT) operation manager from Norwegian Red Cross. The outcomes of all these assessments were shared with the other RC stakeholders.

There was no previous agreement among VNRC, IFRC and PNS on how to carry out needs assessments prior to disasters, which was linked to the multi-stakeholder JAT initiatives. Neither were there agreed methodology and tools for assessing needs during the different response phases.

**Key finding 5:** IFRC and PNS conducted several needs assessments in which VNRC HQ and Provincial Chapters participated. Some PNS joined multi-stakeholder JAT initiatives. The JAT needs assessments focused on needs rather than local capacity to cope. The results were shared among stakeholders. There was no previous agreement on how to carry out needs assessments linked to JAT initiatives. Neither were there agreed methodology and tools for assessing needs during the different response phases among RC stakeholders.

### 4.2.3. Coordination

*Coordination among VNRC HQ, IFRC and PNS*

There was no prior agreement among RC stakeholders regarding how to coordinate disaster response. VNRC initiated two coordination meetings in the first week for information sharing and resource mobilization. Support for VNRC was geographically divided among PNS to avoid overlaps. The criteria for province selection included those...
most affected, those PNS which cooperated early with Provincial Chapters and provinces bordering each other\textsuperscript{12}. IFRC participated in the geographical division. There were no overlaps among RC stakeholders\textsuperscript{13}. The meetings also achieved a largely coherent response approach. Similar criteria was used for beneficiaries selection, the quality and quantities of rice to be distributed, determining content and quality of household kits and the system for aid distribution. However, there were deviations in the financial management and reporting requirements and specific requirements e.g. indicating the identity card number on beneficiary lists. FRC has the most experience in disaster relief in Vietnam and the other PNS accepted their approach, which was based on earlier VNRC guidelines for international support. By accepting the FRC approach it could be avoided that VNRC was confronted by several different approaches for international support. Although the approach for support was agreed relatively quickly, time was lost discussing issues which could have been agreed before the disaster hit\textsuperscript{14}.

VNRC with technical support from GRC and ARC successfully deployed a water treatment unit and completed water and sanitation field assessments by two Federation delegates in the latter half of January 2010. These assessments helped direct and inform subsequent activities and refocused priorities in the recovery phase\textsuperscript{15}.

AmCross agreed with VNRC to pilot cash distribution with the consent of IFRC and PNS. The AmCross support was implemented under the livelihood component of the IFRC appeal. Although VNRC was initially sceptical about the feasibility of cash distribution, they had the courage to take the risk\textsuperscript{16}.

More complicated was the coordination for external resource mobilization. VNRC initially requested IFRC launch an appeal for 10 million CHF, while IFRC was only willing to appeal for 5 million CHF because of insufficient coverage in recent appeals and the assumption that a number of PNS would support VNRC directly. VNRC and the five PNS preferred to apply for funds on top of the Federation’s appeal, except one contribution of NLRC from the Netherlands government. The PNS of EU member states planned to request funds from ECHO. The latter preferred the four PNS form a consortium and make one common application to cover not only Vietnam but also Cambodia and Laos PDR, which were also affected by Typhoon Ketsana. Some PNS did not consider a consortium of four PNS to be practical, which could potentially delays forwarding the proposal. In the end, the NLRC and GRC formed a consortium and made one ECHO application, but only for Vietnam. Only the FRC application covered Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos PDR. The proposals were developed with coordination between the PNS. ECHO accepted the separate applications and approved those from the NLRC/GRC and FRC. There was no prior coordination mechanism among the RC stakeholders on the resource mobilization\textsuperscript{17}.

Key finding 6: Coordination meetings among VNRC, IFRC and PNS resulted in a geographical and sectoral division of the support to VNRC and a largely coherent response approach with no overlaps. There was no prior agreement among RC stakeholders regarding how to coordinate disaster response and resource mobilization.

\textbf{Coordination with other actors at the national level}

VNRC HQ is a member of CCFSC. VNRC coordinates their response with other government agencies. IFRC and PNS participated in the DMWG meetings to coordinate the international response, both geographically and by sector (Food, Water and Sanitation) to avoid overlaps. The UN keeps records on each planned response in a template, but there is no overall coordination yet for a more coherent response among all stakeholders\textsuperscript{18}.

\textbf{Coordination at the provincial, district and commune level}

The Provincial Chapters of VNRC have regular meetings and actively participate in the provincial CFSC and the recently established Aid Receiving Units (ARU). ARU is created in times of disaster by the Fatherland Front (FF). The latter is the umbrella for all mass organizations in Vietnam, including VNRC. ARU has a mandate to mobilize resources for the mass organizations for a period of two months. All donations in the province should be made to the ARU, with the exemption of donations to VNRC, which can be made directly. The ARU functions as a coordinating unit in the province. The ARU in Quang Tri Province develops an overview of all responses in Excel to avoid overlap. There is no coordination for a more coherent approach in other fields, e.g. quantities of rice distributed by different stakeholders\textsuperscript{19}.

At the district level, VNRC coordinates all activities with CFSC. There is strong cooperation between the members of CFSC. At the commune level, the coordination and cooperation between the CFSC members is so strong that often they work as one operational team\textsuperscript{19}.

In one seriously affected and disaster prone area in Quang Tri province, the CSFC commune received many different relief items from different donors at different times. It is very difficult to avoid overlap among hundreds of

\textsuperscript{12} Interviews # 5 and #9
\textsuperscript{13} Interviews #1, June 15; #2, June 9; #5, June 19
\textsuperscript{14} Interviews #1, June 15; #2, June 8; # 5, June 15; #7, June 9
\textsuperscript{15} IFRC Operation update No.8, Vietnam Flood and typhoons, 20 May 2010
\textsuperscript{16} Interview #6, June 15
\textsuperscript{17} Interviews #1; #2; #5; #8
\textsuperscript{18} Interviews #12; #23; #24, June 21; #34
\textsuperscript{19} Interviews #20, 18 June; #28, June 23; #40, June 29; #47, June 30
households while comparing beneficiary names on several lists. It is far more difficult to keep the data of hundreds of households at the commune level than that of about 10 communes at the district level or 10 districts at the province level\textsuperscript{20}. This underlines the importance of CFSC and FF coordination at the district and provincial levels and avoiding, if possible, different donors providing the same relief items to the same communes.

In addition to the coordinated response of the government, mass organizations and VNRC, there is an increased amount of private initiatives from companies, local (often religious) organizations and individuals. This local response occurs mainly in the early days of the disaster when small quantities of relief items are distributed to the affected population. Understandably, these distributions are not registered at ARU and are often not reported to the commune PC\textsuperscript{21}.

### 4.2.4. Setting the objectives

The IFRC appeal objectives were largely set by VNRC HQ in close cooperation with the IFRC delegation. The time pressure to launch an appeal does not allow a consultation process with provincial and district chapters\textsuperscript{22}. IFRC launched its appeal within three days of the disaster. The first appeal was revised on October 18, but the objectives and target for relief distribution remained unchanged, even after several field assessments had taken place. The assessment team has not reviewed the process for setting objectives for PNS support. PNS have limited flexibility once objectives are set and funds are raised. It is difficult to change objectives without going through complicated procedures with donors\textsuperscript{23}. IFRC has more flexibility to change objectives as long as the change can be explained by changing needs over time linked to clear evidence from assessments.

### 4.2.5. Targeting beneficiaries and geographical selection

VNRC set the following general criteria for beneficiary selection for IFRC and PNS support. These criteria provided guidelines for distribution of relief items and commodities.

**Beneficiaries to be considered in priority:**

- Households affected by the disaster
- Households listed on the latest poverty list
- Households that lost their means of generating income as a result of the disaster
- Households that have no labour force; children 0-5 years; pregnant and/or lactating women; disabled-and/or female-headed households
- Households that have received no significant support from other sources

**Distribution of food aid criteria:**

- Households that lost their food stocks
- Households in which cultivation fields were seriously damaged (> 50%) 

**Distribution of non-food items (household kits):**

- Households in which house collapsed, was severely damaged or lost its roof
- Households that were flooded

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\textsuperscript{20}Interview #47, June 30 | \textsuperscript{21}Interview #24 | \textsuperscript{22}Interview #1; #57, 5 July | \textsuperscript{23}Interviews #8; #9; #10

Key finding 7: VNRC coordinates its response with the Vietnam Government bodies at all levels. PNS and IFRC coordinate their support with other international stakeholders. These coordination mechanisms are effective in largely avoiding geographical and sectoral overlaps, but do not result in a coherent common approach for disaster response.

Key finding 8: IFRC appeal objectives were largely set by VNRC HQ in close cooperation with the IFRC delegation. The relief response objectives remained unchanged during the implementation.

Key finding 9: VNRC set the criteria for beneficiary selection, which was accepted by PNS and IFRC.
4.2.6. Ownership of the response

VNRC has overall responsibility for the relief phase implementation. All relief items were procured by VNRC HQ and transported to the Provincial Chapters, who arranged distribution in cooperation with the district and commune chapters. In absence of the latter, the commune CFSC would implement beneficiary selection and aid distribution. IFRC and PNS have only a monitoring and support role. Due to capacity constraints at VNRC HQ, PNS opened offices in the provinces or, like the FRC, established a mobile team from which they could monitor and support the disaster response.24 Except for this monitoring and support role, which is also the responsibility of VNRC HQ, VNRC owns the overall disaster relief implementation. There are parallel structures of the five PNS and IFRC for technical assistance and monitoring in Ha Noi. PNS considered field presence in the provinces essential. They did not find it feasible to strengthen VNRC HQ short-term capacity, which would have enabled VNRC HQ to provide technical assistance to the provinces and monitor the program.25

Key finding 10: VNRC owns the overall relief operation, except for monitoring and technical assistance provided by IFRC and PNS.

4.3. Implementation

4.3.1. Selection of provinces, district and communes

Most of the affected provinces were included. VNRC prefers wide coverage rather than prioritizing a limited number of provinces.26 Also provincial and district chapters of VNRC give preference not to prioritize and to include all affected geographical areas. Relief items were not distributed equally. The quantity varied according the degree of damage and the support given by other organizations. Prevalence of poverty or the number of poor households affected is not yet a selection criterion for targeting of provinces, districts, or communes.27

Key finding 11: VNRC prefers to include all affected areas. The quantity of relief items varies according to degree of damage and support given by other organisations. Poverty is not yet a selection criterion for geographical areas.

4.3.2. Targeting beneficiaries: the process

Beneficiary selection is in principle the responsibility of the commune VNRC representative. At the communes visited by the evaluation, the Vice Chairman of the PC is often also the Chairman of the RC chapter in the commune. The combination of these two functions has a number of advantages, such as the close relationship between the RC and the PC and support of local authorities to the RC work. On the other hand it may also influence the independence of the RC. Quang Tri province is again the exception, where separate representation was present at the communes visited.28 In all communes visited, beneficiary selection and aid distribution was implemented by the RC representatives in the commune together with other members of CFSC in the commune. CFSC is chaired by the PC chairman.

None of the PCs interviewed felt sufficient ownership for the selection criteria set by VNRC HQ for IFRC and PNS support.

The PC in the commune used the following criteria for other distributions:

- Distribute the same quantity to all affected households in the commune.
- Distribute only to poor households on the MoLISA poverty list, regardless of whether these households were affected by the disaster.
- Distribute the same amount to all households in the commune, affected or not.

PC members consider it unfair that some households receive relief items, while others who are also affected and in a difficult situation do not. This sentiment is particular strong in communes where the number of relief items is insufficient to assist everybody who fits the criteria. The PC likes to maintain harmony in the commune and villages. Providing relief items to one household and not to another in need can potentially disturb this harmony. The RC representative has to implement the complicated process of targeting beneficiaries in an environment that considers the criteria to be donor imposed. The RC representative depends largely on village leaders and mass organization representatives to select the beneficiaries.29

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24 Interviews #1; #2; #4; #5; #7; #9  
25 Interviews #5; #7; #8; #9  
26 Interviews #1; #2; #53  
27 Interviews: #1; #2; #53  
28 In all communes in Hai Lang district, the chairman of commune RC is not the PC vice-chairman. Out of 9 districts and town in the provinces, there are only 3 districts where the chairman of district RC is the vice-chairman of the district PC; phone interview with the chairman of RC Chapter of Hai Lang district, August 31  
29 Interviews: #20; #28; #40; #47; #53
Key finding 12: The RC implements beneficiary selection in cooperation with the commune PC, village leaders and other mass organisation representatives. PCs feel insufficient ownership of the RC selection criteria.

The VNRC relief items distribution guidelines for IFRC and PNS support mentions that: “Public meeting gathering the villagers and particularly the most vulnerable villagers should be organised in each targeted village in order to identify the beneficiaries of the distributions”.

In the household survey, 90% confirmed that a selection meeting was organised in the villages. From the semi-structured beneficiary interviews, the team found that several beneficiaries and also non-beneficiaries did not attend or could not remember such meetings, so the actual percentage might be less.

The meetings were structured in two primary ways:

1. The village leaders and mass organization representatives prepared a draft list of selected beneficiary households. In principle, all villagers are invited to the meeting to discuss this selection. The village leader informed the participants of the selection criteria. The villagers were then able to comment on the list. Proposals for changing the list were made, which led to minor changes to 20% of the listed beneficiaries. The meeting could be held in approximately one to two hours.

2. Several meetings were held in different parts of the village. The village leader introduced the selection criteria and participants identified candidates for the list. It is an unwritten rule that one does not put forward oneself for the list. This is a very participative and lengthy process. These meeting could go on for several hours late into the night.

Provincial and district chapters did not monitor these meetings. The RC commune representative was not always present.

The guidelines for beneficiary selection criteria were not very detailed, which allowed for individual interpretation by the commune and villagers. This provided more commune flexibility and ownership, but also created more potential for disagreement (and targeting other beneficiaries as planned by VNRC HQ with the support from IFRC and PNS). Some beneficiaries mentioned that the difficult situation the household is in due to the disaster is an important selection criterion. For example, households can be in difficult situations due to increased debt or not having access to family support. This criterion is related to the ability of the household to cope with the disaster, which is not explicitly included in VNRC criteria.

The meetings were organised for each distribution and could be held for one or more relief items at the same time. One commune receiving many items at different times from different donors organised several selection meetings.

Key finding 13: Community meetings were often organised for beneficiary selection. Two approaches were used: either a draft list prepared in advance was discussed or the participants selected the beneficiaries at the meeting. Some beneficiaries mentioned the difficult situation a household is in as important selection criteria. The selection criteria of VNRC were insufficiently clear. This led to targeting also beneficiaries that were not intended by VNRC HQ, IFRC and PNS.

4.3.3. Targeting beneficiaries: the results

Almost all beneficiaries interviewed by the team largely met the criteria set in the guidelines (see 4.5.2). According to the household survey, only 4% of the beneficiaries were not affected by either Typhoons Ketsana or Mirinae. The majority of beneficiaries (57% according the household survey) were households on the poverty list. All the beneficiaries visited by the team had either lost crops, lost food stocks, had their house flooded or damaged or their roof blown off. Very few households had no labour force at all, but many were taking care of elderly, disabled or young children.
The assessment team reviewed whether the beneficiaries belonged to the “vulnerable” of the affected population. Vulnerable people are those who are at greatest risk from situations that threaten their survival, or their capacity to live with an acceptable level of social and economic security and human dignity (IFRC definition). In the early phase of a disaster, both poor and better-off parts of the affected population can be in vulnerable situations which threaten their lives and impact their access to safe drinking water, food and shelter. During this disaster, this period lasted about one week. The floods had receded in most places within three days and basic necessities were soon available at the markets once again.

The ability to recover from the disasters varied widely between households. Poverty proved a crucial factor in determining the rate at which a household could recover. While some had savings and/or other income to assist in disaster recovery, others could only cope by borrowing money and increasing their debts, selling assets or accepting outside support.

Based on data from the household survey, 98% of respondents have electricity, 82% have a TV, 65% have a telephone, 70% own a motorbike, and most have a brick house to live in. These findings are in line with the team’s own observations. A minority of the beneficiaries can clearly be classified as vulnerable, but at least half of the beneficiaries are only marginally vulnerable. A number of households visited were definitely not vulnerable. Some households owned next to nothing, while some owned nicely tiled two-story brick houses, an equipped kitchen with running water, a bathroom and several motorbikes. The classification “no labour force” in the household does not necessarily mean that a household is vulnerable. However, this was sometimes used as the only selection criterion, without taking the real vulnerability of the household into consideration. Based on the household survey results and our own observations, the evaluation team estimates that half of the beneficiaries were only marginally vulnerable and some not at all.

There is a large difference in vulnerability between communes. The commune visited close to Da Nang city, although prone to disasters, has very few real vulnerable households, while the commune in the mountains in Quang Ngai or Gia Lai province, (largely populated by an ethnic minority), has many vulnerable households.

Key finding 14: Most of the beneficiaries met the beneficiary selection guidelines criteria. Vulnerable households were reached, but the selection criteria were insufficiently detailed and not focused enough on vulnerability. This resulted in also selecting less vulnerable households. The team estimates that half of the beneficiaries were only marginally vulnerable. In addition, there is a large difference in vulnerability between targeted communes.

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22 Household survey and interviews #13, June 17; #14 June 17; #30, June 23; #31, June 23; #38, June 28; #39 June 28; #41, June 29; #42, June 29; #44, June 29; #46, June 29; #48 June 30; #49, June 30; #50 June 30; #53
4.3.4. The distribution system

The VNRC distribution system is working well. The beneficiaries praised the distribution as very well organised. Also, the FF chairman in one province commended VNRC for their excellent “relief technology”. Others confirmed that it works well. One commune PC decided to use the same distribution system for relief items from other sources. No difficulties in logistics within the provinces have been reported to the team.

Key finding 15: The VNRC distribution system works well and was praised by all stakeholders.

4.3.5. Relevance of distributed relief items: the beneficiaries’ perspective

Rice

Rice is the staple food in Vietnam. All affected households, including those from minority groups, consume rice. Those who lost their crops or rice stock will have to purchase rice if it is not donated by relief agencies. The importance of food is illustrated by the fact that according the survey in the cash programme supported by AmCross households spent 42% on food.

All beneficiaries interviewed by team confirmed that they consumed the distributed rice. According to the household survey, 97% of households ate the rice themselves. Only 2% kept rice in stock, while 1% shared the rice to others and 1% exchanged rice for medicines. There is no evidence that rice was sold.

The household survey revealed that beneficiaries were satisfied (42%) or very satisfied (48%) with the type of rice distributed. Only 7% were quite satisfied, while 2% were not satisfied with the type of rice. This was in line with the assessment teams’ findings that all the beneficiaries and PC were satisfied or very satisfied with rice quality, with the exception of two communes in Da Nang city. In these two communes, beneficiaries and PCs complained about rice quality, which could have been wet or kept in stock too long. However all confirmed that they still ate the rice despite the taste.

Key finding 16: Most beneficiaries were satisfied or very satisfied with the type of rice distributed. Almost all ate the rice. There is no evidence that rice was sold.

The rice distributed did not save any lives. Nobody would have starved if the VNRC had not distributed rice. The only possible area at risk would be the most vulnerable households in very remote mountain villages. The coping mechanisms, especially in the lowland areas among the Kinh (the majority ethnic group in Vietnam) are quite strong. Households will look for other sources of income, such as finding temporary work in towns, using their savings, receiving assistance from family and neighbours or borrowing money to obtain rice. The few households that cannot cope are likely to be assisted by the PC commune. If the communes cannot cope, the district PCs or provincial PCs or the national government will ultimately make rice available. In 2009, Vietnam produced about 39 million tons of rice. It is the second largest exporter of rice in the world, exporting about 6 million tons. The RC distributed...
5,815 tons of rice, or respectively 0.014 % of total production and 0.09 % of total export. Rice is only a minor part of the many products exported from Vietnam. From October 2009, the Vietnam Government distributed 47,000 tons of rice\textsuperscript{37}. The Vietnam government can afford to distribute rice in response to disasters with a similar impact if needed.

Although most beneficiaries had access to rice, the VNRC distribution was a welcome relief. The rice distribution made it possible to use money for other priority needs, serving as a cash substitute. However, strictly speaking, rice distribution after the affected population had access to rice, was not in accordance with all 2004 SPHERE food aid standards. SPHERE justifies food distributions, it is required to sustain life, protect or restore people’s self-reliance and reduce the need for them to adopt potentially damaging coping mechanisms. General (free) distribution should be introduced only when absolutely necessary, targeting those who need food most. The fact that most beneficiaries still own luxury assets, such as TVs, makes it unlikely that they had to resort to damaging coping strategies, such as the sale of productive assets. Increasing debt is one coping mechanism and for some poor households this could be irreversible. Food aid would have been justified only for the most vulnerable according to 2004 SPHERE standards. In this case, the majority of beneficiaries could not be classified as most vulnerable.

Several PCs and also RC chapters expressed dissatisfaction with distributing the same amount of rice to households that varied in size from one to three persons. Many considered this unfair\textsuperscript{38}.

**Key finding 17:** All beneficiaries had access to rice from other sources. Rice served as a substitute for cash and was a welcome relief in a difficult period. SPHERE justifies food aid only for the most vulnerable. This was not the case for the majority of beneficiaries. Distributing the same of amount of rice to households that vary in size is considered unfair by many at the local level.

**Timeliness of rice distribution**

The need for rice was most urgent in the disasters’ early days. Once the floods receded and people could dry their rice stocks, or make purchases or borrow rice, the need became less urgent. Provincial Chapters were able to distribute rice early. Most of the IFRC and PNS support arrived when the need was no longer urgent, but the rice was still a welcome cash substitute. FRC support was the earliest, with their first round of rice distribution completed by November 2009. IFRC and SRC managed to complete most distribution by January 2010. NLRC and GRC support was the last, completing most distribution in March 2010, with a final small distribution in May 2010. The differences in timeliness are due to the source of funding. FRC was funded by ECHO from the pre-emergency phase, while NLRC and GRC where only funded by ECHO from the emergency phase. Except for the last distribution in May 2010, all these distributions were in time for the next harvest. Beneficiaries received rice in the most difficult period, that being the gap between the disaster and next successful harvest. According to the survey, 85% considered the distribution to be timely, 14% as quite late and 1% as too late.

**Key finding 18:** Most of the rice arrived when the need was no longer urgent, but the rice was still a welcome cash substitute to overcome the period till the next harvest.
**Household kits**

A household kit consists of one large water bucket containing one kettle, one cooking pan, one blanket, one bucket, one mosquito net and sometimes soap. The type and quality items are considered as appropriate by the beneficiaries and PCs and the team could observe the use of similar items in the villages, which confirms its appropriateness.

The household survey outcome contradicts the assessment team’s findings. The household survey identified that all respondents used the items and considered them useful. Team observation noted completely unused kits, partially used kits, partially sold kits and kits used next to the old items. The team noted a few times that volunteers who conducted the interviews did not observe the use of items as instructed, but solely relied on the beneficiaries’ answers, which may have been biased due to a tendency to please donors. The evaluation team actually requested that beneficiaries show their items. Several times beneficiaries claimed to use items, but the items did not appear to have been used. This different way of assessing the use of household items could explain the discrepancy between finding from the household survey and the team.

Beneficiary selection criteria included households whose house collapsed, was severely damaged or lost its roof. All beneficiaries we visited had their house flooded or lost their roof. One beneficiary’s house collapsed. However none lost household items and all could collect, dry, and re-use items after the hazard (heavy wind or floods) ended.

The AmCross cash distribution survey revealed that very little was spent on household items. This is another indication that the household kits were not a priority for many.

**Timeliness of household kit distribution**

When beneficiaries and PCs were asked to prioritize support for future disasters, household items were sometimes mentioned as needed immediately after the disaster, but not at all for recovery. Most of the household kits were distributed when essential items were again available at the market. Despite the survey outcome, the team observed that household kits were of limited use at this point. Household kits can be urgently needed in the early days after a disaster, but are often no longer required during recovery.

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**Water tanks**

Access to safe drinking water was a serious problem in many of the flooded areas. With support from the GRC, SRC and Luxembourg Government, VNRC distributed water tanks which could store safe drinking water. The GRC and SRC distributed 5,489 tanks consisting of 500-litre tanks to households and institutions and 1,000-litre tanks to nursery schools. Communes visited by the team all had structural water supply problems. We saw several 500-litre tanks installed at relatively better-off households, where the tank was placed high and filled with water from an electric pump to supply current water to the house. The 1,000-litre tanks had a similar function at nursery schools. The team observed that many of the water tanks donated by the Luxembourg Government in a flood prone commune near Da Nang city were not used. The household survey sample did not have enough recipients of the water tanks, water filters and/or water purification tablets to analyse the data.

In addition, with technical and financial support from GRC and ARC, VNRC successfully deployed a water treatment unit in Thua Thien-Hue province, supplying 118,600 litres of fresh water to 5,519 households (some 26,000 people); distributed 11,600 boxes of water purification tablets to 11,360 households (some 46,745 people); and completed water and sanitation field assessments by two Federation delegates in the latter half of January 2010.

In December 2009, ARC in collaboration with VNRC performed an evaluation of the water treatment unit. Beneficiaries interviewed expressed gratitude and appreciation for the water provided and commented on the high quality of water produced. Other findings showed the quality and quantity of the water provided by the intervention was appropriate to the scale of the disaster. The local authorities and humanitarian actors also expressed their appreciation of this deployment.

**Timeliness of water tanks distribution**

Safe drinking water was urgently needed immediately after the disaster. Water tanks were distributed from December 2009 through February 2010. However, water tanks arrived too late to serve as relief. Households and

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*Key finding 19: The items in the household kits are appropriate and can meet an urgent need in the early days after a disaster. However, they are not a priority for households in the recovery phase.*
institutions (kindergartens) regarded GRC and SRC tanks as useful, serving to address structural problems and providing valuable disaster preparedness for future floods. Most tanks were placed higher than flood level and can be used to tap drinking water when the next flood strikes.

**Water filters**

VNRC distributed 2,090 water filter jars with support from GRC. The team observed that a few households visited were using the filters. One household did not use the filter jars because the instructions were insufficiently clear. For one larger household, water did not penetrate fast enough to supply the whole family. A few stored the filter jars in preparation for future disasters.

**Timeliness of water filters distribution**

Water filter jars could be valuable during and immediately after the floods. The water filter jars were distributed two months after flooding, when the needs were less urgent. These filter jars could prove valuable for future floods.

**Water purification tablets**

VNRC, with support from IFRC and GRC, distributed 12,500 boxes of 100 water purification tablets (brand name Aqua Tabs). The team evaluated the GRC’s use of the Aqua Tabs in Quang Tri province. The VNRC chapter of this province donated the water purification tablets to government health centres for distribution, with clear instruction for the beneficiaries for its application. The tablets were donated in this way because the affected population was less familiar with the use of Aqua Tabs. There was a fear that tablets would be used inappropriately, such as swallowing them or overdosing. The water tablets arrived too late to serve a relief purpose. In one commune, the health centre did not distribute the tablets, while in another the tablets were distributed, to reduce the risks for inappropriate use, to more educated beneficiaries, which are often the better-off.

**Timeliness of water purification tablets distribution**

The team did not evaluate IFRC tablet distribution, which occurred in October and was most likely timely. The GRC distribution in December was not timely and therefore did not serve a relief purpose. The tablets were only partly used, with the remainder stored for future floods.

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**Key finding 20:** Water tanks and water filter jars could be valuable relief items immediately after a typhoon hits. In this case, the items were not distributed in a timely manner, but could still be valuable for future floods. The appropriateness of water purification tablets is questionable in the Vietnamese context.

**Plastic sheets**

With FRC support, VNRC distributed 8,000 plastic sheets to use as shelter material. Many households who lost their shelters stayed temporarily with family or neighbours, in public buildings or even in the open air. The plastic sheets could be used as a temporary roof cover or wall until the house had been repaired, facilitating an earlier return home. According to the survey, 50% of respondents said they used the sheeting for a roof, while 24% used it for walls. Twenty-three percent used it for other purposes, such as drying rice and animal sheds. The respondents were very satisfied (82%) or satisfied (18%) with the sheet quality. The team observed sheets being used to prevent leakages, for roofs or walls and as veranda cover. Most sheets were used now for other purposes or stored for future disasters.
4.3.6. Cause of delays

There were several causes for delays and less timely distributions. VNRC, IFRC and PNS needed some time to coordinate and agree on the support approach. In addition, only a few items were pre-stocked. VNRC HQ had 5,000 household kits in stock, but was reluctant to release them all until their replenishment was guaranteed. IFRC had the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) which could be made available early, but had to wait for the appeal response before large scale distribution could start. PNS had to prepare proposals for their HQs and donors. This process is always time consuming and most PNS can only start support if the financial contribution from back donors is confirmed. Although PNS proposals were prepared in a couple of days, the approval by donors took much longer.

Most delays were caused by suppliers. A number of suppliers withdrew their offer after selection, forcing the procurement process back to square one. This was due to high fluctuations in rice prices at that time. Additional delays were caused by currency fluctuations. The Vietnam Dong increased in value against the Euro, which caused delays in the ECHO-supported programs of NLRC and GRC. Other delays were caused by communication problems between logistics and social welfare departments at VNRC HQ and PNS. The Provincial Chapters were reluctant to start distribution without authorized guidelines and financial management clarity, which differed slightly between IFRC and among PNS.

Plastic sheets proved to be more appropriate and cost effective shelter material than tents. Unsolicited tents provided to VNRC by a donor outside the RC were not distributed and being kept in stock for disaster preparedness.

**Timeliness of plastic sheet distribution**

In the survey, 75% of the respondent said the plastics sheets were timely, while 25% said they were late. Based on beneficiary, PC and local RC interviews, the evaluation team found that the earlier the plastic sheets are distributed, the more useful they are. Many households were able to repair their roofs shortly after the typhoons. Plastic sheets are valuable relief items early in the emergency phase, although they can still serve a purpose if distributed later.

**Key finding 21:** Plastic sheets are appropriate for temporary roofs, walls or to prevent leakage. The earlier the sheets are distributed, the more valuable these are for shelter. At a later stage, plastic sheets serve many other purposes.

**Key finding 22:** There were several causes for delays in getting aid items to beneficiaries. The major causes included supplier withdrawal and the fact that IFRC and PNS cannot support large scale implementation until funding from external donors is confirmed.
4.3.7. Redistributions

Rice can easily be divided into smaller quantities. It is therefore most at risk for redistribution. A household of one to three family members is rationed 30 kg of rice, while a household with four and more members receives 60 kg. In areas with larger households, 90 kg were distributed to those with seven or more members. We found only one commune supported with IFRC rice, in Da Nang city, which had systematically redistributed their rice. The PC decided to distribute only 30kg to all households irrespective of household size. Back in the village, all beneficiaries shared at the village leader’s request a “voluntary” 15 kg with another household. In the past, VNRC/IFRC introduced 30 kg rather than 10 kg bags to promote targeting and complicate redistributions.

Key finding 23: In most cases, rice was not redistributed.

4.4. Impact on people’s lives

The impact of receiving relief items will vary according to actual household needs and the type and timeliness of the items received. On one extreme are beneficiaries who can be classified as most vulnerable. These people lost their house and harvest, own almost nothing and could only cope with the disaster by increasing their debt. A donation of 60 kg of rice before the next harvest was a very welcome relief. On the other extreme, there are beneficiaries with big houses, several motorbikes, flat screen TVs, etc. For these better-off families, a relief item such as a households kit received two months after the disaster means very little to their lives.

Key finding 24: The impact of relief items varied according to household needs and vulnerability, and the type and timeliness of items distributed. The largest impact was made by those items most needed arriving at the right time to the most vulnerable households.

4.5. Cash distributions

The team has not evaluated the VNRC cash program supported by AmCross. This programme was evaluated in March 2010 by the IDL Group. The findings below are based on review of the Programme Final Evaluation Report, Post Typhoon Ketsana Cash Transfers in Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces prepared by Richard Rastall.

The cash distribution program was effectively implemented by VNRC with support from AmCross, who also assisted with implementation through provision of technical guidance as well as overall monitoring, project management support and supervision. This was the first time that the VNRC had implemented a cash transfer program in response to disaster. The cash transfers were intended to assist beneficiaries meet their immediate basic needs; begin to stabilize or rebuild their livelihoods and to re-stimulate local economies. The distributions ultimately reached over 8,500 household in 4 provinces.

The majority of the cash transfers have been used for buying food. There have been significant expenditures on other basic needs such as house repair, medicines and clothes. There were also significant expenditures on productive assets such as agricultural tools, seed, fertilizer and or small livestock (e.g. pigs and poultry). According to this evaluation, beneficiaries overwhelmingly (83%) prefer cash grants to other forms of humanitarian assistance. The programme has demonstrated the potential of unconditional cash transfers in the early recovery phase of the disaster. It also created a set of clear guidelines, processes and formats, which can be utilized by future cash transfer initiatives.

The evaluation team discussed cash versus relief items distribution with beneficiaries. Relief items were preferred in the early days of the disaster, but cash was preferred by all once the market had restored itself.
4.6. Monitoring

Provincial RC chapters and district staff monitored beneficiary selection by taking random samples of the beneficiaries list and closely reviewing the distribution and post distribution checks to prevent redistributions. Delegates and local PNS staff intensely monitored the progress in the provinces. IFRC monitoring was implemented from Ha Noi and was less intensive than that of PNS. In December 2009, ARC in collaboration with VNRC performed an evaluation of the water treatment unit while their response was still on-going.

Across organizations, monitoring was completely focused on implementing objectives. There was little monitoring going on in terms of the populations’ changing needs, as this would require response adjustments. The difficulties associated with changing PNS objectives once they have been approved by back donors make such monitoring less useful. An advantage of cash distributions is that they are more flexible to changing needs. IFRC conducted recovery needs assessments in February/March 2010. This led to revised appeal objectives to ensure they met emerging needs.

VNRC does not yet have a formal, safe complaints procedure for beneficiaries. Presently, beneficiaries can complain to the village leader, who passes the feedback to the Commune PC, CCSF or RC, who then passes the complaint to the district RC chapter. Beneficiaries have no easy access directly to the RC, although this could enhance beneficiary accountability.

4.7. Visibility

The team reviewed the extent to which beneficiaries were aware of the source of relief items. According to the household survey, 80% of households were aware that their donation was from VNRC, while 20% thought it was from IFRC. Very few mentioned PNS. The team found that VNRC visibility was high, but few beneficiaries were aware who supported VNRC. Some beneficiaries were aware of IFRC, but few remembered the PNS. The team found that the relief items themselves were most important to beneficiaries. It is of little importance who provided the items. The team is of the opinion that it is important that VNRC has clear visibility, but that visibility of IFRC, PNS and donors is less important, unless these donors insist on visibility.

4.8. VNRC capacity building

IFRC explicitly included a capacity building objective in the appeal: “The operation will contribute to the ongoing organizational development and capacity building of VNRC in a manner which leaves behind a stronger set of skills and capacities at HQ and branch level”. IFRC linked their relief support with VNRC development. The main activities planned include on-the-job training, this evaluation and documenting lessons learned and recommendations for strengthening the internal systems and procedures. Finance, procurement and communication were all identified as requiring capacity building.
Key finding 28: Disaster response capacity varied among Provincial Chapters. Participation in capacity building and disaster preparedness projects and previous experience with disaster response appear to influence these variations.

4.8.1. Human resources at VNRC

The following units are responsible for implementing the relief response at VNRC HQ:

- Department of Social Welfare and Disaster Management (SWDM) of VNRC HQ
- A task force including representatives from different departments such as procurement, donor relations, communications team, finance.
- A steering committee for Typhoon Ketsana response consisting of heads of all relevant departments of VNRC and the resident members of VNRC HQ leadership

SWDM has 15 staff members of which 6 work at the Disaster Management Unit. The Social Welfare Unit staff are mobilized as well during disasters. The procurement, donor relations and communication teams are established temporarily using staff from other departments. This flexibility enables VNRC to quickly increase its human resources for fast response, but has an unavoidably adverse impact on the progress of other programmes. It is not possible for VNRC to recruit additional staff on short-term contracts\(^5\).

Recently, there have been a number of SWDM department staff changes, in which experienced staff left and were replaced by less experienced staff.

IFRC, PNS and other support has resulted in additional work as compared to 10 years ago, when almost all support was exclusively provided by IFRC\(^3\). VNRC HQ had insufficient technical support capacity to monitor the province relief response implementation and welcomed PNS initiatives to recruit delegates and local staff, who would work directly with the provincial VNRC chapters\(^4\).

The Provincial Chapters have 8 to 14 staff members, including chairman, vice-chairman, and some officers in charge of SWDM, of which 2 to 4 staff members have regular disaster management responsibilities. Provincial Chapters are able to mobilize all their staff in times of disaster. Shortage of staff is less an issue here as it is at VNRC HQ. Most district RC chapters...
have only two staff members, who work closely with the district PC. Shortage of staff is more an issue at the district level than at the provincial level. The district and Provincial Chapters can request their PC to make staff available for RC work. This staff will remain in their own department, but will perform tasks for the RC. In addition to staff, VNRC also mobilizes volunteers55.

Key-finding 29: VNRC HQ has insufficient human resources to monitor and provide technical support to Provincial Chapters. Staff shortage is less an issue at the Provincial Chapters.

4.8.2. Which capacities need to be strengthened?

VNRC has a number of strengths which enable it to deliver relief items across a large area. The society is able to mobilize its network of provinces, districts and volunteers and has strong relations with the Vietnam Government. It is able to arrange logistics from HQ to beneficiaries in an effective way, based on prepared beneficiary lists. Coastal provinces have accumulated many years of disaster response experience. However, there is still room for improvement, with two areas which clearly need to be addressed: needs assessment and beneficiary targeting.

From 1998 to 2001, the IFRC supported VNRC in disaster management capacity building. The Community Based Disaster Preparedness Programme and Human Resource Development and Consolidation of Disaster Preparedness Centres project was implemented followed by the Human Resources Development, Institutional Development and Risk Reduction Activity project. Both projects were funded by DIPECHO. After a lengthy consultation process, the Disaster Preparedness Manual was developed. Several chapters of the manual deal with disaster response. More than 100 people were trained to train other VNRC staff. Many were trained under this program and other initiatives, which focused on human resource development. The manual includes information and reporting systems, criteria for targeting the most vulnerable, distribution systems, etc. A separate manual was prepared to enable others to assess needs after a disaster. However, a decision was never made regarding how VNRC would work with this information. In the meantime, there has been a change of staff at several Provincial Chapters. When asked which approach the new staff follow in disaster response, all mentioned the “four-on-spots” of the government approach56. None made any reference to specific VNRC approaches or the manual. Quang Tri is again the exception, but soon three of their experienced senior staff will retire. Human resource development needs to be a continuous process. It is more important that the majority of staff feels ownership for the relief response procedures and systems that training is based on these procedures and systems rather than the other way around. Ownership of these procedures and systems will be essential for their successful implementation.

The VNRC response is part of the government response at the commune level. The strengthening of VNRC capacity must be linked to government initiatives to be most effective. UNDP supports strengthening the institutional capacity for Disaster Risk Management in Vietnam at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the CCFSC standing office.

At this moment, guidelines are being developed for each VNRC operation, which are valid only for the specific operation. There are no standard operational procedures for VNRC, which can in principle be applied to all international support or all support in general57.

Key finding 30: VNRC has the capacity to deliver relief items in a large area by mobilizing its network. The society has strong relations with the Vietnamese Government. There is a need to strengthen capacity in the areas of needs assessment and beneficiary targeting. Capacity building needs to be focused more on the development of procedures and systems rather than training.

4.8.3. Material resources

The lack of transport and/or warehouse facilities was rarely mentioned as problematic. The quantity of relief items VNRC had in stock was low considering the frequency of disasters in Vietnam. There were no pre-arrangements made with suppliers. Considering the high fluctuations in rice prices, pre-arrangements would be difficult for this commodity58.

Key finding 31: The quantity of relief items VNRC had in stock was low considering the frequency of disasters in Vietnam.
4.9. IFRC and PNS technical support

With the exception of experienced local staff, the Federation delegation did not have a representative with previous experience in Vietnam. Support was received from the IFRC Asia Pacific Zone office in Kuala Lumpur for one week, but was limited due to emergencies in the Philippines and Indonesia at the same time. The Operation Manager did not arrive until 17 October 2009. The IFRC representative, who had just arrived, had to leave for personal reasons after one month. The changes in staff made it difficult for the IFRC to play a leading role in coordinating the response among the PNS.

VNRC did not mention differences in the technical support quality from the different sources. FRC was clearly the fastest and most experienced in Vietnamese relief. They took the lead in defining the approach for relief items distribution to be followed. AmCross led technical support for cash distributions.

Proposal (or appeal) writing and reporting to international donors are areas in which VNRC still clearly lacks knowledge and skills. The requirements of ECHO are very high and the procedures are complicated. Without technical support, VNRC could not obtain ECHO funds\(^{59}\). This expertise does not necessarily have to be provided by PNS. VNRC could hire in experts to write proposals and reports, however they currently do not have the systems in place to do so\(^{60}\).

The technical support from field offices created some communication challenges. The provincial chapter needed instructions from VNRC HQ on response procedures and financial management. PNS field offices were initially communicating this information directly to the Provincial Chapters rather than through the VNRC HQ. This created implementation delays. The Provincial Chapters also found it confusing that support financial management varied between IFRC and PNS, each using different formats\(^{61}\).

4.10. Efficiency of the support

The evaluation team asked itself the following questions: Could the results have been achieved with less overhead expenditures? And, could there have been a better ratio between delegates’ expenditure and relief items? IFRC and all five PNS have their own representative offices and recruited one delegate and local staff for the program. The NLRC and GRC formed a consortium for the ECHO program and employed one relief delegate and local staff jointly. The team did not compare overhead costs between the different RC partners. Calculating exact overhead costs is difficult. Since all organizations have representative offices, which were there for development programs, it is questionable whether a part of their expenditures should be considered as overhead for the relief response. Such an analysis would also require comparing overhead at headquarters. We did compare the volume of relief items distributed and number of beneficiaries reached with the number of relief delegates. This process was also complicated because delegates worked both for relief and recovery, and quantities for each relief item varied.

The VNRC Provincial Chapter required technical support in the areas of need assessment and targeting beneficiaries. Monitoring by delegates paid off in better performance. However, money spent on delegates cannot be used for relief items. Despite this, if monitoring leads to better relief response quality, more accurate targeting of vulnerable beneficiaries and easier access to funds, it can be the most efficient way forward. The donor governments and ECHO requirements on reporting are high. VNRC does not yet have the capacity to meet these requirements.

There are no clear benchmarks for efficiency, but in comparison to other relief programs, the ratio of delegates to volume of relief appears to be reasonably balanced.

Efficiency could possibly have been increased if all EU PNS or the FRC and SRC had also formed a consortium and employed only one delegate and more national staff. However, forming consortia takes time and requires additional coordination mechanisms. Also, the more parties in a consortium, the longer it can take to come to agreement and the more complicated the coordination. This could adversely affect efficiency. Nonetheless, an advantage for consortia would be that VNRC HQ would have to deal with one less partner, which could ease pressure on them.

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\(^{59}\) Interviews #9 and #53 | \(^{60}\) Interviews #53 | \(^{61}\) Interviews #12; #23; #53
5. Conclusions And Lessons Learned

5.1. Conclusion

5.1.1. Response relevance and appropriateness

Relevance

The typhoons’ impacts clearly justified a response from VNRC, IFRC and PNS. The response was largely based on the many years of relief experience held by VNRC and its RC Partners. The VNRC cash distribution program supported by the AmCross was a very innovative response in the context of Vietnam.

The Vietnamese socio-economic environment has changed significantly over the years. Local capacity and the capacity to cope with disasters in many households have been improved. These contextual changes require changes in the disaster response.

The total damage of the two typhoons is estimated by the Vietnamese Government at 1,151 million USD. This means that the value of the RC response is only about 1% of the damage. The majority of recovery efforts have been carried out by the households, communes, districts, provinces and national government themselves. The limited amount of RC support becomes relevant only if VNRC is able to identify and assist those households who really need support to cope with the disaster.

Based on our findings, we conclude that the RC response was relevant for half the beneficiaries. That leaves the other half for which the response was of limited relevance or, for some, not relevant at all64. In particular, the rice distribution was helpful to assist households in overcoming a difficult period between harvests. The rice served as a cash substitute since beneficiaries would have purchased the rice anyway65. In addition, the AmCross supported cash program demonstrated the potential of unconditional cash transfers in the early recovery phase of the disaster66.

Appropriateness

The relief items distributed were all appropriate for the Vietnamese rural population. The only questionable item was the water purification tablets (Aqua Tabs) because the rural household kits distribution conducted by VNRC in Kon Tum province.

4.11. Resource mobilization

VNRC was able to mobilize a variety of resources, as were the Provincial Chapters62. In addition, local companies quickly made resources available enabling a fast response, although limited in quantity.

Key finding 34: VNRC and the Provincial Chapters were able to mobilize a variety of resources.

4.12. Learning cycles

Several Provincial Chapters mentioned that in the past, meetings were held in which all Provincial Chapters came together to review the relief operation and discuss lessons learned63. The same process could be repeated at the provincial level where the district chapters and commune chapters could meet. At the national level there could be a learning event among VNRC HQ, IFRC and PNS.

Key finding 35: Systematic learning through meetings was applied in the past, but has not consistently been included in this relief response.
population is insufficiently familiar with its application. The primary problem concerning the relief items was related to timeliness and targeting. Relief items such as plastic sheets, household kits, water tanks, and water filters were relevant in the early days of the disaster for specific households. Bottom-up needs and field assessment, reporting systems and monitoring of changing needs are necessary to ensure that the right households get the right items at the right time. For this disaster, the relevant time frame for the distribution of certain items was short, at most one week to a month. In other disasters, such as the Mekong flooding, this time frame can be much longer.

5.1.2. Response effectiveness

The targets for quantities of relief items to be distributed and number of households reached have largely been met. From this perspective, the program has been very effective. Most of the beneficiary households which received relief items were within the criteria set by VNRC. There were no distribution deadlines set in the proposals, except for program length. The Red Cross Movement targets the most vulnerable and vulnerable people. This was not explicitly mentioned in all program objectives. Flexible interpretation of the selection criteria made it possible to target households which were marginally vulnerable. The evaluation team estimated this to be the case for half the households covered.

5.1.3. Response efficiency

The evaluation team is of the opinion that the ratio of delegates’ expenditures to relief items was reasonably balanced, compared to other relief programs. Intensive monitoring and technical support pays off in better performance. Efficiency could possibly have been increased if all EU PNS or the FRC and SRC had also formed a consortium and employed only one delegate and more national staff.

More efficiency could be achieved by prioritizing only the most affected and poorest provinces. This could reduce monitoring time by VNRC HQ, IFRC and PNS. At the same time, it could increase effectiveness by targeting those most in need. In this case, care should be taken to avoid overlap so that no poor affected households are left behind in other provinces.

5.2. Lessons learned

5.2.1. Needs assessments

It is essential to systematically assess the needs of the affected population and to differentiate between the urgent humanitarian needs (early days of the disaster), short-term needs (three months) and recovery needs.

Assessing needs based on damage figures gives insufficiently accurate information. The VNRC Disaster Preparedness Manual has a chapter on disaster information and reporting, which includes formats for reporting damage and needs. As the Quang Tri chapter demonstrates, it is possible for commune RCs to report on needs.

The Disaster Preparedness Manual has been used for training, but so far no decision has been taken on how to apply the information and reporting system presented in the manual. Provincial Chapters are unlikely to introduce these systems if they are not officially approved by VNRC HQ.

There is still the need to cross check needs assessments carried out by VNRC Provincial Chapters. PNS and IFRC are able to mobilize resources for needs assessments jointly with VNRC HQ and are able to participate in multi-stakeholder JAT initiatives. There were no prior agreements among RC stakeholders linked to JAT on how to cooperate on the needs assessments. Such agreement could create more synergy in the future. The increased coping mechanisms in Vietnam require more attention to local available capacity than in the past. It is essential to differentiate between urgent needs in the early days of the disaster (emergency phase), short-term relief needs (e.g. three months) and recovery needs. While in the past, household kits could still be a short-term or recovery need; nowadays, household kits were mainly needed in the early days after the disaster and especially useful for households that lost their belongings. In general, the coping mechanisms of households have become strong enough to obtain such essential items within a period of three months.

PNS and IFRC should respond to urgent needs only, if the relief items can be delivered within a few days after the hazard. PNS who do not have the capacity to respond fast can focus instead on responding to short-term or early recovery needs and strengthening the VNRC disaster preparedness capacity.
5.2.2. Coordination

Although IFRC and PNS were able to coordinate their efforts, avoid overlap and develop a largely coherent approach, time could be saved by agreeing on coordination mechanisms before the disaster season.

It is possible to agree on geographical and sectoral division, support the same type, quality and ratio of relief items and use the same criteria for beneficiary selection. There are still a few issues which need clarification, such as the financial management requirements for Provincial Chapters or the requirement of ID numbers on beneficiary lists.

In addition, the coordination mechanisms agreed upon by the RC stakeholders should link to standard operational procedures for international support.

5.2.3. Standard operational procedures

It is important to have overall standard operational procedures, endorsed by VNRC, IFRC and PNS, which are updated annually.

There are various guidelines and procedures from earlier operations and a manual on disaster preparedness. However, they are not part of an overall endorsed system to respond to disasters. The lack of mutually agreed standard operational procedures made it necessary to come to agreement over many issues, which could have been agreed before the disaster season.

5.2.4. Targeting

Vulnerability and poverty are strongly related in Vietnam. Poverty is clearly linked to the ability to recover after a hazard. Being directly affected by disaster and poverty are two essential criteria for selecting beneficiary households. This is not yet clearly reflected in the current beneficiary selection criteria. For example, the current list provides opportunities for local communes to select affected beneficiaries who are not poor or vulnerable.

5.2.5. Community meetings

Community meetings can improve transparency and beneficiary accountability.

Community meetings to select beneficiaries can increase transparency and accountability. The preparation of a proposed beneficiary list prior to the meeting can reduce overall meeting time, yet still serve its purpose, provided that all affected villagers are invited and the proposed list truly can be changed. For these meetings to be most successful, meeting guidelines require further development and meetings need to be more closely monitored by all levels.

5.2.6. Cash programme

Cash distribution can be a good alternative to the distribution of relief and livelihood items.

The AmCross program showed that under certain conditions cash distributions can be a good alternative to the distribution of relief and livelihood items. The AmCross cash program external evaluation concludes “The unconditional cash transfers have served their intended purpose allowing some of the poorest and most vulnerable rural households in Vietnam to meet their basic food and other immediate needs in the post-disaster/emergency context.”

VNRC has proven that it is capable of implementing cash distributions, although there are areas for improvement. Cash transfers are not always appropriate for all situations. Households in remote mountain areas might prefer relief items because of limited market availability. Cash distributions need a market analysis before implementation.

Refer to Key findings #6 | Refer to Key findings #14 | Refer to Key findings #13 | Rastall R. Programme Final Evaluation Report, Post Typhoon Ketsana Cash Transfers in Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces
5.2.7. Distribution system

The distribution system functions well and does not need adaptations. Distribution guidelines can be included in the standard operation procedures of VNRC.

5.2.8. Monitoring indent

Monitoring changing needs is as important as monitoring the relief operation implementation. Monitoring changing needs requires the possibility to change the operation’s objectives or activities. For example, monitoring outcomes could suggest the procurement of construction materials would be more useful than plastic sheets.

A safe, formal complaints system does not yet exist at VNRC. Such systems are increasingly recognised internationally as tools to improve quality, transparency and accountability since it involves beneficiaries in program monitoring. A first step could be to create awareness among VNRC staff of the benefits of complaint mechanisms and beneficiary accountability in general.

5.2.9. Capacity building

Strengthening the response capacity of Provincial Chapters pays off. The capacity of Provincial VNRC Chapters to respond to the disaster themselves and raise funds locally has increased significantly over the last 10 years. The Provincial Chapters’ response with their own resources was much more timely than international support. Past local capacity-building efforts had a positive impact on local response. By strengthening VNRC to respond to urgent needs in the early days of a disaster, the international support could focus more on short-term and recovery needs in the future.

VNRC’s stock was limited. Certain relief items such as plastic sheets, household kits, and water filters are urgent humanitarian needs. These can only be supplied in a timely manner if they are available in stock for immediate release.

There is the dilemma regarding the requirement to launch an Appeal in a few days and the requirement for thorough needs assessments and consultation processes at all levels, which take time. If the VNRC disaster preparedness capacity is sufficiently strengthened to take care of urgent needs, possibly with support from DREF, than there is less need to launch an immediate Appeal. Potential donors could be alerted to a forthcoming Appeal by information bulletins so as not to lose momentum.

5.2.10. Consortia

PNS consortia can work well. The consortia between NLRC and GRC worked well and proved that a two-party consortium does not create major difficulties when responding to short-term and recovery needs. The technical cooperation between GRC and ARC in establishing the water treatment unit was also considered as an effective and positive mechanism to timely provide clean water to the affected population as well as to direct, inform subsequent activities, and refocus on priorities in the recovery phase.

78 Refer to Key finding #28
6. Recommendations

6.1. Coordination mechanisms

VNRC, IFRC and PNS should agree on disaster response coordination mechanisms, roles and responsibilities before each typhoon season.

With regard to coordination meetings, VNRC, IFRC and PNS must agree on the following: frequency of meetings, which organisation will take the lead, and which staff members will be required to attend.

There is the need for at least one meeting prior to the typhoon and flood season, one meeting if a typhoon approaches Vietnam, frequent and short meetings in the disaster emergency phase and weekly meetings in the disaster relief phase.

Prior to each typhoon season, SOP should be updated and an inventory should be taken of each organization’s capacity to mobilize financial resources and technical assistance specified for urgent and short-term needs and for recovery. Although the IFRC delegation and PNS will not be able to make firm support commitment, it should be possible to agree in advance in which sectors (e.g. Water and Sanitation), geographical areas and disaster phases the PNS will prepare funding proposal(s). PNS that do not have the capacity to mobilize resources urgently could agree to support only early recovery and livelihood recovery efforts.

The EU PNS delegations and their HQs need to agree on how to approach ECHO for funding and to consider the formation of consortia.

VNRC, IFRC and PNS need to agree on roles and responsibilities for needs assessment immediately after a disaster in order to identify urgent needs in affected areas and a second field visit to assess short-term and livelihood needs. This needs assessment must be linked to DMWG initiatives. Prior to the disaster season, the draft TORs for needs assessments and tools (guidelines) to be used should be agreed.

The above coordination mechanism could be agreed in the short term in meeting minutes without a formal MOU. In the long term, it is advisable to develop a MOU in line with the Seville Agreement and annex to “Supplementary Measures to Enhance the Implementation of the Seville Agreement”. This agreement deals with roles, responsibilities and coordination mechanisms among the different emergency response components of the RC movement. The supplement states that a MoU regarding respective roles and responsibilities at country level needs to be established, whenever there are various components working in a given country, in order to promote coherent working practice and understanding of the roles and responsibilities already elaborated in the Statutes of the Movement and Seville Agreement.

6.2. Standard operating procedures

VNRC should develop SOP for international support.

Existing guidelines, procedures, common undocumented practices, manuals and recent lessons learned could be integrated into one SOP for VNRC relief and early recovery response with international support. The SOP could include the following:

Assessments

- Needs Assessments, by VNRC at all levels and jointly with IFRC, PNS linked to DMWG

Targeting

- Province, district and commune selection criteria
- Beneficiary selection criteria and process, noted in detailed guidelines, for each relief item and disaster phase

Response Action

- Distribution systems
- Standardization of type, quality and quantity per household for essential relief items
- Pre-stock arrangements and release procedures
- Cash distribution guidelines

Roles and Responsibilities

- Roles and responsibilities of VNRC HQ departments and response teams
- Procedures for deployment, roles and responsibilities for National Disaster Response Team
- Role of IFRC and PNS in monitoring response and technical support for VNRC and communication with VNRC
Support procedures

- Resource mobilization procedures
- Communication procedures
- Logistics procedures
- Financial management, reporting and monitoring

Evaluation and monitoring

- Information flows, reporting and monitoring
- Procedure for annual update of SOP and Evaluation and Learning Cycle
- Preparations for next typhoon and flood season

The VNRC Disaster Preparedness Manual and the Needs Assessment Manual from 2001 can be used as sources for developing the SOP. The information from these manuals needs to be updated due to the changing context and increased insights. Many have been trained with the DP manual and are familiar with its content. In the short term, it is advisable to prioritize those areas which need to be improved, rather than developing a comprehensive SOP, covering all areas including non-documented procedures which are working fine.

It is too early to include complaint mechanism procedures in the SOP, but it is advisable to increase awareness among VNRC DM staff of the structure and benefits of possible complaint mechanisms.

6.3. Relief items versus disaster preparedness and recovery

IFRC and PNS are advised to support less relief items during response and focus instead on more disaster preparedness, cash and livelihood recovery.

Instant noodles, plastic sheets, household kits, water tanks and water filters are relief items most needed in the disaster emergency phase, which often lasts from a few days to four weeks. The items are best pre-stocked in small quantities to support households with immediate needs. It is only possible to distribute these items in the early days of a disaster if they are pre-stocked at strategic points or are purchased by the Provincial Chapters with their own contingency funds or funds such as DREF. PNS and IFRC are advised not to plan for urgently-needed relief item distributions, unless fast delivery is possible or assessments confirm that these needs will remain over a longer period, e.g. in response to Mekong floods.

The AmCross cash support evaluation shows that under certain conditions, cash can be a good alternative to relief or early recovery items. VNRC, IFRC and PNS are advised to expand cash distributions in response to the next disaster. However, it is too early to expand on a large scale. AmCross has given significant technical support and intensively monitored the cash program. IFRC and PNS will have to do the same until VNRC (and IFRC and PNS) has sufficient expertise in this area. This must be built up gradually.

Rice distributions can continue in future similar disasters until cash distributions are well institutionalized in VNRC. Rice can function as a cash substitute and is an alternative for cash distributions. It is advised to consider distributing 10 kg per household member in 10 kg bags to reduce feelings of unfairness at the lower level and facilitate easier preparation of beneficiary lists. The evaluation team advises gradually reducing rice distributions and shifting to more cash and livelihood support in future disasters. If rice is given, the gaps between the different harvests need to be better taken into account for distribution planning. Once the cash distributions have become more routine, only the most vulnerable or vulnerable households in more remote areas could be supported with rice. This is in line with SPHERE standards. Small quantities of rice distribution in response to urgent needs in the early days of a disaster are best left to Provincial Chapters using their own resources or DREF.

Roof sheets, construction materials or livelihood support, such distribution of seeds, fertilizers, cows, pigs and fishing equipment can be good alternatives to relief item distributions. Beneficiaries and PCs often expressed the need for these items in interviews conducted by the evaluation team. PNS could decide to prioritize this support in future disasters and leave the urgent relief items to be provided by IFRC or other PNS with more experience and capacity to respond quickly. This type of support must be carefully planned and implemented in a timely manner with local procurement in the provinces. Distribution of the wrong seeds, for example, can lead to a new disaster for farmers. Other rehabilitation activities could be considered, such as a micro-projects program in which a commune identifies and takes responsibility for implementing small community-based rehabilitation activities, e.g. the rehabilitation of village water supply.
6.4. National Disaster Response Team

VNRC HQ has insufficient staff at the Social Welfare and Disaster Management to carry out thorough needs assessments, provide sufficient technical support to Provincial Chapters and to monitor disaster response. More staff is available at the Provincial Chapters. Rarely there are more than one third of Vietnam’s provinces affected by disasters. This means that staff from non-affected Provincial Chapters could be mobilized to support the response. Establishing a NDRT could address the VNRC HQ staff shortage.

The evaluation team suggests keeping the NDRT responsibilities limited. The main responsibilities for disaster response should remain at VNRC HQ and at the Provincial Chapters as they will remain in charge of the response. The Provincial Chapters are capable of quickly distributing relief items and many other response activities. There is no need for the NDRT to take over such functions. The team’s main role and responsibilities could be in the following the areas:

- Needs assessments
- Targeting beneficiaries
- Monitoring the implementation

Further, the team could provide technical support to the provinces for response planning and implementation and (self) evaluation at the end of the operation. The NDRT could also advise on updates to the SOP.

The team can take over functions which are now implemented by IFRC and PNS delegates and national staff and potentially reduce the need for PNS delegates and national staff.

Establishing such a team requires a well-defined TOR with clear reporting lines. One staff member at SWDM should be responsible for the team mobilization and support. NDRT funding needs to be arranged. For example, VNRC could cover its day-to-day costs, but IFRC finance its mobilization in times of disasters.

NDRT members could be recruited from the 100 VNRC core disaster management trainers. Member qualifications need to be defined and an assessment for the selection among candidates will be required. A group of 20 members from all geographical areas would be sufficient. Depending on the disaster’s size, six to 12 members could be mobilized to work in teams of three. The group requires training and on-job-training in the first assignments.

6.5. Targeting

VNRC is advised to increase the effectiveness of beneficiary targeting by improving the guidelines and including poverty more explicitly as a selection criterion.

Improved targeting starts with improving the selection of provinces, districts and communes. While covering urgent needs in the early phase of a disaster it is still justified for all affected geographical areas, there is a need to include poverty in the selection criteria for early recovery, e.g. the distribution of rice, cash and livelihood support. The ability to recover is strongly related to poverty. Priority needs to be given to those provinces, districts and communes which include most of the affected, poor households. This information is available from the GSO. UNDP has proposed a new format for damage assessment by CCFSC and this includes poor households affected as one of the indicators. Next to the disaster impact and poverty criteria, the support of other organisation should remain a selection criterion.

Beneficiary selection guidelines need to be more clearly defined. This will facilitate the selection of beneficiaries. Vulnerability is difficult to assess, but households that still own certain assets after a disaster could be excluded from receiving relief items in the early recovery phase.
6.6. Communication and logistics

The logistic team and SWDM department must streamline their communication and agree on what essential information is always communicated to each other. The same has to be done between VNRC HQ, Provincial Chapters, PNS HQs and PNS field offices.

More relief items, such as plastic sheets and household kits, need to be stocked at strategic points under VNRC HQ and under provincial chapter control, to be used in their province or other provinces on request. VNRC HQ and the Provincial Chapters are advised to release these items immediately and not wait till they are replenished. PNS are encouraged to actively build up this stock and replenish items when necessary. Pre-arrangement with suppliers to keep stock of instant noodles could be explored again.

IFRC and PNS are advised to always select independent, internationally-recognised quality control agents for rice purchases and other large quantities of relief items.

6.7. Strengthen disaster response capacity

In the past, capacity building has focused primarily on disaster preparedness training. Training is a valuable instrument to strengthen capacity, but rarely sufficient alone. In addition, disaster response procedures and guidelines that are owned by VNRC and are accepted by supporting IFRC and PNS must be developed. These can be based on existing documents and lessons learned. The development of SOP is the first priority. More training is not a priority.

Training can then be implemented if there are insufficient skills and/or knowledge to implement the SOP. Training needs to be linked to practice and be part of the learning cycle. If possible, PNS are advised to support the strengthening of disaster response capacity as one of their disaster response program objectives. Program evaluations and “lessons learned” workshops could be included as part of all response programs.

The Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction initiatives could be better linked to strengthening communes’ disaster response capacity in line with the VNRC SOP. Relief program evaluations conclude often that the response immediately after a disaster by local organisations and the people themselves is more important to saving lives and reducing human suffering than the support provided by the international community. This evaluation is no exception. IFRC and PNS are encouraged to continue strengthening the response capacity of the provincial, district and commune chapters and to support community-based disaster risk reduction. This evaluation did not review the impact of early warning, evacuations and search and rescue efforts at the local level, but it was clear that in some communes visited, the early, local actions in which the RC participated saved many lives.
Annexes

Annex I: Methodology

Data collection:
The review/evaluation will include visits to the provinces of Quang Tri, Da Nang, Quang Ngai and Phu Yen and 9 district and 19 communes. The evaluation team used mainly qualitative research methods to collect information and a household survey for quantitative information.

Secondary information review: The team reviewed the Appeal, programme proposals, ECHO applications, progress reports and the evaluation report of the VNRC cash programme supported by AmCross. This was prior and during the evaluation.

Data collection and field survey was implemented all program’s levels with observation, interviews, focus group discussion with participation of staff at central, provinces, district and commune levels.

- **Key Informant Interviews** (semi-structured and in depth interview – IDI): The key-informants were the provincial and district VNRC staff and commune volunteers involved in the project’s implementation; other key informants were the chairmen of CSFC committees at these levels. At the central level the key informants were the representatives, delegates and staff of VNRC, IFRC and PNS and other stakeholders such as members of the CCSFC, FF staff and UNDP staff responsible for disaster response coordination. The most important key-informants were the programme beneficiaries. Most of the beneficiaries interviewed were Women.

- **Focus Group Discussions** (FGD): a FGD was organized with representatives of the Red Cross, PC and other members of CFSC in each of the 19 communes. In 14 communes FGD were held with groups of about 10 beneficiaries. Topic discussed included impact of the disasters on their live, involvement in needs assessment, appropriateness and timeliness of the relief items, priorities of relief items, the beneficiaries selection process and fairness, involvement of beneficiaries in need assessments, participation in monitoring vulnerability and recovery

- **Observation**: The existence and physical status of the more durable relief items distributed was observed. Especially the team observed whether the items were used or not.

- **Household Survey**: The team prepared a questionnaire for structured interviews among beneficiaries. The questions focuses on vulnerability (socio-economic background), timeliness and relevance for each of the relief items distributed, participation in the selection process and visibility. It was planned to mobilize Youth Volunteers for the survey, but this was not possible. In each of the provinces 5 Red Cross volunteers were instructed during 3 hours to conduct the survey. This included a role play to practice interviewing. This brief training helped, but did not make them professional interviewers. When monitoring the volunteers in the field, the team noted that the volunteers not always observed the use of items. The beneficiaries tend to please the donors and that influences their answers. The volunteers had insufficient skills to get unbiased answers. The team members interviewed a number of beneficiaries themselves for a better understanding and to counterbalance the possible bias.

Sampling: The provinces, districts and communes for the field visits were elected in consultation with VNRC Headquarters, IFRC and VNRC taking into consideration logistical and time constraints. The Provincial and District Chapters were not involved in the selection. The selection of the beneficiaries was made at random from the beneficiary lists.

Historic information: The international consultant worked for several assignments for VNRC and IFRC in the period 1998 – 2001. This made it possible to compare the present situation with 10 years ago.

Meeting: A half-day meeting was held on July 7 to share the findings of the review with VNRC HQ, IFRC and PNS staff in Hanoi and representatives of IFRC in Bangkok

Team composition
The Team of Consultants included the following members:

1. Henk Tukker Team Leader/ CBDRM Specialist
2. Ngo Cong Chinh Team Member/ CBDRM Specialist
3. Vu Thi Phuong (Ms) Team Member/ VNRC staff

Ms Nguyen Dieu Linh joined the team as translator in the field.

The team split the field work. Team 1 consisting of Chinh and Phuong went to Gia Lai and Phu Yen, while team 2, Henk and Linh visited Da Nang, Quang Ngai and Quang Tri Provinces.

Schedule: The evaluation was carried out between 5 June and 9 July 2010.
Annex ii: Household Survey Results

Methodology

In all five provinces a household survey was conducted by five RC volunteers. The volunteers interviewed more than 500 households who benefited from the relief distribution. Most of the results of the survey are in line with the in-depth interviews and focused group discussions with beneficiaries.

General household information

According to the survey results, in responding to the question “What does your household have: electricity, clean water, TV, telephone, motorbike?”, there are 98.2% of respondents having electricity, 75.4% having clean water, 83.9% having TV, 67.1% having telephone, and 69.9% having motorbike. Overall, a majority of the responses are “yes” to the question meaning that most of surveyed households who received supported from Red Cross are in better-off conditions.

Furthermore, out of 470 surveyed households, only 270 are on the poverty list accounting for 57.4% of the households which received Red Cross’s emergency support. The beneficiary selection criteria consider poverty is one of the priorities to receive relief items. From the survey results, out of 440 surveyed households, 395 have farming land or equivalent to 89.8% of the households.
**Housing conditions**

In answering the question “What kind of house do you own: temporary, brick or 2 floors house?” there are 44.19% of the beneficiaries households have a temporary house, 54.6% having a brick house, and 0.8% having a house with 2 floors and up. The temporary house means a house made of weak materials such as bamboo, palm leaf, soil, or coconut leaf, but the team observed that the interviewers also ticked as temporary houses, that were made of bricks, but less durable. The brick house means a house made of brick, concrete, and tile. The 2-floor house means a house made of concrete and having more than one floor. Overall, the housing conditions of the households received Red Cross’s assistance with difficult housing condition taking more than 50% of the total surveyed households.

**No labour force**

Findings collected from the survey on no labour force in the household shows that generally, most of families received supports from Red Cross having an elderly (accounting for 69.3%), or having a child (accounting for 74.6%), or having a disabled person (accounting for 17.3%) of the respondents. Other vulnerability criteria are not very prominent in these families with only 3.9% are pregnant women, 9.8% are breastfeeding, and 24.3% are injured by disasters or being sick for a long period.
Affects of disasters to households

According the survey, responding to the question “Was your family affected by the typhoons? There are 31.9% of respondents answered having been affected by the Typhoon Ketsana, 27.3% affected by the Typhoon Mirinae, and 36.9% affected by both typhoons. The percentage of households affected by both typhoons is high causing more difficulties for these households to recover from the disasters. There is very interesting finding that among 520 surveyed households, there are 20 families who did not affect by disasters but still received Red Cross’s supports (accounting for 3.8%). This can be an error during the interview process that will need further investigation to clarify. The team did not meet beneficiaries, who were not affected by the disaster.

In terms of damages caused by typhoons to households, there are a majority of families have lost their rice paddy totally (75.5%), lost other crops (72.95), animals (59.1%), HH items (45.5%), educational kits (43.5%), and farming tools (34.5%).

While the typhoons caused only few deaths (6 or 2.5%) and some injures (10 or 4.1%), they caused a serious damage in terms of housing and agriculture to these families with 81.8% houses flooded, 45.9% houses collapsed, and 75.5% rice paddy flooded. From the teams own interviews we met with many households that lost there roofs, but only one case of a household whose house collapsed completely.
In response to the question “What are the most needed items/assistance after the disaster hit your household?”, there is a majority of respondents said they needed rice (89.3%) while there is smaller percentage of respondents said they needed Household Kits or fertilizer or house building materials (53.9%, 55.5% and 58.7% respectively), and a much smaller percentage of respondents said they needed plastic sheets (31.1%) or clothes (20.5%). The questionnaire did not make a difference between short term and longer term needs. The team findings were that household kits are a priority for people, if they really lost household kits and the items were not yet available on the market. In the early recovery phase, household kits are not a priority.

**Beneficiary selection and relief distribution**

Relating to the questions about the process of beneficiary selection and relief distribution, a very high response rate of respondents said they participated in the hamlet (or village) beneficiary selection meeting (accounting for 90%). It is quite contradictory with the in-depth interview and discussion with beneficiary representative that there is a much lower percentage of people confirmed they participated in these meeting.

Similarly, a question about the fairness of the beneficiary selection process, there is a very high percentage of respondents (accounting for 91%) said they think it was a fair process to select the beneficiaries of the Red Cross’s assistance. There is only 1.7% of respondents said it was not a fair process and 7.3% respondents said they do not know.
The response to the question about the overall assessment of the beneficiary selection and relief distribution process shows that 37.1% said they are very satisfactory, 57.6% satisfactory, 3.1% quite satisfactory, and 1.2% not satisfactory.

In terms of the project visibility, among 100% of respondents, there are 93.8% said they knew where the support coming from. Among them, 80% said the supports come from VNRC and 20% said from IFRC.
Overall, a majority of respondents are satisfied with the rice distribution in terms of the type and quantity. According the survey, responding to the question “Are you satisfied with the kind of rice you received?”, there are 48,9% said they are very satisfied with the type of rice they received from Red Cross, 42,9% satisfactory, 7,2% quite satisfactory, and only 1,1% not satisfactory.

In terms of quality of rice distributed, there are 48,1% said they are very satisfied with the type of rice they received from Red Cross, 42,8% satisfactory, 6,9% quite satisfactory, and only 2,1% not satisfactory.

When the respondents asked about the time of rice distribution by Red Cross, there are 85,6% said it was timely while there are 14,4% said it was late. Among 55 respondents said that rice was distributed late, there are 92,6% said it was quite late and 7,4% said it was too late.

Fig. 14: Quality of rice?
Fig. 15: Kind of rice?
Fig. 16: Was rice distributed timely?
HH kits distribution

In terms of HH kits distribution, the survey results are very contradictory to the discussion with beneficiaries, IDI and observation that 100% of respondents said they used the HH kits provided by Red Cross. Almost 100% said that they are satisfied with each item in the HH kit such as water container 40L (99.5%), water container 10L (97.4%), water boiling kettle (99%), sauce pan (99.5%), water bucket (99%), blanket (97.6%), and mosquito net (96.1%). There is only one item that did not meet people’s satisfaction if the soap (only 65% satisfactory). The reason is that 12 out of 183 respondents said they did not receive soap or soap was not included in the HH kit.

Plastic sheets distribution

Surprisingly, a majority of respondents said that they are very satisfied with the plastic sheet distribution (accounting for 81.8%). There are also a majority said that they are happy with the quantity they received from Red Cross (accounting for 93.9%) and 100% said they are happy with the size of the plastic sheets.
However, then they are asked about the distribution time, there is a significant percentage of respondents said the plastic sheets were distributed to them late (accounting for 25.3%). Of which, there are 75% respondents said it was distributed quite late.

In responding to the question of what did they do with the plastic sheets, out of 111 responses, there are 55 people said they used plastic sheets to cover the house roof (accounting for 50%), 27 used to cover the house walls (24.3%), and for other purpose such as rice drying, animal cages (26%).

**Water tanks, jerry cans, water filters and water purification tablets.**

The number of respondents in the household survey sample who received water storage or purification relief items was too small for analysing the data.
The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

**Humanity**
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

**Impartiality**
It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

**Neutrality**
In order to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

**Independence**
The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

**Voluntary service**
It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

**Unity**
There can be only one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

**Universality**
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies promotes the humanitarian activities of National Societies among vulnerable people.

By coordinating international disaster relief and encouraging development support it seeks to prevent and alleviate human suffering.

The International Federation, the National Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross together constitute the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.